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The Signature Poetics of Sharon Olds and John Cage 
Walter E. Lewallen 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation studies and applies the signature theory of Jacques Derrida to 
two American poets, Sharon Olds and John Cage. I begin by looking at the two texts by 
Derrida that most closely apply signature theory to poetics: Glas and Signsponge. Along 
the way, I narrow the scope of Derrida’s writing somewhat by focusing on 
psychoanalytic aspects that relate to Jacques Lacan’s ideas and to the concept of the 
superego. From this work I isolate some protocols for reading, which are then used to 
study Olds and Cage, two poets who have clearly developed their own signature styles. 
Here are the protocols: 
1. Treat Olds’ and Cage’s texts as blazons. 
2. Read for anthonomasia—Derrida’s neologism combining the words 
anthology and antonomasia (the trope of using proper nouns as 
common nouns and vice versa).  
3. Look for (and practice) hypogram and anagram. 
4. Trace the placement in abyss. 
5. Post-death-of-the-author, read and write for and as if mourning.  
6. Eat the proper names, continuing whatever encryption of the letters 
can already be read.  
 
My studies of Olds and Cage alternate between application of these protocols and my 
attempt to follow the respective laws of their own signatures. In Olds’ poetry the most 
prominent signature effect is the encryption of the Sh-effect. Cage’s poetics places his 
rebus-signature in the abyss of his texts. 
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Chapter One 
Signature: Protocol 
Introduction 
 Jacques Derrida’s reputation among American literary scholars has largely to do 
with deconstruction and the role that term plays in poststructuralism. Three of Derrida’s 
early books, Writing and Difference (1967), Of Grammatology (1967), and Margins of 
Philosophy (1972) are more or less canonized in the American literary establishment, and 
a few of the essays contained in them are usually anthologized in readers designed for 
literary theory courses. Derrida’s theory of the signature comes on the second wave of his 
texts and ideas, taking up and developing certain ideas present in the prior works. Those 
aspects of the signature theory that interest me the most come embedded in two texts, 
Glas (1974) and Signéponge/Signsponge (1977). Glas focuses on the German 
philosopher G. W. F. Hegel and the French writer Jean Genet, and Signsponge is devoted 
to the French poet Francis Ponge. It is likely that Derrida’s works, among those of 
theorists in general, have had the single greatest influence on the contemporary theories 
of Anglo-American literature, but while the later projects (roughly from Glas onward) 
have influenced Anglo-American literary studies, it is generally thought that the “basics” 
of Derrida’s work should be grasped through the early texts. In my view, the difficulty of 
all these texts persists, no matter the order of approach. Many of the later texts and 
interviews seem at least as useful as the early texts for looking at issues of poetics and 
literature in general. 
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Derrida’s work is interdisciplinary in radical ways, and his theory of the signature 
is typically complex for this reason. Geoffrey Hartman explains:  
Derrida’s mind is so assimilative (“reprosuctive,” he puns, benefiting from a slip 
of the pen) that neither literature nor philosophy nor the sciences of man or of the 
mind can be identified as exclusive sources. Indeed, his very understanding of 
writing (“écriture”) rejects such source-hunting in favor of a more comprehensive 
haunting. (xviii) 
 
Nevertheless my work will go against the grain of this haunting because I am particularly 
interested in the roles that psychoanalysis and the work of Jacques Lacan play in 
Derrida’s signature theory. The single image that best sums up this relationship is 
probably “The Ear of the Other,” a phrase that titles a collection of  “texts and 
discussions with Jacques Derrida” (as the title page announces), which are subtitled 
Otobiography, Transference, and Translation. To the extent that the theory behind the 
“ear of the other” is psychoanalytic, it is designed to let the unconscious, as theorized by 
Freud and Lacan, be heard. And up to a point, Derrida’s project draws on that of Lacan. 
One of Freud’s texts, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, models theory formation as 
autobiographical (the famous fort-da formulation arising from Freud’s observations of his 
grandson—a familial and autobiographical scene). Derrida moves orthogonally, punning 
from auto- to oto- (ear), from “self-biography” to “hearing-biography” or “ear-
biography.” Autobiography is then understood as hearing-oneself-speak: not auto-
biography because the signatory narrates, but otobiography because he tells himself the 
story of his life. Of this scene of writing, Lacanian psychoanalysis would hold that only 
another (an analyst) can discern or hear within the discourse of the speaker/writer that 
accent among the signifiers that marks the movement of the unconscious. Only the 
analyst can read the double inscription, both what is written consciously and what is 
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written through unconscious agency. Derrida translates this possibility into the realm of 
academic discourse. In “Tympan” he talks about piercing the ear of philosophy by 
listening to the discourse of philosophy with the ear of the psychoanalyst (Margins ix-
xxix).   
 Yet Lacan, like Hegel, remains logocentric within the Western tradition to the 
extent that he privileges the paternal. Derrida’s project in Glas, and the signature poetics 
implicit therein, seeks to redress the balance between the name of the father and the place 
of the mother. Genet’s writing is taken by Derrida to exemplify a mother tongue, as 
opposed to a patriarchal language of reason, exemplified in Hegel. Or in other words, 
Genet’s writing is a promotion of dissemination, a writing that would not return to the 
father. Hartman writes: 
With Derrida dissemination enters a new phase. It is now directed 
analytically—prosaically, if you wish—against the mimetic principle (the 
“collect” or “legein” of the logos) in major texts of the Western tradition. 
They are so separated from a direct logo-imitative intention by his 
deconstructive readings that they cannot be returned to the father: their 
author, or their author in heaven. Instead of converting the straying text to 
a central truth by a mode of interpretation similar to allegoresis or sacred 
parody, Derrida absolutizes the text’s “error.”  
 What emerges is an anti-allegoresis . . . . Interpretation no 
longer aims at the reconciliation or unification of warring truths. . . . For 
the movement away from the father does not lead to the redemptive 
adornment of a complementary, maternal presence, except in certain 
Jungian or mythological versions of the attack on the “masculine trinity” 
of the logos. Instead the prestige of all origins, of all ultimate sources 
(spermatic word or immaculate womb), is questioned. (51)  
 
So Derrida’s text tries to de-authorize itself. Glas endlessly theorizes the mother-text, but 
figures of actual mothers are generally withdrawn. Derrida’s anti-patrology allows the 
possibility of the “calcul” of the mother. The pun between figuring and calculating works 
in both French and English: a figuring out, a working out of the mother. He reads in 
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Genet’s corpus a signature “event” that is described as womb-like, or not just womb-like, 
but womb/tomb/labor-of-mourning-like. Furthermore Glas attempts to repeat this event, 
by placing himself, Derrida, in the womb of Genet’s text—or rather by simultaneously 
placing his signature in the womb of Genet’s text and of his own text. This event is a kind 
of death, castration of the name and signature, that breaches the boundaries of propriety. 
The text-as-event buries the signature in the womb/matrix of itself and then the funereal 
birth-labor of resurrection begins. This becomes Derrida’s excuse for what Hartman 
describes as a very cold and rational style of comedy. Glas could be called a funeral 
comedy; the word “glas” itself means the death knell. Derrida works at a distyle text, di-
style, or two-styled writing: we could say die-style, too. Not just Hegel-Genet, a totally 
improper coupling of genres, philosophy and literature, but Genet-Derrida. Besides 
following the aigle (eagle) in Hegel and the flower in Genet in Derrida’s attempt to 
discover the relation between their signatures and their texts, Derrida’s readers can also 
read Derrida putting his own name in the abyss of his text: one notable example of this is 
the derrière in his writing: a near constant thematics of the rear, butt, following, behind, 
bottom, trailing, etc. The calculus of the mother, the poetics that Derrida presents in this 
text, comes mostly from the Genet column, which mixes Derrida and Genet styles.  
Glas does not produce the mother, but asserts that a maternal calculus constitutes 
its method of textual production: Derrida writes that he is “seeking the good metaphor for 
the operation I pursue here. I would like to describe my gesture, the posture of my body 
behind this machine” (204b). What happens there in the womb of text is that the signature 
becomes the new body of the writer, the corpus or body-of-work he leaves at his death, 
not unlike the gift a mother makes of/to her child to/of the world: 
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 Stone, stele, gisant, patiently agglomerated concretion: I am 
(following) the calculus of my mother. 
 I counterband erect for her, after all, with the remain(s) of which I 
make myself a gift {je me fait cadeau}. (203b) 
 
The term “patiently agglomerated concretion” would refer to the text or corpus as a piling 
up of bits, morsels, and words—the matter of writing. A “stele” is a stone erected as a 
monument, usually with writing on it. Gisant means recumbent statue, as found at graves. 
Derrida combines or fuses together the monumental and the scene of writing. Following 
Hegel, one of Derrida’s constant arguments in Glas identifies the mother as the figure 
who constructs this scene. Derrida’s metaphorology of the mother places him against 
Genet: 
 I do not know if I have sought to understand him. But if he thought 
I had understood him, he would not support it, or rather he would like not 
to support it. What a scene. He would not support what he likes to do, 
himself. He would feel himself already entwined. Like a column, in a 
cemetery, eaten by an ivy, a parasite that arrived too late.  
 I wormed my way in as a third party, between his mother and 
himself. I gave him/her. I squealed on him/her. I made the blood {sang} 
speak. (203b) 
 
Another name for this aspect of the mother-style is the “placement in abyss,” which I will 
come to shortly. 
 
Tone 
The tone of Glas constantly balances on the grotesque. The columns are described on the 
opening page as stumps: womb/stumps. There is also a constant chewing and spitting: the 
morceling of pre-texts, emblematized on the opening page in the first words of the Genet 
column, a quote torn from some text of Genet’s:  
“what remained of a Rembrandt torn into small, very regular squares and 
rammed down the shithole” is divided in two. (1b) 
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This morceling, and the tone of it, takes place as part of the maternal poetic. From 
“seeking the good metaphor for this [textual] operation” Derrida slips to “seeking the 
good movement”:  
  What [Genet] would support with the greatest difficulty would be 
that I assure myself or others of the mastery of his text. By procuring—
they say, distyle {disent-ils}—the rule {régle} of production or the 
generative grammar of all his statements.  
   No danger stepping there {Pas de danger}. We are very far from 
that; this right here, I repeat, is barely preliminary, and will remain so. 
(No) more names, (no) more nouns. It will be necessary to return to his 
text, which watches over this text here during its play. 
 So I am seeking the good movement. Have I constructed 
something like the matrix, the womb of his text? On the basis of which 
one could read it, that is, re-produce it?  
 No, I see rather (but it may still be a matrix or a grammar) a sort of 
dredging machine. From the dis-simulated, small, closed, glassed-in cabin 
of a crane, I manipulate some levers and, from afar, I saw that (ça) done at 
Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer at Eastertime, I plunge a mouth of steel in the 
water. And I scrape {racle} the bottom, hook onto stones and algae there 
that I lift up in order to set them down on the ground while the water 
quickly falls back from the mouth. 
 And I begin again to scrape {racler}, to scratch, to dredge the 
bottom of the sea, the mother {mer}. 
 I barely hear the noise of the water from the little room. 
 The toothed matrix {matrice dentée} only withdraws what it can, 
some algae, some stones. Some bits {morceaux}, since it bites {mord}. 
Detached. But the remain(s) passes between its teeth, between its lips. You 
do not catch the sea. She always re-forms herself.  
She remains. There, equal, calm. Intact, impassive, always virgin. 
(204b-05b) 
 
This “machine” which Derrida manipulates would be the grotesque image of the poetics, 
“the generative grammar,” that he both takes from Genet and applies to Genet’s (and 
Hegel’s) texts. Or rather than taking it, he is re-born with it out of Genet’s text-womb 
where he had “wormed” his “way in as a third party” between Genet and his mother 
(203b). The new generative grammar is a hybrid. This dredge model of intertextuality 
emphasizes the mouth, and its scraping, scratching, and biting of  . . . the mother, which 
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could figure for other texts, the sea of text. In what kind of hallucinated metaphor could 
the bucket of a dredging crane be taken for a “matrix” or womb? This dredge image 
refigures a certain psychoanalytic recognition. The dredging of language, the scraping of 
words, not simply paronomasia, but the channeling and shifting of language plays at 
Lacan’s notion of signature, which I will come to shortly.  
Ulmer points out that the “movement” Derrida seeks in this passage has to do 
with cadence or rhythm as signature effect. Derrida’s caveat, “No danger stepping there,” 
disavows any mastery of Genet’s rule. Of course he has grafted Hegel and Genet 
together. As a result, his text won’t return to either one. The return comes in the water 
flowing out of the dredge-womb, and back down to the water it came out of. The rest of 
the debris goes from Hegel to Genet and Genet to Hegel.  
 This delirium of language is the aspect of Glas that most appeals to me. In some 
respects Glas attempts to turn academic discourse against itself, in line with its parody of 
phallogocentrism. Derrida is deriding and his readers are along for the ride. This is why 
we have to put up with the near obscene “objesting” as someone, I can’t remember 
whom, calls it. The pulse of Derrida’s text, the movement of language that draws me 
along, is the constant alteration of language, the (impossible) movement away from 
language by means of language. So this attraction is not for the derision, not the obscene 
turns, in themselves, but the inside-out quality of the text of which they are an aspect. 
When I read Olds and Cage, something similar in their texts, having to do with the 
signature, has been the object of my reading. Their texts attempt to move language: they 
move a lot of language and I seek the cadence of that movement in my reading. In 
Derrida’s dredge image I see this in the crunching, chewing, scraping, crushing of 
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language.  
 The particular alterity that Derrida accentuates gives us another way to hear the 
theorizing or tympanizing that takes place in the texts of Hegel and Lacan: when they put 
emphasis on the place of the father or the “name of the law of the father,” the mother’s 
voice and its law become muffled. Derrida does not try to counter-muffle the sound of the 
father, but merely to pose a stereophony or a stereography. Each page consists of two 
columns, the one on the left devoted to Hegel, the one on the right devoted to Genet. We 
can think of Glas as a pair of headphones, the speaker on the left represented by the 
Hegel column, the speaker on the right represented by the Genet column. This head-dress 
bifurcates the text and the act of reading. And the pleasure of reading Glas requires a 
hard-to-acquire taste for it. Reading the “double erection” of the two columns is 
uncomfortable as one’s attention oscillates back and forth like a shuttle, but it enables a 
logic that draws out potential alterities of both columns. Trying to read one column, one’s 
awareness is always haunted by the presence of the other column on the page. As words, 
images, ideas, events, etc. echo back and forth between the columns, the various texts of 
Genet offer a commentary on those of Hegel and vice versa. Neither side muffles or 
mutes the other side. My project has been to read Olds and Cage in a stereographic mode, 
to hear a related bifurcation in their poetries. But I am not reading Olds and Cage against 
each other, as Derrida reads Genet against Hegel. With Cage the bifurcation results from 
the extreme intertextuality of his work, specifically with James Joyce. With Olds the 
bifurcation has to do with the tension between the patronym and the given name.  
 The idea of the signature sets up a stereography. I have been trained in an 
American university setting where the baseline for reading poetry is the idea of close 
 
 
 
 9 
reading, that is, paying close attention to the text as opposed to, say, the biography of the 
author. And when I read and write about poetry, I’m trying to perform in this mode of 
close reading. Or at least I think I am. In addition to this mode, I am trying to read the 
signatures of Olds and Cage in a manner after Derrida. How do their proper names enter 
into the texts? So these are two poles or columns of my efforts, close reading in one ear 
and signature effects in the other. While close reading does not rule out attention to issues 
of the unconscious, such attention isn’t required of it either. But theorization of the 
unconscious deeply informs Derrida’s theorizations on signature. 
 
A Very Short Primer on the Unconscious 
 And what is the unconscious anyway? Here are the main theoretical points I have 
in mind. There are Freud’s two theories. First, the earlier topographical model consisting 
of three systems or places: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. Early on 
Freud theorized that the contents of the unconscious could not re-enter the conscious-
preconscious without distortion because of the dynamics of repression. Freud’s later 
structural theory of the mind presented the familiar id/ego/superego structures of agency, 
all of which have unconscious components. My study focuses on issues of the superego. 
The concept of the superego analyzes the issue of authority figures. With respect to Olds, 
this has to do with the parental imagoes, on which the self-analysis at the heart of her 
poetics depends. In the case of Cage the superego is useful in analyzing his critique of the 
aesthetic ideology of the master artist. I’ll say more about this in a moment. The concept 
of the superego seems made to order for articulating the poetics of both Olds and Cage. It 
allows a productive focus on their texts; Olds and Cage can be read as guides for dealing 
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with issues of the superego. 
Continuing with my working definition of the unconscious, there is Lacan, for 
whom the unconscious is primarily linguistic; thus, it is learned, exterior rather than 
interior. The symbolic order imposes its structure on the unconscious of the subject. In 
fact, the unconscious is the discourse of the symbolic order, i.e., the discourse of the big 
Other. Thus, it has to do with the radical alterity of language and the law, that which 
cannot be assimilated by the subject. Yet it is the “place” where speech is formulated.  
Lacan’s notions of memory and knowledge are particularly germane to the 
signature. The unconscious-as-memory consists of the semantic evolution or history of 
the individual’s signifiers. Derrida’s idea of the signature stands as a corollary to Lacan’s 
unconscious-as-memory. The signature is the idea of contract with the symbolic order 
itself. It is the most essential contract with the Other. Lacan’s idea of knowledge, savior, 
helps articulate the nature of this contract. “The unconscious is simply another name for 
symbolic knowledge insofar as it is an ‘unknown knowledge’, a knowledge which the 
subject does now know he knows” (Evans 94). Our relationship with our proper name 
and our signature tends to suffer from this condition of savior. My experiment in reading 
Olds and Cage would ask how the structure of intention works in relation to signature 
poetics. When writing becomes a conscious attempt to (un)veil one’s name in one’s 
(text’s) abyss, then what happens? And what happens when someone else tries to do this 
to the text? 
Lacan himself used the term “signature” to designate the language of delirium 
symptomatic of language beginning to speak on its own. It is savior (from and of the 
Other) taking over the speaking apparatus of the subject. Greg Ulmer goes into this 
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Lacanian underpinning of Derrida’s glas style, by reading Lacan’s third seminar, The 
Psychoses, which reviews Freud’s case study of Schreber and his sudden madness. 
Lacan’s analysis of the psychosis revolves around inner speech. Derrida famously 
translated this concern with inner speech into a critique of western philosophy. The unity 
of hearing-oneself-speak almost always defines the logos and logocentrism. Schreber’s 
case is about the loss of this unity.  
Derrida takes up Schreber’s psychosis in two key ways. First, he adopts and 
adapts Schreber’s own “calcul of the mother”: Schreber thought he needed to save the 
world “by becoming a woman and bearing God’s child" (Ulmer 39). Second, Derrida’s 
style in Glas owes much to the linguistic character of Schreber’s hallucinations. Schreber 
developed a persecution paranoia: he began to hear God persecuting him. Lacan’s work 
on Schreber theorized the language of delirium that seems to fuel Derrida’s style. The 
“root language” in which Schreber heard himself persecuted by God is key to the 
paranoid psychosis. Ulmer redacts Lacan’s reading this way: 
 In his verbal hallucinations the psychotic confuses the inside and 
the outside. What he hears comes to him not from his ears but from the 
preexisting structure of language . . . . this situation gives access to the 
“great paradox of unconscious thought” that Freud attempted to 
conceptualize, and that Lacan understands as “the thing that articulates 
itself in language” [Psychoses 128]. “This language we could call interior, 
but that adjective already falsifies everything. The so-called interior 
monologue is perfectly continuous with exterior dialogue, and it is just for 
this reason that we say that the unconscious is also the discourse of the 
Other” (Psy 128). Thinking, in short, takes place as much outside as inside 
the subject, with the permanent murmur of inner speech, producing an 
“inmixing” of the subject and the symbolic order, constituting a kind of 
“poison” against which it is the function of the ego to defend.  
 
It is precisely in the space of “the thing that articulates itself in language” that Derrida 
locates the event of the signature. Schreber’s paranoia produced this “inmixing,” his ego 
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unable to defend against it. According to Ulmer, Schreber heard himself persecuted by 
God in the mode of “a variety of agents in a ‘root language’ consisting in part of 
antiquated, euphemistic German, and fragmented, incomplete phrases” (39). This 
language of Schreber’s exemplifies what Lacan labeled “signature”: “certain words 
acquire a special accent, a density which manifests itself sometimes in the very form of 
the signifier, giving it a frankly neologistic character so striking in the productions of 
paranoia” (Psychoses 42, qtd. in Ulmer 45). Derrida’s image of the dredge is of a 
machine for producing this kind of language: “hallucinated” in some sense but not 
psychotic—“No danger stepping there” (Glas 204b).1   
 It may seem that Olds and Cage are an unlikely pair of subjects for this study. 
Their styles are completely different. Thematically, Olds often writes in a now traditional 
confessional mode. Her formal mode is not unusual, the standard short lyrical poem, 
about a page in length, exhibiting a typical free verse. Cage, on the other hand, always 
pushes the limits of form. His poems defy almost all expectations for poems. 
Thematically, they often focus on the texts of other writers by applying chance operations 
to those texts. In very different ways, however, both poets are deeply concerned with the 
unconscious. Olds’ confessionalism has to be seen largely as a work of catharsis and 
redemption. On this heading, the superego presents an excellent tool for reading her 
work, especially Lacan’s caveat concerning the obscene character of the superego—as it 
has to do with sexuality. Patriarchal structures of the signature, and specifically the fact 
that Sharon Olds is named after her father and by her father, exist through and with the 
parental structures of the superego. This issue is the primal scene of Olds’ poetry, and she 
                                                
1 Derrida’s style in Glas is also about verbal hallucination. In fact the theory of the signature works over 
issues of presence and absence via the mechanics of hallucination. When Derrida makes qualifying remarks 
about taking chances, this hallucinated style is often at stake. 
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treats it directly. Cage’s poetry, on the other hand, has none of this tone. The dynamics of 
the obscene superego play no role in his poetry. However, Cage’s experimentalism 
always seeks to escape the received ideas that govern aesthetic expectations. By 
dismantling texts, Cage opens a space for normally unconscious processes to operate. 
Those processes become the new frame for nonintentional poetic events, a framing that 
prevents or at least qualifies the formation of aesthetic superegos. For Cage, style 
identifiable with the author should be completely eliminated. The modernist doctrines of 
impersonality and intentionality are pushed to extremes in Cage’s texts. Cage’s 
intertextual poems seek out the alterity of their pre-texts, largely by reducing intentional 
structures of language. Although Cage probably wasn’t familiar with Derrida, his poetics 
would take Derrida’s “mimetology,” which I discuss below, to the limit. Cage makes it 
hard to cling to the personality of the author/composer by shifting the burden of aesthetic 
production toward the reader. Yet Cage’s texts hold to the proper names of their subjects.  
 
On the Signature: Derrida’s Work on Poetics 
 The signature theory of this dissertation draws primarily from two texts by 
Jacques Derrida. We have explored Glas a little bit. In Signsponge, Derrida treats the 
work of Francis Ponge. Both texts are signature studies. According to Gregory Ulmer, the 
“literary nature of the method used to compose Glas is explained in greatest detail in 
Signsponge, Derrida’s text on the name ‘Francis Ponge’” (“Sounding” 67), wherein 
Derrida outlines three modalities of the signature. My readings of Olds and Cage depend 
mostly on the third modality.  
 The first of these modalities is an ordinary sense of the term, “signature,” the 
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sense of authenticating the fact that the signer is the person who is writing. The second 
modality, Derrida calls “a banal and confused metaphor for the first,” “the set of 
idiomatic marks that a signer might leave by accident or intention in his product” 
(Signsponge 54)—in other words, the style of a text considered as a function of its author. 
The third modality is the poststructuralist moment in this theory of the signature, which 
Derrida follows in his own signature readings, the “general signature”, or “signature of 
the signature.” Derrida writes: 
Thirdly, and it is more complicated here, we may designate as general 
signature, or signature of the signature, the fold of the placement in abyss 
where, after the manner of the signature in the current sense, the work of 
writing designates, describes, and inscribes itself as act (action and 
archive), signs itself before the end by affording us the opportunity to 
read: I refer to myself, this is writing, I am a writing, this is writing—
which excludes nothing since, when the placement in abyss succeeds, and 
is thereby decomposed and produces an event, it is the other, the thing as 
other, that signs. (Signsponge 54) 
 
In this aspect of the signature there has been a disconnection between the signature and 
the signer. This disconnect amplifies and particularizes the structuralist notion that the 
signifier and signified only arbitrarily relate to each other. Language and writing bring 
the textual existence of the signature to the foreground of a text in ways which are not 
strictly controlled by the signer, ways which are overdetermined by the textual 
environment within which the composer works, and the signature assumes an otherness, 
an objectness apart from the identity of the signer. The signature becomes a kind of 
program within itself.  
 This event can be read in both Olds’ and Cage’s texts. In Olds’ work it is most 
obvious in the way the name Olds begins to travel as the phoneme “old” in words like 
fold, cold, and gold. More bluntly, Cage uses the image of the cage like a rebus for his 
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aesthetics of release and escape.  
 Another point to remark about this passage concerning the third modality of the 
signature is the use of heraldic terminology. Derrida extends the terms of heraldry as 
emblems for the processes that the theory of the signature organizes. The term 
“placement in abyss” denotes a small shield bearing a coat of arms, or simply a coat of 
arms, placed in the center of a larger shield or coat of arms. This then refers to a 
“structure in which the whole is represented in miniature in one of its parts” (“Coming” 
147-48; qtd. in Ulmer, “Sounding” 69). Ulmer points out that Derrida has also made 
much of the heraldic term “blazon” (coat of arms, or the proper method of depicting such 
symbols) in Glas, The Post Card (1980), and especially in Cinders (1987), where Derrida 
suggests that the punning connection from blazon to blaze and cinders may be finally the 
best metaphor for the trace (69). Thus, heraldic terms come to articulate and extend the 
theoretical thrust of Derrida’s texts as they embody the signature effects that he seeks to 
address and exercise. 
 Although the three modalities of the signature are quite dissimilar, Derrida shows 
that Ponge “is able to fold all three into a single one, or in any case combine them in the 
same scene for the same drama and the same orgasm.” Derrida’s exposition of a textual 
erotics takes on a literary quality—the metaphorology of the signature theory branches 
out into the domains of drama, sexuality, and death: 
The law producing and prohibiting the signature (in the first modality) of the 
proper name, is that, by not letting the signature fall outside the text any more, as 
an undersigned subscription, and by inserting it into the body of the text, you 
monumentalize, institute, and erect it into a thing or a stony object, but in doing 
so, you also lose the identity, the title of ownership over the text: you let it 
become a moment or a part of the text, as a thing or a common noun. The 
erection-tomb falls. Step, and stop, of man. (Signsponge 56) 
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Part of the difficulty of reading this passage (especially in translation) has to do with the 
doubleness of the word tombe in the French: the noun tombe denotes grave, tomb, or 
tombstone; the intransitive verb tomber denotes falling (over or down). In addition, the 
phrase tomber sur also means to come to some topic conversationally. Derrida exploits 
these senses of the word, letting them illustrate the textual event that relates a signature to 
a text. Writing is a kind of death in which one’s identity, in so far as it has to do with the 
proper name, is given over to the text. When the text is read, the absence of the writer 
corresponds to the absence of the dead person at his or her grave. Like the name on a 
tombstone, the signature keeps living on as long as it is read, and the memory of the 
deceased person also lives on according to the constraints of this reading. The textual 
processes are bound to the signature; the reading keeps the signature going as if the 
author is dead, whether or not he or she has died. Thus, reading constitutes a form of 
mourning. The signature falls into the grave/text and it becomes a grave itself, marking 
the absence of the author. Reading is a kind of grave visitation.  
 Derrida’s metaphorical contextualization of Ponge’s writing in the passage quoted 
above stretches the scene of writing until it illustrates what he calls the double bind and 
double band of the signature, the double movement of rising and falling related to the 
programmatic processes of life, death, and, in particular, mourning. This double 
movement consists figuratively of a death of the author and a birth of the text. The proper 
name is monumentalized as signature, erected like a tombstone, but it is also lost, given 
away with and to the text. As the proper name begins to operate at the level of common 
nouns, Ponge’s texts figuring like sponges (éponge) for instance, the countersignature 
takes place, the signature signing for itself. Derrida’s draws examples of this from 
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Ponge’s texts to show that Ponge squeezes the sponge of his name “Across the entire 
corpus” (70). For instance in “The Orange,” Ponge compares the “ignoble” sponge to the 
orange. Derrida prefaces his reading of this text by noting that in the rebus signature, “the 
metonymic or anagrammatic signature,” the thing loses or soils the proper name and 
simultaneously would soak up, retain, and hold the proper. Then Derrida crushes the two 
word-things, sponge and orange, to get the ge out so that he can pun to “ob-ge,” “two ob-
ges,” two objects which present the problem of deciding between the two things (64). The 
problem is that one of the things, the sponge, absorbs the qualities of the other, and 
becomes undecidable in itself. Which makes Derrida happy, because it characterizes the 
signature event itself, the movement between proper and common denotations of the 
words in the proper name.  
In The Seine, Derrida finds a typical example where the sponge resides fully in 
the abyss of the text: 
Solid or plastic, full of air or water, what does the sponge resemble? An 
animal swollen with water, it is, in effect, a medusa. You will find this in 
The Seine, “water,” says he, “profoundly soiled and impure”—and dirt is 
always determined between linen and water. You will find this in The 
Seine, which also sets out to describe a sort of “Genesis”: “. . . certain 
marine organisms, for example the medusa, contain more than ninety 
percent water . . .” 
 . . . . The sponge is not named in this passage. (70,72) 
When the signature falls within the text, identity and ownership of the text is lost in that 
particular signing but any signifier that somehow shares an affinity with the proper name 
may then hold up that proper name, binding to it like a bandage, banding with it to 
support or buttress it. All these senses are operative in the French word bande, which is 
also the French term for the male sexual erection; Derrida’s use of the term bande and a 
constellation of related terms also goes back to the question of tone. Glas, especially, 
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mounts a parody of phallogocentrism with its constantly inflated double bind/double 
band. The text is constantly suggesting (that it has) a hard-on.  
 Derrida’s working over of the passage cited from The Seine could be considered 
the defining moment of his poetics. According to Richard Rand, the term “placement in 
abyss” also means “the way in which the operations of reading and writing are 
represented in the text, and in advance, as it were, of any other possible reading. In ways 
that the reader can never bypass, the role itself of the reader is perpetually spelled out 
beforehand; and if the reader ever hopes to come forth with a new reading, he or she 
must, as an essential preliminary, read off the reading lesson already at work in the work 
at hand” (ix). It is as if the text presents a self-organizing poetics. Derrida argues in 
Signsponge that Ponge’s sponge represents writing itself: 
Able to hold gases or liquid alternatively, “to fill itself with wind or 
water,” the sponge is, above all else, writing. Like all things. You will fish 
this, too, out of The Seine, and we shall presently see how it is put on the 
page: “. . . in spite of the very certain non-discontinuity between thought 
and its verbal expression, as between gaseous and liquid states of matter—
the written text presents some characteristics which render it very close to 
the thing signified, in other words to objects in the external world, much in 
the same way that liquids are very close to solids.” . . . The sponge is not 
named in this passage, but as an analog to the medusa, or to any state 
intermediate between all states—an analog in this respect to the written 
text, if it can put itself into every state, and serve as an intermediary, an 
intercessor, or a universal witness—the sponge not only constitutes the 
term of an analogy (allegory or metaphor), but also constitutes, in 
addition, the very medium of all figures, metaphoricity itself. (70, 72) 
 
The way the thing works, detached from the signature in the event-abyss, becomes the 
model for writing and the emblem of (Ponge’s) poetics. The thing, the sponge in this 
case, begins to model the processes of the text. So—can anybody go out and find in the 
corpuses of our poet-subjects the thing-in-abyss that has come from the poet’s signature? 
And then read a theory of writing modeled in its operations? What are the chances of 
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this? My readings of Olds and Cage experiment with their texts in order to test Derrida’s 
“science of chance (alea)” (116). What are the chances that a proper name, a signature, 
will supply a theory of writing or a poetics of the text, that it will be locatable in the abyss 
of those texts subscribed by that signature, and that something pertinent can be said about 
the signatory?  
 
Mimetology  
 Text as monument, as tombstone, makes it possible for the proper name of the 
author to survive or live on. In Glas Derrida’s text plays with this idea. In a complex 
analogy, Derrida likens himself to a mother or wife in the cultural function of mourner at 
the funeral of a son or husband. Derrida develops this image by describing the work of 
the funeral mime: “As for the strangeness of the word, here is the end of the text that this 
very glas has not ceased to accompany, to escort or precede, or betray: ‘Where? I read 
that Rome—but maybe my memory is deceiving me—had a funeral mime? what was his 
role? Preceding the cortege, he was in charge of miming the most important facts in the 
dead man’s life when he—the deceased—was alive’” (Glas 259bi). Ulmer points out that 
“Derrida’s procedure follows that of the mourner, accompanying the body of the author’s 
work, miming in figures his celebration or decelebration of the great name. One text 
accompanies another, along side” (“Sounding” 49). Through this operation, the names of 
Hegel and Genet are carried on, and Genet’s name lives on via figures from his own 
writing, signature figures that seem ambivalent toward his mother, Camille Gabrielle 
Genet, as Derrida re-cites death and funeral scenes from Genet’s works that include 
mothers and, invariably, flowers (one French meaning of the word “genet” is 
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broomflower). Funeral Rites is remarked for this (Glas 183b). In Genet’s play The 
Balcony, it is the Madame, the “mother” of the girls in the brothel, who fears she will die 
beneath a crush of funeral flowers (Glas 48-9b). Genet’s figures figure on as Derrida 
inflates the language and rhetoric of flowers into a poetics of Glas. 
 One of Derrida’s strategies in Glas is to write as if he were such a funeral mime, 
miming not only the mime but also the mother who accompanies her husband’s body in 
the funeral procession. Hegel saw this as part of the marriage contract; it is the duty of the 
wife to write the name of the husband in stone, to save the name, “entrusting her with his 
death” (Glas 143a). This is a very Genetian activity: Genet is always writing about 
“women” who are counterfeits, i.e., transvestites. The character “Divine” in Our Lady of 
the Flowers is the most famous example. So Derrida makes it a pretense to write about 
himself—as if he were (miming) a woman. This is the calcul or ruse of the mother. 
Silently, in Signsponge, Derrida works this strategy by retracing Ponge’s play on plant 
mimesis, for which the Mimosa is named. The plant contracts when touched. The 
appearance of this action is like the grimace of a mime; hence, Mimosa’s etymology 
(136-8). Derrida links this contraction with the Pongian signature (or contract) via the 
squeezing of the sponge. Prepare to scowl or smile: “Mimosa” is also one of Genet’s 
transvestites. The silence of the mime also pleases Derrida because it goes back to a 
movement between writing and speech. The fall from speech to writing is a kind of death, 
a silencing of the speaker, a silence that follows the death knell and which the death knell 
announces.  
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Poetics and Impersonality 
 Signature theory tends to perform its own formal disruptions, or structural 
disturbances, since the formal qualities we would like to codify are so readily disrupted 
by proper names allowed to behave improperly, which is what happens in the third 
modality of the signature. Indeed, the theory is designed to let the Freudian-Lacanian 
unconscious be heard. In this regard, Derrida’s work relates to the work of the concrete 
poets, surrealists, and other avant-garde artists who put into artistic practice the insights 
of Freud and the psychoanalysts. But it also enacts an impersonality theory as well.  
 The modernist theories and poetics of impersonality, at the heart of the criticism 
and poetry of Pound and Eliot, are illuminated by Derrida’s notion that Hegel did not 
want to sign his text:  
Hegel presents himself as a philosopher or a thinker, someone who constantly 
tells you that his empirical signature, the signature of the individual named Hegel 
is secondary. His signature, that is, pales in the face of truth, which speaks 
through his mouth, which is produced in his text, which constructs the system it 
constructs. This system is the teleological outcome of all of Western experience, 
so that in the end Hegel, the individual, is nothing but an empirical shell which 
can fall away without subtracting from the truth, or from the history of meaning. 
As a philosopher and as a teacher, he seems to be saying basically that not only is 
it possible for his signature and his proper name to disappear without a loss, to fall 
outside of the system, but that this is even necessary in his own system, because it 
will prove the truth and the autonomy of that system.... Yet, in fact, Hegel signs. 
(Ear 56) 
 
The denial of personality as a condition of truth is one of those recurring axioms of 
occidental thought that have been interrogated, again, this time by poststructuralism. Of 
course, this denial’s confused and paradoxical manifestations in high modernist ideas of 
impersonality set the stage for postmodern reversals. Symptomatically, one concern of 
New Criticism was to earn the poetic text autonomy from the empirical desires of 
composers and readers. The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (1993), 
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which seems representative of an influential and still widely cited view of modernism, 
argues that the New Critics narrowed “Yeats and Eliot to their self-doubts and [by] 
virtually ignoring Stevens, Williams, and Pound, ... translated the modernist desire to 
have art produce direct testimony to values into an account of aesthetic experience which 
subordinated everything to the exposure of internal ironies and paradoxes. Modernism 
then became tragic resignation to the failures of Enlightenment optimism” (794). The 
entire entry on Modernism and Postmodernism in the NPEPP orbits the issue of 
impersonality, describing the various stages of postmodernism as moving away from and 
back toward the sense of personal immediacy.  
 Modernist conceptualizations of impersonality probably find their most 
immediate corollaries in the problematic of the subject which poststructuralism entwines 
with its characteristic themes—perspectivism, binarism, presence, genealogical narrative 
vs. ontology, power/knowledge, ideological domination, etc. Marxist, Freudian, 
Nietzschean and feminist critics all engage the problematics of the subject just as they use 
the techniques of deconstruction nowadays, and self-reflexivity concerning the 
construction of the writing subject constitutes one of the challenges of writing under the 
sign of deconstruction. For instance, when Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari stress the 
concept of becoming, a Nietzschean program, they invoke a problematics of subjectivity 
similar to that of modernist “impersonality.” One of Deleuze and Guattari’s central 
concepts, the BwO—body without organs or received organization—is something like 
impersonality if we understand the organization of the body as the physical/emotional 
encoding of state/oedipal ideology. By way of contrast with Deleuze and Guattari, Eliot’s 
concept of the synthetic emotion, which he elaborates in “Tradition and the Individual 
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Talent,” would transmute, possibly during the process of composition, the dross of 
personal emotions into the poetic representation of refined or pure emotions 
(representation sanctioned by proper poetic tradition). Deleuze and Guattari, instead, 
implicitly and self-reflexively position the concept of the BwO so that it cannot function 
as an ideal, like the ideal of a proper poetic tradition, that would ultimately reproduce the 
power formations of ideology which the concept strategically opposes. In this sense, the 
BwO would be just the body, escaping power. Hence, Deleuze and Guattari do not allow 
their theorization to close on the certainty or truth of concepts, nor do they identify their 
standpoint as that of the BwO. But for Eliot, a good poet, or his text, is something like a 
BwO, a body that has transcended the ideological encoding and emotional organization 
that reproduces the order of the state within the subject—and of course, Eliot is a good 
poet. The fact that Eliot’s theorizations might begin to read a certain alterity within the 
poet himself is obscured by the fact that Eliot’s binarism is strictly hierarchical, 
privileging one half of the opposition unquestioningly and positing a single ideal 
tradition, however heterogeneous that tradition of reading by various great poets may be. 
 Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida and Lacan are more directly invested in the 
structuralist investigation of language. Yet all “three” projects are similar in some ways. 
Geoffrey Hartman’s explanation of how Lacan and Derrida similarly approach the 
positioning of the subject within language may also serve to map them onto the 
conceptual topography of the BwO: 
Did Freud really succeed in ushering in an era of “deconversion” or of purely 
“psychological man”? With Lacan in particular, the project of psychoanalysis is 
not only involved in what the relation of analyst and analysand may mean for the 
“order of discourse” each embodies—just as Derrida, in Glas, explores 
simultaneously the question of a relation between the paternal discourse of a 
magister ludi called Hegel and the thievish, maternal “calculus” revealed by 
 
 
 
 24 
Genet. Lacan’s project is not only this sensitive exploration of the power relations 
between codes or idioms within language; it is also an attempt to restructure them, 
in order to build a new communitarian model on the basis of psychiatric 
experience. (Saving 98) 
 
In its (de)celebration of singularity, the theory of the signature resembles the concept of 
the BwO. Where D & G see the possibility of the wolfpack as a model for community 
among BwOs (in a kind of signature reading of Virginia Woolf), Derrida can bring Genet 
and Hegel together in a textual community that celebrates the two signatures 
simultaneously by listening to the play of their names in their texts with a psychoanalytic 
ear.  
 At first glance, Olds and Cage seem about as far apart as Genet and Hegel. But 
my study is not about pitting literature against philosophy. Rather I try to read Olds and 
Cage the way Derrida reads Ponge. When Derrida reads Hegel/Genet this way, via 
signature theory, the ramifications are great because Hegel is one of the most important 
philosophers in the Western tradition, and Derrida’s reading exposes his backside. When 
he reads Ponge this way, academic style and its relation to poetics is the issue. According 
to Geoffrey Hartman, the signature project of Glas aims at, among other things, “a 
commentary style that eschews all allegoresis, all ideologizing moves”: “it resist[s] being 
in the service of political power” (xxv). To write something impossible to co-opt would 
require an impossible discourse. I don’t even pretend to this kind of rigor in my 
commentary on Cage and Olds. I think of my work here as preliminary, a chance to 
explore the “literary” techniques, which Derrida employs to read Ponge—as a preparation 
for reading Glas. And more importantly as an experiment in literary style: to begin to try 
to write with the poets.  
 The first and foremost of these protocols would be to submit to the law of the 
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signature. Derrida says he “ought to submit to the law of his name [Ponge’s]” 
(Signsponge 18). There is an “ought” here for several reasons. First, how could a text 
signed by Derrida submit to a Pongian law of signing? As per the first modality of the 
signature, Ponge would not sign Derrida’s text. Even if he did, he would have to sign 
behind Derrida. Second, what sort of ruse would enable the law of “Francis Ponge,” in its 
unconscious action as well as its manifest aspects, to be made explicit. If Derrida can 
reproduce the “Francis Ponge” textual event, how can the unconscious aspects of it be 
certified? I’ll stop there: arrêt-law.  
 
Protocol 
 To sum up this limited and brief investigation of Derrida’s signature poetics, I 
present a few rules. They tend to overlap and part of the glas effect is to heap them up on 
each other. In the way of the pun, punning is probably the main rule of Derrida’s 
signature texts. In “Proverb: ‘He that would pun . . .’” Derrida remarks that Glas is an 
analysis of the pun, although “by definition a pun must not be absolutely controllable and 
subject to the censorship of rational consciousness and its representatives” (18). Puns 
open on the unconscious, and Glas builds up a vast network of punning associations. As 
such, its protocols are violations of protocol. And yet there is plenty of glue, excessive 
glue to hold it together: “protocol” means first-glue. For fun and excess in the style of 
Derrida here is some of the OED entry on protocol: 
[Early mod.E. prothocoll, a. OF. prothocole (a 1200 in Godef. Compl.), 
prothecolle, mod.F. protocole (= Prov. prothcolle, It. protocollo, Sp. 
protocolo), ad. med.L. prtocoll-um, ad. Gr. - the first leaf of a volume,  
a fly-leaf glued to the case and containing an account of the MS., f. - 
PROTO- first +  glue.    The history of the sense-development of this word 
belongs to mediæval Latin and the Romanic languages, esp. French; in the 
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latter it has received very considerable extensions of meaning: see Du 
Cange, Cotgr., Littré, Hatz.-Darm., etc. The word does not appear to have 
at any time formed part of the English legal vocabulary; in Sc. from 16thc. 
probably under French influence; otherwise used only in reference to 
foreign countries and their institutions, and as a recognized term of 
international diplomacy in sense 2, until its comparatively recent entry 
into the general vocabulary of English in senses 5b, c.]  
    1. a. The original note or minute of a transaction, negotiation, 
agreement or the like, drawn up by a recognized public official, notary, 
etc. and duly attested, which forms the legal authority for any subsequent 
deed, agreement, or the like based on it; sometimes applied to a book or 
register in which these were written by the official concerned, as they 
were drawn up by him; = protocol book: see 7 (obs.).   In the parts of the 
United States acquired from Mexico, the name is used for the original 
record of a grant, transfer, etc. of land; under the Spanish law this was an 
entry made in his book by the official recorder of such transactions. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1726 AYLIFFE Parergon 304 An Original is in other Terms stiled the 
Protocol, or Scriptura Matrix; and if the Protocol, which is the Root and 
Foundation of the Instrument, does not appear, the Instrument is not valid. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    2. a. spec. The original draught, minute, or record of a dispatch, 
declaration, negotiation, treaty, stipulation or other diplomatic document 
or instrument; esp. a record of the propositions agreed to in a conference, 
signed by the parties, to be embodied in a formal treaty.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    b. transf. (familiar) A preamble, a preliminary. 
1897 MRS. RAYNER Type-writer Girl xi. 126 When all protocols were 
settled he went on, ‘Can you come in at once?’ 
    c. [In Gr. sense.] The first sheet of a roll of papyrus, bearing the 
manufacturer's official mark; this mark itself. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    e. Philos. A statement which forms an essential part of a person's 
description of something experienced or perceived; a basic statement that 
can be verified or assessed. 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
    3. A formal or official statement of a transaction or proceeding; spec. 
the detailed record of the procedure and results in a scientific experiment; 
hence, experimental procedure. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    4. An official of police in some foreign countries. 
1865 BARING-GOULD Werewolves xiv, When taken before the 
Protokoll at Dabkow. 
    5. a. In France, The formulary of the etiquette to be observed by the 
Head of the State in official ceremonies, relations with ambassadors, 
foreign sovereigns, etc.; the etiquette department of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs; the office of the Master of the Ceremonies. Also used of 
analogous departments in other countries. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    b. An official form of procedure and etiquette in affairs of state and 
diplomatic relations; the observance of this. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    c. In extended and general uses, any code of conventional or proper 
conduct; formally correct behaviour. 
    protocol, n. 
    Add:   [5.] d. Computing and Telecommunications. A (usu. 
standardized) set of rules governing the exchange of data between given 
devices, or its transmission via a given communications channel. 
 
I include this long definition from the OED as a means of observing Derrida’s protocol in 
Glas. The two columns of Glas often have such definitions “tattooed” into them. Derrida 
calls them “judases” because they betray the words they define, exposing them, as it 
were. My plan here is to betray my protocols. As per Derrida’s instructions for a science 
of the signature in Signsponge, I have tried to get busy with my own name in this text: 
“For me, Francis Ponge is someone first of all who has known that, in order to know 
what goes on in the name and the thing, one has to get busy with one’s own, let oneself 
be occupied by it” (26).  
 I have laws in my name: but they run backward, like walls. The ret-law has to do 
with the production of linen. To ret is to season flax (or wood) by soaking it in water in 
preparation for weaving. And this is an alteration of the materials by means of water, 
itself a simple alteration of my name. My siglum, well, it’s WEL. There is water in the 
well and we (the royal WE) we could throw the flax or hemp in to ret, but running water 
is better for soaking (or, etymologically, rotting) the flax. But there are two laws, two 
protocols, two cops. The law of the patronym would stand in lieu of the other, in place of 
the other. This place with its double law is my ex- for the superego figures I analyze here 
in this text: the good cop, bad cop nature of the superego—the figure of conscience and 
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its obscene double. This double law returns already (deja) in my signature.  
 But where is the etiquette, the protocol? Where is the agreement produced 
beforehand, the (electronic) handshake, or the flyleaf glued into the beginning of these 
readings? Does this text have a protocol? After Derrida, it has to do with the GL-effect, 
as in the slippage from glas to glue. By accretion, here is a list of the primary reading 
protocols I take from this watered down look at JD’s theory.  
7. Treat Olds’ and Cage’s texts as blazons. 
8. Read for anthonomasia—Derrida’s neologism combining the words 
anthology and antonomasia (the trope of using proper nouns as 
common nouns and vice versa).  
9. Look for (and practice) hypogram and anagram. 
10. Trace the placement in abyss. 
11. Post-death-of-the-author, read and write for and as if mourning.  
12. Eat the proper names, continuing whatever encryption of the letters 
can already be read.  
 
Number 6 is the key to putting these rules together. Recall Derrida’s dredge image 
discussed near the beginning of this chapter. The bucket, described as a toothed matrix, 
“scrapes the bottom of the sea, the mother {mer}.” In the passage, this is happening to 
“Hegel.” One strategic aim of the glas effect, or Gl-effect is the dissemination of Hegel’s 
name, the unnaming of Hegel (and Genet, as we have seen). Note first that the 
“generative grammar” of Genet is referred to as a régle (rule), rhyming with Hegel. 
Second, in the image Derrida sits in a glass box: “From the dissimulated, small, closed, 
glassed-in cabin of a crane, I manipulate some levers and, . . . I plunge a mouth of steel in 
the water.” Encased in glass, Derrida can “barely hear the noise of the water” below. 
Among the bits (morceaux) of chewed material that the bucket “bites” (mord), there is 
some algae, in which the g-l-a is mixed up. Early in the text, readers are warned about 
this rotting of language: “For the first and last time, and as an example, here you are as if 
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forewarned by this text of what clacks here—and decomposes the cadaver of the word 
(balc, talc, alga, clatter [éclat], glass, etc.) in every sense” (3bi). The gl-effect is always 
about the end of Hegel’s name, the syllable –gel shortened to gl, at least until that fact is 
forgotten.  
The gl-effect puts Schreber’s linguistic delirium in play, enabling Derrida to hear 
himself crack or “clack” language and then glue it back together. Derrida hints at this in 
his description of Glas’ two-column structure: “A dialectics on one side, a galactics on 
the other, heterogeneous and yet indiscernible in their effects, at times up to 
hallucination” (qtd. in Leavey 28). I chose the figure of eating the names of the signature 
from among Derrida’s various metaphors for this process because I think it goes well 
with the hallucinated calcul of the mother. Part of the galactics of course has to do with 
breasts: Derrida uses the obsolete word seing, which means both breast and signature, to 
connect the eating of the body of the mother with the eating of the signature. The poetics 
of the mother, the image of the womb, requires the ongoing digestion of language to 
begin the process of birthing and nursing the new text.  
The chewing of language also takes the theory of the signature down to the level 
of the letter. For Lacan, the letter is that which returns and repeats itself, insistently 
inscribing and re-inscribing itself in the subject’s life. Derrida plays at this with the gl and 
other sigla. The condition of savior operates in the action of the letter, which for Lacan 
links the destiny of the subject to the letter or “cryptogram” and its decryption or 
decipherment (Ècrits 160). In the famous dispute between Lacan and Derrida, Derrida 
argues that the letter does not necessarily return to mark the destiny of the subject. It may 
simply get lost or never arrive at its destination or never arrive on time. Or go looping off 
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through the signatures of others. 
The gl-effect is the first glue, or first protocol of Glas: “A gl-effect (glue, 
birdlime, spit, sperm, chrism, ointment, etc.) forms the conglomeration without identity 
of this ceremonial” writes Derrida (Leavey 28). This introduction to signature theory has 
been overweighted with Lacan. In spite of all the galactics of Derrida’s theory, I think the 
word “glacan” never appears although there is plenty of play on lactation. We have balc, 
talc, alga, clatter [éclat], glass, etc.; clearly glacan is there hypogrammatically. Maybe 
Derrida and Lacan are the two laws of my adaptation or alteration of Derrida's theory.  
But the protocol, the first protocol, is to tear up the etiquette and flush it down the 
chiotte, the shithole, as Leavey (another JL, but a john this time) translates in the second 
first sentence of Glas. My first protocol in this dissertation should be to shoulder some 
more signature effects into the signature theory: from “Sharon Olds” the sh-effect, and 
from “John Cage,” the JC-effect and the blazoning of the cage. Strangely, nowhere in her 
works does Sharon Olds give her parents’ names. They have been withdrawn, silenced, 
shushed finally, if not flushed. Putting these effects together, the sh and the JC, I arrive at 
the W.C. To read Sharon and John together, is to visit the old water closet. That would be 
the dredge image of this dreadful poetics in its double glas, or double law: to chew up 
their signatures, to digest them, and then to pass them (on). That would be the je suis, the 
I am, or the I follow (behind Derrida), which becomes Jesus, if you die and take out the I, 
as Ulmer points out. After Genet (another john, Jean), JD alternates between a cogito of 
mourning, “I am therefore dead,” and the Immaculate Conception, the IC (from Hegel’s 
christianic philosophy and Genet’s Catholic-inflected textuality), these letters always 
arriving in the wake, the litter of Glas, as part of the calcul of the mother. Tracing the 
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abbreviations, the sigla, the morcellation, toward the subjects of this book the Glas-effect 
would continue along something like this: jd, jg, jl, wl, gl, ic, jc, wl, sh, ww, jj . . . .   
At the heart of both their poetics, Cage and Olds place a desire to resist the 
proper. Maybe it can be articulated as tearing down walls, a waltering down, more or less 
well played.  
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Chapter Two 
Sharon Olds: In Two Places At Once 
Introduction: the Fetish Double 
 I ought to submit to the law of the signature “Sharon Olds.” That said, the 
protocol for communication with “Sharon Olds” needs to be laid out: and the sh-effect is 
put down in the first poem in the first book, prescribing, in the abyss, the etiquette for 
reading her corpus. There is a certain tearing sound in the dialogic of the poem.   
This chapter emphasizes what I am calling “fetish logic,” and most of the readings 
explicitly show how this concept informs the poems I discuss. Chapter 3 de-emphasizes 
the fetish logic in order to continue to allow the signature “Sharon Olds” to unfold itself 
according to its primordial Biblical intertextuality. “The Lifting” works over this proto-
intertextuality; this poem also depends on a certain tearing effect. 
 In this chapter, this fetish logic seemed to direct the discursive movement of the 
reading. By default I had begun writing with a chronological approach for lack of 
concepts or tropes that had asserted themselves as ordering devices and due to my desire 
not to force a conceptual grid over the signature and poems. In the process of reading and 
writing, however, the fetish logic, a logic of two scenes or two times unfolding at once, 
seemed to manifest itself everywhere I happened to be reading in her first five books.2  
This led to departures from the chronological reading. So there are several readings that 
defy the book-by-book order of analysis. Yet the general shape of my analysis goes book 
                                                
2 Although I offer no readings of poems from The Wellspring, I find many of Olds’ signature effects as I’ve 
delineated them operating there. 
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by book.  
 The thematic that I most identify with Olds’ poetry has to do with the oedipal 
relations to which she has always returned. In particular, this thematic marks her work via 
her signature effects. Fetish logic connects the oedipal scene, the childhood of abuse, 
with the present of the speaker in most of these poems. The speakers of the early poems 
wonder at having survived. Many poems also construct a healing imagery that exploits 
signature effects. I argue in the second half of the chapter that this healing imagery is 
articulated by a psychoanalytic reading, and in particular that the name of the father 
opens to reveal a reconfiguration of the subject, enabling her to live and love against and 
through the oedipal experiences associated with the proper name. This reconfiguration 
amounts to an analysis of the superego and the gender roles that go to construct it. While 
Olds manages to carry out this analysis of her identity, her texts also treat her signature, 
especially on the question of the relation of the two names, Sharon and Olds.  
 
Sharon Olds 
 
 The first name is a place: the Plain of Sharon, an area of Israel, a fertile plain 
extending along the Mediterranean coast, a western coast. Sharon is a place name that 
appears in the Old Testament books of First Chronicles, the Canticles, and Isaiah. The 
sexual aura of the name Sharon emanates from the Song of Solomon: probably the book’s 
most famous line is the King James Version 2.1: “I am the rose of Sharon, and the lily of 
the valleys.” Sharon Olds has played heavily on this etymology of her name, but it has 
been only by means of the third modality of the signature. I find no direct reference to 
this line in her work.  
 Aside from the name of the Old Testament, the name Olds lacks this specifically 
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religious-erotic etymology or association. Under the first entry for “old” in the OED 
database there are some 16,000 words according to my computer’s word count tool. It is 
hardly possible to describe the word’s play or rootedness in the European languages. As a 
proper name it apparently derives from its use as kind of nickname adjective: old Smith 
or old So-and-So. The entry for “Olds” in the OED refers only to the “Oldsmobile car, 
esp. a large family saloon [sedan] model.” The American Heritage Dictionary lists only 
“Olds, Ransom Eli,” who “founded the Olds Motor Works, manufacturer of the 
Oldsmobile.” This automotive signification, so common in American English, rarely 
comes into play in Olds poetry. However, her poetry seems to originate in an obsession 
with her elders. In that sense, her poetry makes up an Olds Testament. 
Certainly the two preceding paragraphs could be as misleading as they are 
informative. Nevertheless, they indicate some of the possibilities of the words. But the 
research task is to discover how this proper name plays through the poems aurally, 
visually, conceptually, metaphorically, etc. What event takes place when the words are 
released into the depths of the poems? Where do the names in her signature lead? And as 
to the name’s movement in the abyss, what are its chances, between the aleatory and the 
necessary, of its countersignature?  
 
 “Satan Says” 
 The speaker in the first poem of the first book enters this maze, matrix or erection 
of the proper names immediately. In “Satan Says” the speaker tries to write her way out 
of an enclosure, a cedar box with “a gold, heart-shaped lock and no key.” Implicitly, this 
is a struggle to forget and escape her name, to let it go insofar as it has to do with “the 
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pain of the locked past,” and to write with her body: “I am trying to write my / way out of 
the closed box / redolent of cedar” and her “spine uncurls in the cedar box like the pink 
back of the ballerina pin with a ruby eye.” The spine is the central line of the body, the 
structure that encloses the central nervous system. It extends from the region of the 
sexual organs to the brain. “Spine” also rhymes with line. In this controlling image (the 
body and its double, the ballerina pin, within the cedar box) of the poem there is a 
possible escape from the scene. The speaker is writing, and although there is no key, 
Satan comes in. As the narrative of the poem unfolds, the arrival of Satan is contiguous 
with the attempt to write:  
  I am trying to write my  
way out of the closed box 
redolent of cedar. Satan 
comes to me in the locked box  (3) 
 
The speaker says to Satan, “I love [my parents] but I’m trying to say what happened to us 
in the lost past.” Satan gives her the words to describe the past, and as she says them, he 
enables her to leave. But the speaker refuses to leave, realizing that “The exit is through 
Satan’s mouth.” She insists that she loved her parents too. As the poem closes, she warms 
her “cold hands at the dancer’s ruby eye— / the fire, the suddenly discovered knowledge 
of love.”   
The movement from gold, early in the poem, to cold in the closing image of the 
poem, follows the drift of the phoneme old through the abyss of emotions and memories 
evoked by the struggle of the poem: this drift traverses the unconscious of the speaker. 
The color gold also is displaced by the color red, of the ruby eye, which suggests female 
power, as well as the rose of Sharon. That red also suggests shame is not overlooked in 
the poem: 
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The pain of the locked past buzzes 
in the child’s box on her bureau, under  
the terrible round pond eye 
etched around with roses, where 
self-loathing gazed at sorrow. (3) 
Roses of Sharon surround her image in the mirror. How has her sexuality been 
prostituted? Satan gets her to say, “My mother is a pimp,” which makes whores of her 
daughters. And the “round pond eye”: could it be the O in Olds? The box also suggests 
the female genitals.  
Where does the name of the signatory go in the language of the unconscious? I 
am interested in what the signature says, reveals, conceals, does (pick your predicate) 
about the unconscious, according to the signature discourse of the poems, and from there 
to discern the poetics of Sharon Olds. Like reading the Song of Solomon, we could be 
reading a language that exceeds the limits of propriety: aspects of its economy would, if 
unconscious, work in the interstices between strictures, laws, letters, or rules of the 
signature. And she allows it to happen. It could be unintentional. Boxes, roses, gold, red, 
Os: the trace of the signature would be nonrepresentational—mise en abyme. Or is it just 
her idiom? The crude, reductive violence of banal obscenities forms a kind of visual and 
tonal maze: shit, fuck, cock, cunt, come. These words are all worked on Satan’s waxy 
tongue; they all are repeated by the speaker—except “come.” She does not come. She 
does not come out: desire to resist, resistance to desire. It is also about the fall of 
“Sharon.” She is dead already, in her coffin, in the tomb: or within the walls of a cedar 
house. 
The second modality of the signature is about control. The idiomatic marks, that 
“banal and confused metaphor for the first [modality]” as Derrida says, that constitute 
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what is sometimes called style, are in the command of the writer when she has become a 
stylist, when intention modulates idiom, although, as Derrida remarks, a signer might 
leave the marks by accident (Signsponge 54). But what we are interested in here is a 
poetics or style that gives up something to the third modality. Maybe it can be traced in 
the accidentals. The element of control is given away at some point; otherwise, there can 
be no countersignature. Whatever signature effects are isolated and capitalized on no 
longer represent the general economy of the text, even though they may participate in it. 
This is why Derrida refers to the third modality, the countersignature, as le pas de Ponge, 
the step, and stop, of Ponge or, more broadly, pas d’homme, of man (Signsponge 50, 56). 
In a restricted economy nothing would be lost. The writing would only come back to the 
signatory. Olds would control everything. But a general economy admits loss.  
The placement in abyss, mise en abyme, slides easily into a thematics of mourning 
and burial. And if Olds buries her signature, puts it to rest, what happens? In the French, 
a second meaning of mise is wager, gamble, or stake. Is it by chance or necessity that the 
sh is disseminated in this poem in the words “shepard” and “heart-shaped” but mostly in 
the word “shit”? There is a buzzing in the box. The word “shit” appears four times, twice 
as often as any of the other casual obscenities. It could get cold and red hot. The word 
“shepard” resides en abime, a picture placed very carefully within the opening image, a 
picture “pasted onto / the central panel between carvings.” In the end the speaker is left 
behind this abyss below the mirror.  
The agon of “Satan Says” pits the speaker against Satan. Satan personifies the 
obscene superego, that figuration of authority that not only knows the moral codes but 
also enjoys such knowledge by violating it. Thematically, the agon pits love against an 
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obscene, linguistic force for the right to represent the past: this force manifests itself 
through profane naming (“Say / My father is a shit.”; “Say your mother is a pimp.”), 
profanity (“Say shit, say death, say fuck the father”), and reduction of the past to trauma 
(“say: torture”). Lacan refers to the superego as the “ballast of the unconscious,” and 
these obscenities all conform to classical Freudian notions of repressed desires and 
memories. When the speaker responds to Satan verbally, love becomes the form of 
resistance to the obscene superego—in the poem and in the act of writing. But the play of 
forces, the emotional energies and exchanges of the poem, never resolves itself; rather, it 
cools down and the reader is left with the image of the speaker warming her cold hands 
“at the dancer’s ruby eye,” heated by “the knowledge of love.” 
 Writing becomes a struggle with Satan, another proper name beginning and 
ending with the same letters as Sharon. It is also a struggle with the past, at and with the 
oedipal scene itself, with what is old in the life of the speaker. Perhaps most of all, 
writing becomes the struggle to write one’s name and to write in one’s name. The main 
argument of my study is that Sharon Olds’ imagery usually implies a certain fetish logic 
that characterizes the topology of Olds’ poetics, as if the logic of two scenes or two times 
are unfolding at once, as if the speaker were in two places at once.  
In “Satan Says” the scene of writing is connected with the scene of conception: 
  Say: the father’s cock, the mother’s 
  cunt, says Satan, I’ll get you out. 
  The angle of the hinge widens  
  until I see the outlines of  
  the time before I was, when they were  
  locked in the bed. (4) 
The word locked recalls the gold lock of the cedar box, the opening image of the poem, 
while figuring a metonymy for the locking together of the genes that form the daughter 
 
 
 
 39 
(the poem opens the section of the book entitled “Daughter”). On a more primal sexual 
level, “locked” is used of dogs copulating: sometimes two become literally stuck 
together, unable to separate. This image is of her (own) conception, including the tone of 
it. “I see the outlines of the time”: that would be gazing at the Olds. Old, the morsel of the 
name, functions like a shuttle between the two scenes, the scene of writing, which is the 
present tense of the poem, and the scene of the past, “redolent of cedar.” Both scenes, a 
double signature scene, fold into the abyss.  
The word redolent combines within it red and ole and contains an anamorphic 
spelling of the word old. Redolent and cedar evoke old clothes and the smell of the 
means of preserving them. In the dreamlike sequence of the poem, the cedar box is 
displaced by a cedar house: 
Come in my mouth, he says, you’re there 
already, and the huge hinge 
begins to close. Oh no, I loved  
them, too, I brace 
my body tight 
in the cedar house. 
Satan sucks himself out the keyhole. 
The house figures the double bind of the poem, the fact that the tools for exploring the 
past, language and memory, were formed in that past and continue to exercise their 
powers on the speaker in the present. The speaker’s language is born out of the linguistic 
economy of the parental home, but she cannot let herself be born along by the forces of 
that language. Her poetry, her poetics, must be about her parents, whose imagoes go to 
form the superego. Yet the language she has to use carries within it the obscene 
properties of the superego. Although Satan withdraws, sucking himself out the keyhole, 
he may be the outside. It seems as if the universe itself, that which lies outside the house, 
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is Satan, the obscenity. This possibility is both temporal and spatial. The obscene 
superego always lies in wait. 
In the words gold and cold, the force of the signature and the unconscious of the 
signature remain an origin and destination of the poem. The hands of the writer are cold, 
having rejected the heat of Satan’s breath and mouth, in essence having rejected his 
proffered exit from the oedipal scene. She remains locked in the box with her past: “It’s 
your coffin now, Satan says.” But the ruby eye of the ballerina pin warms her hands. The 
speaker, no longer “pinned,” instead sees, powerfully—but not by escaping the box, her 
gender. This warmth in the recognition of the dancer, “the suddenly discovered 
knowledge of love,” suggests the poetic dance between the past and the present of the 
text that will come out of the struggle to make the past into text. At the end of the poem, 
as the verbal exchange with Satan fades out, the hands are being warmed, presumably in 
preparation for the task of writing. This suggests a transition from hellish discourse to 
writing. The hand warming contrasts with the heat of Satan’s breathy invitation to come 
out of the house: “the air around the opening is heavy and thick as hot smoke.” Satan’s 
language would be hell. In contrast, it’s not clear what the practice of writing will 
produce beyond resistance. 
 
“Love Fossil” 
  The poem following “Satan Says,” “Love Fossil,” at first reading might seem 
silly, but it capitalizes an exploration of what is old and at the same time carries out a 
logic of the name  
Sharon:  
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  My da on his elegant vegetarian ankles 
  drank his supper. Like the other dinosaurs 
  massive, meaty, made of steak, 
  he nibbled and guzzled, his jaw dripping weeds and bourbon, 
  super sleazy, extinct beast my heart dug for. 
The paleontology implicit in “my heart dug for,” an archeology of love, continues the 
thematic of “Satan Says.” At the same time it is an archeology of the proper name. How 
big is the surname, the name of the father? How old is it? It is nothing less than 
monumental. The father is characterized as a Brontosaurus in this poem, a huge joke. 
And the speaker is later figured as a carnivore—but in the surprising form of a “storm of 
mosquitoes” in the dinosaur image. This predatory, parasitic pack makes a good image 
for characterizing the way in which “Sharon” can be read in this poem. The singularity of 
the name is dispersed across a multiplicity of carnivores. Similarly, “Sharon” launches 
many separate semes when it begins to work in the unconscious of the text and the text of 
the unconscious, where it feeds on the name of the father.  
 The word “rose” makes a second appearance here, following its first in ‘Satan 
Says,” this time as a predicate: “Love rose in me, a storm of mosquitoes / hovering over 
La Brea.” This sentence suggests red and black, the red hinted at in “rose” and the red of 
swollen mosquitoes together with the black of the tar pits. In the next clause, the plurality 
of “mosquitoes” resolves into the singularity of the first person pronoun: “Carnivore that 
I was.” This resolution passes through the word “carnivore,” categorizing the speaker 
among those organisms that consume other organisms. In the poem “California 
Swimming Pool” from The Gold Cell, mosquitoes are likened to sharks: “sated 
mosquitoes hung in the air like sharks.” The word “shark” appears in a several of Olds’ 
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poems3, and this deformation of “Sharon” is of a piece with her penchant for imaging the 
bodies of others as meat, red and raw, as well as her penchant for metaphors of predation. 
The confusion of sexual desire, love, fear, and hunger remains a constant concern in 
Olds’ poetry, and this recurrent imagery of eating of the Other begins in the first two 
poems. As we shall see, this predation is an Oedipal reversal, something she learned from 
her father. And one of his nicknames for her was “Shar,” which appears to be pronounced 
like “shark” without the k. 
 “Chevy” and “Sharon” begin with the same opening phoneme, the sh sound. The 
image of the “Chevy” figures the paternal: “He was dark as a reptile and splashed with 
mud like an old Chevy, / he was souped-up and stunned and cruel”; “An old Chevy,” 
constitutes another predation of the name “Sharon” on the name “Olds.” Not an old 
Olds(mobile) but a Chevy, as if the surname has been condensed (encrypted) with the 
forename. The proprietary emphasis shifts, conferring on her father and his name the 
sibilant “sh” sound of the name “Sharon.” 
 The sentence following the image of the Chevy traces a genealogy of love and 
anger from the surname into the pit, the abyss, of La Brea, and up into the storm of the 
forename’s semes which hover above the pit of time and still survive today. This 
genealogy neatly figures and subtly re-centers the emotional struggle of the previous 
poem, “Satan Says,” with an automobile image: “He taught me to love / what was stuck, 
what couldn’t help itself, / what went down mute into time like tar, like anger.” Rather 
than personifying the angry superego as Satan, time mutes and transmutes the anger-
trapped hulk. It is the father himself who sinks into and becomes the tar, i.e., an 
                                                
3 In The Gold Cell see “Alcatraz” and “The Premonition” in addition to “California Swimming Pool.” 
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incredibly dangerous, age-old trap and repository of repressed and silent anger. This 
image also continues the incestuous language of “Satan Says.” 
 Like the phrases “come in my mouth” and “sucks himself out” from “Satan Says,” 
the words “went down” continue the image of oral sex, although only as an undertone in 
this poem. But the possibilities of incestuous desire are more direct here. This oral quality 
of these images suggests a non-procreative sexuality, linked to hunger and aggression, 
those more primitive forms of desire than genitality, less sublimated, more “partial” and 
perhaps more fetishistic.  
 The tar pit is another figure for the crypt of the father, the memorial. The image of 
going down into tar presents an aging process. The place of the speaker, interior and 
exterior, is woven together with the past in the labyrinth of the name. Making the name 
the scene of transgression, finding the way to write within the propriety of the name 
while exploring topics that are normally taboo, using one’s name to search for what 
ordinarily seems veiled and absent from thought or from propriety, all occurs through the 
play of the names. The death of the father imagined here requires mourning. The 
encryption and decryption of the names enacts a mourning that reaches down into the 
unconscious. The end of the poem presents a shift in the subject structure of the speaker 
by means of an encryption of her name in the body of the father. She refuses the 
predation inherent in the image of a storm of mosquitoes by refusing to eat of her father: 
“Carnivore that I was I watched his / bare white shoulder and I went hungry.” An odd 
image perhaps, an Apatosaurus4 with a white shoulder, but the word “shoulder” makes a 
portmanteau of “Sharon Olds,” merging the two names into a single word, a single 
                                                
4 If you visit a museum looking for a Brontosaurus, there is a good chance it will be called an Apatosaurus, 
this “new” name having gained favor among paleontologists in recent years since it was the original name 
given to the species. 
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entity.5 The shoulder and the mouth would converge if she chose to bite, and she would 
take the blood of her father into her body—but the joining takes place on the level of the 
letter, the level of the signature, and most generally on the level of the word. And 
“shoulder,” the double encryption of the two names, results from this step and stop of 
desire. 
 The sharing of signature names in this portmanteau represents a specular 
dynamics of the Oldsian oedipal abyss. Her relation to the specular other, the parent, 
undergoes a change as she fights her own predisposition for predation. The recognition 
that informs this change comes via the exploration of violence and aggression germane to 
her sexual textuality. This violence and aggression would be well figured in the 
primordial image of the male animal, like a tiger, biting the shoulder of his female sexual 
mate, reflecting the confusion of drives in the acts of predation and copulation. In “Love 
Fossil” the sexual nature of this image is latent in the theme of predation, and it is the 
female that would bite.  
In terms of drives, this refusal to eat of the father suggests the Freudian distinction 
between “partial drives,” including orality (the sucking of mosquitoes), and genitality 
proper, the sum of the partial drives in an oedipalized sexual subjectivity. Lacan 
challenged this notion of an integrated drive, suggesting the partial drives represent 
sexuality only partially: they do not represent the reproductive function but only the 
dimension of enjoyment. If Olds’ imagery of predation suggests a regression to the partial 
drive of orality, this poem refuses that demand. Lacan also suggests that the drives and 
desire all originate in the field of the subject, whereas the genital drive would find its 
                                                
5 For pointing out this merging of the names in the word “shoulder,” I owe my student Craig Clements. 
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form on the side of the Other (Four 189). In Olds’ poem the drive moves from oral 
(mosquitoes that bite and suck) to scopic (just watching him sink). But the word shoulder 
is still on the side of the other. It is a shoulder drive rather than a genital drive: a 
sharonolder drive to watch its object go down into the abyss.  
 
“Rising Daughter” 
In “Rising Daughter” the color gold travels into the daughter’s body like an 
invader bringing the father’s name in with the mother’s milk. The jealousy that begins at 
the breast, according, to Freud is mixed with the law of the name of the father in this 
poem, which interiorizes the split between the two scenes of a fetish logic: 
  delicate as shrimp, the Japanese frogmen 
  swam, slowly. They approached from the west, 
  their gold faces glowing like specks of  
  mica, in the heavy Pacific, 
  their flippers the fins of prawns. I lay 
  and sucked, and in great numbers, like yellow 
  flakes of butter, they entered me 
  with my mother’s milk, a vocation. I would be 
  for myself, then, an enemy 
  to all who do not wish me to rise. 
 
Not just an enemy to those who do not wish her to rise, she contains an enemy within 
herself, an enemy to parts of herself, as the line break suggests: “I would be / for myself, 
then, an enemy /.” The gold faces are a part of her, like yellow flakes of butter (risking 
the racial stereotype in the word “yellow” in order to cross the names “Sharon,” sharing 
of milk, and “Olds,” gold, yet again), and they come from the west, like the western part 
of her name, Sharon, the name of a place along a western coastline. The separation of the 
name from the person, the split between the subject and the subject-in-language, is 
figured in the image of the golden cream rising to the top within her. The presence of her 
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mother, sharing the gold cream with her, completes the oedipal triangle across the 
caesura of her signature. Although sharing does not seem to connote resistance, this 
sharing of gold takes place during wartime. She is born at war, as the title note of the 
poem indicates: 
  The Rising Daughter 
           (b. San Francisco, 1942) 
 
The suckling that the poem describes figures a warlike becoming-masculine, the Japanese 
frogmen entering her like shrimp. In this movement, the splitting of the subject in 
language elicits another problem inherent in this signature: the potential conflict of its 
masculine and feminine elements. The conflict of gender is complicated then, the 
frogmen identified with the gold that resounds the patriarchal, masculine, surname and 
yet comes through the maternal milk. The division of parental gender is implicit in the 
image of the milk/butter, and this division is “sucked,” introjected, at the level of 
daughter/subject. The interiorizing violence of this conflictedness is finally redirected 
toward “all who do not wish [the daughter] to rise.”   
 Thus, the rising daughter moves between genders, between states 
(Japanese/American; liquid milk/solid butter), between multiplicity (“great numbers,” 
like the mosquitoes in “Love Fossil”) and singularity (“I would be for myself”), between 
interiority (the interiorizing violence of institutional war as it is projected and sanctioned 
by state ideology) and exteriority (of the nomadic outside of the state personified in the 
Japanese frogmen, a nomadic war machine, a wolfpack at the border of the American 
state), between the anti-oedipal transference across the mother-daughter boundary and the 
oedipal inheritance of gold faces, the nomadic war machine locked in mutually defining 
opposition to state and patriarchal ideology.  
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“I Go Back to May 1937” 
 In “I Go Back to May 1937,” fetish logic is used to temporally bracket the oedipal 
scene thematized in “Satan Says.” The poem reads as if the speaker is examining a 
photograph of her parents and traveling back in time to the moments of their respective 
graduations from their colleges and the moment of their marriage. From the perspective 
of the present of the speaker, with implacable hindsight, she imagines warning her 
parents by saying “STOP,” by saying no to her own life. But as the poem progresses the 
voice undergoes a reversal of viewpoint, finally taking an affirmative stance: “I want to 
live.” This present tense recognition is followed by a revised and reversed version of the 
warning she would issue, the imagined speech act which closes the poem: “I say / Do 
what you are going to do, and I will tell about it.”   
 These speech acts embedded in the temporal structure of the poem embody an 
instance of what Derrida calls “the absolute past.” This imagined commencement address 
to the parents poses the problems of origin, resurrection, rebirth, alternation and alteration 
of the past, the pasts that were never present, etc. The structure of the poem frames a 
movement between two minds, one of negation, saying no to the past, and one of 
affirmation, saying yes to the past and yes to the reflexive moment of the present. This 
movement forms an axis along which the thought of the poem reverses itself freely, 
moving back and forth between the moment of enunciation and 1937, as if the speaker 
were in two places at once. The two logics contaminate each other, and gradually the 
affirmative logic wins out. But before this seemingly simple anagnorisis or recognition is 
concluded, the mixing of the two logics produces a literal fetish image of conception: 
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    I want to live. I 
  take them up like the male and female  
  paper dolls and bang them together  
  at the hips like chips of flint as if to 
  strike sparks from them, 
the speaker says, as if the images (apparently) in the photograph are paperdoll cutouts 
with the properties of voodoo dolls. This fetish event will come to be the dianoia, the new 
way of thinking that develops from the recognition that affirmation is preferable to the 
Stop, which the speaker initially desires. Across Olds’ oeuvre, this oedipal material is a 
constant point of return, the figures of the parents taken up again and again and banged 
about in decelebration of the past and in the conception of the textual event. But it is not a 
simple affirmation; the speaker’s existence was mortgaged with the parent’s unspeakable 
suffering. The yes is a yes to both the affirmation and the refusal, yes to the conflict of 
the poetic faculties, yes to the past and the absolute past, yes to the conflict of desire and 
jouissance within the subject.  
 
“Nurse Whitman” 
 Inserted between one poem thematically concerned with the faulty mother and 
another concerned with the surrealist mother-magician, “Nurse Whitman” seems a 
relatively traditional invocation of the great American bard. But the poem re-genders 
Whitman, who worked as a Civil War nurse, as a mother, and since the speaker likens 
herself to Whitman, the poem implicitly suggests that the speaker fashions herself as her 
own poetic mother. Maybe this image stands in opposition to her biological mother, 
toward whom she is only ambivalent. The last lines of the poem make clear this self-
fashioning with Whitman as model. They do so, furthermore, in oedipal terms: “we 
 
 
 
 49 
conceive, Walt, with the men we love, thus, now / we bring to fruit.” The particular man 
the speaker loves and touches in the poem is her father, figured as the dead person whom 
the speaker must attend the way Whitman attended the Union casualties: “You bathe the 
forehead, you bathe the lip, the cock / as I touch my father, as if the language were a form 
of life.”   
 Olds’ poetry is the poetry of a great healer, albeit a self-healer primarily, and this 
is so thematically, beyond any concern with the boundary between signatories and 
speakers within texts. Freud’s interminable talking cure is translated into a writing cure. 
The fetish logic in “Nurse Whitman,” which espouses the relation between healing and 
composition by way of the two proper names “Sharon Olds” and “Walt Whitman,” 
unfolds across two scenes: Whitman nursing the wounded and the dying during the Civil 
War; the poet attending her dead and locating her poetic contact with language in this 
event. These two scenes are wound together like two halves of a DNA strand, each three 
line stanza effecting a transference between the two scenes by elliptically crossing 
between them and confusing them, as if each scene is immanent within the other—as if 
the two scenes are simultaneously present in the text. This effect could have its place in 
the proper name Olds; a connection across time, like an umbilical cord between the poet 
and Whitman, her poetic elder, whose wisdom is that of an old poet. In the first three 
stanzas the shift occurs through substitution in the subject position, from “You” to “I” in 
each stanza: “You move ... / the way I move”; “You bathe ... / as I touch”; “You write ... I 
take the dictation.” In the last two stanzas this split between second and first person 
pronoun cases is resolved in first person plural: “We bend,” “We lean,” “we conceive,” 
“we bring.” Thus, grammatically, the two scenes, if not the two subject positions, are 
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resolved into one. But rhetorically and oedipally the substitution isn’t symmetrical. The 
man with whom the speaker conceives is her father, substituting herself for her mother on 
one corner of the oedipal triangle. The men with whom Whitman conceives are the Union 
soldiers.  
 In this poem, Whitman is held over against the father as a mother’s breast is 
suspended over a child. Whereas the father is positioned as the dead, Whitman is 
positioned as a conceiver on the same order as the speaker, a giver of language and life, 
and he is given breasts. The W’s of his name may even be read in the word used to 
describe the breasts of Whitman and the speaker: “We lean down, our pointed breasts / 
heavy as plummets with fresh spermy milk.” “Plummets” has two substantive 
denotations, one the plumb bob, the other an oppressive burden. The letter W is shaped 
like two plumb bobs stuck together. The doubleness and the intimacy of breasts are 
observed in the way the name “Walt” is deployed. The poem begins by addressing Walt 
in the second person, the first three stanzas beginning with “You,” then in the third 
person plural (“we”) and by first name twice in the last two stanzas; two Walts hanging at 
the bottom of the lyric like two plumb bobs, two breasts, two scenes and a thematic of 
doubling, all under the auspices of the letter W.  
 Why is “Nurse Whitman” inserted between two poems, both of which are 
ambivalent in their dianoia or thought concerning the mother? Obviously this poem 
celebrates the image of mothering in a less skeptical way than the outer poems, “Quake 
Theory” (which concerns the fault between mother and daughter) and “Tricks” (as 
performed by a surrealist mother-magician who can make her daughter’s ovaries 
disappear, in addition to being “the tops, the best / magician”). The speaker of “Nurse 
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Whitman,” in contrast to the mother celebrated in the outer poems, promotes an image of 
herself as poet/mother, a mannish mother tending her dead father in the manner of her 
femme-y poet father, whom she metaphorically mothers, changing Walt Whitman into a 
nursing, fruiting, partially-feminine alter ego. This metamorphosis of Walt Whitman 
folds the parental corners of the oedipal triangle, superimposing maternal and paternal 
functions (and, to some extent, anatomy) or corners upon each other, displacing the 
“dead” father and the actual mother, who is, indeed, seemingly absent from the poem.  
 On an emotional vector opposite that of birthing, the text genders mourning in a 
strangely bisexual way, the pun on nursing making the scene of death and dying also a 
scene of “spermy milk” issuing from “plummets” figuring both breasts and phalloi. 
Mourning is a feedback loop with the past, with the old. And the form of logocentrism 
preserves itself by having structured mourning around itself. We will not free ourselves 
of it until we stop mourning. And yet, mourning is integral with healing. Mourning is the 
event that roots out the past and the passed, reducing their affects but preserving them at 
the same time. Some science fiction conceits concerned with immortality investigate this 
problematic: what healing capacity would be sacrificed were immortality to be achieved? 
In the human temporality, the temporality of death, this problematic concerns an 
imaginary scene. And the other scene, the imaginary scene of immortality, constitutes a 
fetish logic in its erection, a scene precisely opposite and apposite to thanatology. The 
two logics of dying and living unfold and infold each other in the question of what 
happens between these two scenes. Does either tableau not retain the other in its range or 
domain somewhere? Both Whitman’s and the author’s signatures are made to live in the 
text of Olds’ poem, her last name—indelibly a name of mourning—operating on and 
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through the figure of her father and through the concept of the elder. 
 
Poems About Mothering 
 Mothers and mothering return as a theme, usually set off in its own section, in all 
of Olds’ books except The Father. This thematic foregrounds the double vision of fetish 
logic. Often, the speaker’s desire splits, devising two or more scenes which conflict in the 
psychic economy of the speaker. The conflict may oppose one scene of the speaker-as-
mother to another one of the speaker-before-giving-birth. At other times the split involves 
two mother-daughter scenes: the scene of the speaker with her mother and the scene of 
the speaker with her daughter. In other instances the split under examination is between 
the mother and daughter. In “Young Mothers II” the two scenes of mother-daughter 
relation oppose the scene of the daughterless couple before birth. In each case a persona 
resists an older persona. Taken together, these various images comprise a model and 
exploration of the mother complex. 
 A notable moment in this exploration involves various uses of the birth scene that 
include the motif of salt. We have already seen salt/birthing imagery in two poems 
discussed above. In “Nurse Whitman,” the milk that the speaker and Whitman produce is 
“spermy,” suggesting the saltiness of sexual fluids. Another prevalent image condenses 
water, blood, and milk (fluids of reproduction) with seawater as we have seen in the 
poem “The Rising Daughter,” where the speaker sways in the womb like milk swaying in 
her mother’s breast, later (after birth?) taking into her body Japanese frogmen from “the 
heavy Pacific” as she draws sustenance from her mother’s body. Another exemplary 
instance of this salt-birth association appears in the third section of Satan Says, the 
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section entitled simply “Mother.” The trauma of birthing amplifies the division of the 
mother into two separate subjects until the event takes on Old Testament dimensions. The 
following comes from the poem “Young Mothers I”:  
    She has pressed out  
  the child in her. It lies, separate, 
  opening and closing its mouth, its hands 
  wrinkled with long immersion in salt water. 
 
  Now the mother is the other one, 
  breasts hard bags of rock salt, 
  the bluish milk seeping out, her soul 
  there in the small carriage, the child in her 
  risen to the top, like cream 
  and skimmed off. 
Although not quite biblical pillars, the salt in this poem would prevent nursing if we took 
the image literally, desiccating the breasts, de-oxygenating the milk, making it bluish as if 
it would suffocate the suckling child. The more literal tenor of the metaphor might be that 
the mother, “the other one” like her mother before her, does not receive milk from the 
hard breasts, that pleasurable experience now reversed by the giving of her own breast, a 
painfully sensuous experience, a kind of salt in the wound of birthing.  
 The schema of the poem incorporates a dream logic, a Freudian confusion of 
death and birth, in its representation of a paranoid anxiety dream condensing the fear for 
the life of the child with fear of the loss of self. The escape from this logic, which 
coincides with the reversal of thinking which ends the poem, consists in waking from the 
dream: 
She dreams of death by fire, death 
by falling, death by disembowelling, 
death by drowning, death by removal 
of the head. Someone starts to scream 
it wakes her up, the hungry baby 
  wakes and saves her. 
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Not until the last line is it clear that fear for the child has traced its sources in the 
mother’s unconscious fear for her own life. The words “saves her” refer to the mother 
saved by the child. Waking and escaping the dream logic, the speaker only reverts back 
to the logic of birthing, itself a fetish logic, resolving the fear-of-death dream on a 
conscious level but leaving the dream logic latent in the birthing logic. The speaker’s 
wakening returns her to the aftermath of the real scene of self-division, part of the self 
leaving, splitting off, becoming unknown to the mother: “She has pushed, lying alone on 
a bed, / sweating, isolated by pain, / splitting slowly.” This poem theorizes the mother-
child as the exemplary split subject, the literal splitting iterating itself as it enters memory 
and the unconscious, dividing the imagination against itself. Birthing is represented as a 
sort of inverse mirror stage, the parent misrecognizing herself in the child, herself as the 
specular other, which has indeed arisen from herself but is now separate and no longer 
knowable to herself, as “the child in her / risen to the top, like cream / and skimmed off.” 
At the same moment she is aware of the child’s awareness of her: “Now the mother is the 
other one.” The recognition of her own pre-oedipal memory in the child’s situation 
separates and differentiates her from the child which cannot yet know the further pain of 
separation and interiorizing violence it must undergo in order to grow and mature. A 
mother is faced with responsibility for that post-natal violence that all newborns must 
undergo. In other words she is faced with the task of creating a subject. 
 In the poem “The Possessive,” this theory of the maternal split subject is explored 
in the mother-daughter split. As the daughter ages and matures, the fear harbored in the 
imagination of the mother and in the unconscious (the unconscious without pre-position) 
is modulated, displaced by a return to the thematic of the enemy and war, the war 
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machine that hums in the Olds conceptual matrix, the thematic which runs through 
“Nurse Whitman” and “The Rising Daughter.” Speaking of her daughter, the speaker 
says,  
  Distant fires can be 
  glimpsed in the resin lights of her eyes: 
 
  the watch fires of an enemy, a while before 
  the war starts. 
 
And a similar war will be fought against the old self, the self that preceded the speaker’s 
mother-identity. In “Young Mothers II,” this old self is made the object of desire in one 
scene of a split-scene logic that explores the unconscious of the mother by looking back 
to a scene now illicit for the mother, a scene bracketed temporally by the speaker’s two 
mother-daughter scenes—a daughterless scene. In the aftermath of birth there is 
mourning for an old self: 
  They have torn her soul out of her body and said 
  the child is the other one. 
 
  Always a new baby to take her place,  
  and now she’s a lady-in-waiting again 
  to a queen. Out of her mother’s house 
  she has fallen into her daughter’s. 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  she stands outside a window and watches a childless couple 
  fucking in the resinous light of a fire 
  without interruption. 
 
The childless couple figures a scene of pre-conception, a daughterless scene. Within this 
figure, the circuit of desire is heterosexual and “without interruption.” This preconceptual 
and het circuit of desire is bracketed by the two scenes of mothering that inscribe her 
body and memory: “Out of her mother’s house she has fallen into her daughter’s” as if 
she has passed from one subject position in the mother complex to another. The het 
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circuit of desire may figure a wish to escape the mother complex altogether. This longing 
for the freedom of the old self, the self in the daughterless house, is a taboo desire, a 
desire implying the wish to not have the child or to be without the child, and a desire to 
return to an old paradigm, a middle stage between periods of subjection within the 
mother complex. 
 
 
 
 57 
 
 
Chapter 3 
“The Lifting” and the Superego 
 
“The Lifting” 
In the poem “The Lifting,” the subject matter is nested in the deathbed scene of 
the father. This poem is of special interest for a signature reading, for it has everything to 
do with the return of the name or, what is the same thing, its placement in the abyss. As 
with many of the poems in The Father, which chronicles the death by cancer of the poet’s 
father, the event the poem depicts takes place in the hospital room; the speaker’s father 
lifts his “nightie” (near the end of the poem it will be called his “cotton gown”), and the 
metaphorical trajectory of this lifting extends right to a classical, Book of Revelations 
moment, for the last two lines characterize the lifting as a revelation: “the way we were 
promised at death it would rise, / the veils would fall from our eyes, we would know 
everything.” What the speaker literally sees is the body of her father, dying and “gaunt,” 
beyond taboo, beyond oedipal pre- and dis-positioning, beyond her astonished disbelief: 
“I would not have believed it,” she says.  
 The entrance to this body is through the name. When the father lifts his nightie 
and unveils his body, the speaker turns away as if violating the taboo of his body. She is 
forced to turn back when he calls her by her nickname: 
Suddenly my father lifted up his nightie, I 
turned my head away but he cried out 
Shar!, my nickname, so I turned and looked. 
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Much of this poem’s structure results from a joining of names: the intimate and 
abbreviated nickname becomes enfolded with the surname, through an exploration of the 
old taboo body—and it begins with Shar!, not “shâr” (like “air” or “care”) apparently, but 
“shar.” This nicknaming performs an apocalyptic syncope of the proper name Sharon. 
How is Shar pronounced? The father’s pronunciation is buried, encrypted by this graphic 
representation of the nickname. Thus, the nickname becomes unknown at the moment of 
its representation and, in the chronology of the poem, within the father’s command that 
his daughter view his unveiled body.  
At the same time, in the same textual event, the second name of the signature 
encrypts “The Lifting.” The orientation and setting of the poem’s thought is clearly one 
of Old Testament intertextuality. A Old Testament undertone can be heard in the “nick” 
of  “nickname.” Old Nick is a moniker for Satan. As I’ve pointed out in the reading of 
“Satan Says” above, there is a hypogrammatic possibility that Sharon and Satan share, 
both words beginning with S and ending with n. That coincidence aligns perfectly with 
the thematic struggle of that poem: the speaker against her Satan. In “The Lifting” we are 
dealing with syncope, a different kind of deformation, suggesting a partial object.  
The scene of the child viewing the naked father constitutes one of the primal 
moments in the Old Testament, a psychological scene of the originary moment of taboo 
inception. In the ninth chapter of Genesis, after the flood narrative, the taboo of 
nakedness is articulated in a homofamilial scene. Ham sees his father, Noah, drunk and 
naked (and passed out?) in Noah’s tent. Ham reports what he has seen to his two brothers, 
Shem and Jephath, then God curses him, or at least his son Canaan (there is some 
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confusion in the patchwork of narratives).6 Olds’ poem is an elegant, feminist 
(mis)reading of this homotextual event, re-centering it around the subject position of a 
daughter. The poem follows the biblical trajectory of the motif of veiling, carrying it 
through to the idea of proper and final unveiling, the revelation, and the asymptotic and 
promissory omniscience of the Book of Revelations. But the poem first opens the scene 
of taboo and curse.  
 The various encryptions of the poem, including this encryption of revelation 
through taboo, reside in and consist of the description of a crisscross of gazes and 
signature effects.7 The command, Shar!, is elicited by an initial refusal of the gaze: “I / 
turned my head away but he cried out / Shar!” Thus, the first sentence introduces a 
deformation of the name “Sharon.”  A similar syncope forms an antonomasia, perhaps 
the most obvious type of counter-signature, “Olds” reduced to an adjectival “old,” 
delimiting the particular crypting of this poem: “he / shows me his old body.” The first 
and last names form an echo chamber in which the poem resounds with the two names. 
Between these names there is mourning for the once “solid ruddy stomach,” and the 
pelvis is compared to “a chambered whelk shell hollowed out.” The word “solid” 
expands the word “olds” by adding an “i” after moving the “s” to the front of the word. In 
a similar fashion, the word “hollowed” expands “old.” The word “shell” sounds the “sh” 
phoneme. The once solid stomach has lost its solidity, now old and loose.  
 Two crypts, the stomach and the pelvis: the stomach, or the skin of it, has fallen 
                                                
6 As an iteration of the prohibition against nudity, the story of Ham and Noah reiterates the story of the first 
veiling in the Garden of Eden. Adam and Eve ingest the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and 
become ashamed of their nakedness. Upon this realization, the couple fashions the first veil, an apron of fig 
leaves sewn together. These events are described in the third chapter of Genesis.  
7 For a rigorous theoretical reading of the gaze and the abject body in The Father, see Laura E. Tanner’s 
article “Death-Watch: Terminal Illness and the Gaze in Sharon Olds’ The Father.”  
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folded down “at the base of the abdomen,” which is the mouth or opening of the pelvis. 
The stomach, a fleshy sack (a bag of tissue forming a crypt for digestion, a crypt of 
consumption like the mouth, which is also a crypt of ingestion), collapses into the bony 
crypt of the pelvis, a crypt that may survive the death of the body for some time, thus, a 
crypt associated with corpses and one which while living houses the sacs of the lower 
organs, such as the ovaries and various alimentary organs. The poem roots down into the 
body of the father. The two names, Sharon and Olds, are also crypts that the poem 
explores. 
 Subtly, as the speaker is forced to make a decision about viewing the taboo 
nakedness of her father, the gaze of the reader also enters decision space. How does the 
father pronounce the forename-nickname? Would he say “sharr” or “share” or “cher”? 
These pronunciations conduct various meanings into the poem. The syncope, leaving out 
the “on” of Sharon, forces the reader into the signature space of the author, into the 
question of how her name functions in relation to her identity. No matter how her father 
pronounces the nickname (both ways? and/or possibly some other way or ways? not to 
mention the possible by-play between various nicknames that may affect the speaker), the 
promise of the name prominently accents the crossed identities of the daughter and the 
father. They share identity. Which one is charred, burnt? Which gaze burns and consumes 
the other? The question of the pronunciation is immediately complicated in the next 
sentence by “to show,” a synonym for sharing: “He was sitting in the high cranked up 
bed with the / gown up, to show me the weight he had lost.” His cancer has burnt the 
weight off his body; what is revealed by the gaze, what is shown? Identity reduced to its 
oedipal ashes? The gaze of the poem passes through cancer, his body, his chances, and 
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through memory. The weight has been lost, and to be shown it has to be shown in 
memory. This is one part of the chance operation of the gaze; another part of the chance 
operation is that it passes through the proper name. The “sh” of “to show”: the 
denotations of showing and sharing overlap within the concept of the gaze, and the “sh” 
disseminates the opening phoneme of Shar by means of a synonym of share. This 
dissemination also capitalizes obliquely on the shared pronunciation, which sounds the 
Old French cher, meaning dear, from the Latin carus. Because she cares, she looks: 
     I looked 
  where his solid ruddy stomach had been 
  and I saw the skin fallen into loose 
  soft hairy rippled folds 
  lying in a pool of folds 
She looks, and she sees one set of folds nested within another. The repetition of the word 
“folds” reproduces the same sort of invagination that appears in the nickname Shar, 
although the mechanism is idiosyncratic with each word. To fold—the word has great 
conceptual and theoretical range: invagination, la brisure, le pli, the pleat, the manifold 
of mathematics, etc. Deleuze says that “when an organism dies, it does not really vanish, 
but folds in upon itself, abruptly involuting into the again newly dormant seed by 
skipping all intermediate stages” (Fold 8), and this process might describe the 
transference between father and daughter of “The Lifting.” In this poem, the doubling of 
the word lets the meaning of the word act on itself: to fold is to double. In “Shar,” this 
doubling appears in the space between writing and sound, in the possibilities of 
pronunciation. In which case is desire more of a factor or chance more of a factor? In the 
syncope of the nickname, the desire of the father has been narrowed down to a precise 
dimension of the desire that he wishes to instill in the daughter, i.e., to the mastery of the 
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desire of the other. That much is graphed by the order word Shar!  The gazes will be 
exchanged, and then, in a second movement of this precise desire, the father will look 
away as the daughter did in the second line of the poem: “I saw / his rueful smile, the 
cast-up eyes as he / shows me his old body . . . ." In the exchange of gazes, the desire of 
the daughter moves through the desire to eat the father at the same time that it moves 
through the name of the father: “I saw the folds of skin like something / poured, a thick 
batter, I saw / his rueful smile ... as he / shows me his old body.” “Folds, batter, shows, 
old”: these words diagram the desire at stake in the hinge of the names Shar and Olds. 
Sharing and sharking, signature iterations of Shar!, both channel the meaning of desire 
through the image of consuming the other; offering one’s self to be consumed, or force-
feeding (by means of the order word) the other one’s own body, figures the desire to 
reproduce one’s own desire precisely within the other as a means of reterritorializing the 
identity of the other—as a means of jealousy.  
 To cook the batter of the other from the inside out: the poem constructs the 
subjectivity of both father and daughter by mirroring their desires in symmetry. He issues 
her nickname as an order word; the poem disseminates countersignatures of his name, 
Olds, folding the two names into a religion of this singular mirroring by reterritorializing 
the concept of revelation. From the old body (the name of the law of the father), Olds, 
comes the order word, Shar!, as if Olds were the origin and destination of Sharon, the 
teleology and eschatology of the obscene super-ego, the father that says no but then says 
yes, ordering the daughter to see his body as his desire would consume her desire, as 
death is consuming the old body. She struggles to find every way possible to redeem the 
law of the father as a means of transcending all the ways the law of the father (un)veils 
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and forecloses love. In other words, by turning the circuit of desire that originates in the 
oedipal moment inside out, she converts a scene of reterritorialization (of the child by the 
parent on the oedipal plane) into one of deterritorialization (on the religious plane, 
opening or contaminating revelation, here the coincidence of death and omniscience) by 
equating revelation with the desire of the obscene superego, thus contaminating or 
opening that desire. This kind of event also occurs in scenes of mourning; mourning as 
the occasion for otherwise unacceptable sadness and the delirium that points to problems 
in one’s existence. 
 Every breath is the entrance and exit of death: the empty chest, skin folded down, 
cadaver collapsed, then the body inflated like a balloon, the most basic extension of 
consciousness, the autonomic system’s embeddedness in the material and energetic textus 
or economy of the universe. This entrance and exit of death implies the body’s 
unconscious exploration and reterritorialization of the experience of death through 
breathing. Breath as a metonymy of life implies the metaphorical absence of life at the 
conclusion of exhalation: presence and absence of breath, presence and absence of life. 
This reterritorialization is further mapped by means of language when the breath is 
morcelized as speech, segmented influence networks that modulate representation in the 
formation of the linguistic ego, and further mapped by the inevitable folding back of 
consciousness into the absolute past and the present of the unconscious due to the 
memory structures language creates. This structure tends to unsuture the conceptual 
veiling of death and its lack, a process in which language’s peculiar delay modes play an 
important role. Olds’ poetry, like much good poetry, is an exploration of this zone of 
language and signature. 
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 “The Ferryer,” another poem from The Father, explores this transitional space 
that folds together the edges of life and death in the mythic figure of Charon, the 
ferryman whose proper name forms a port into the proper name Sharon. The cadaverous 
body of the father becomes a gargoyle sitting in the prow of the ferryboat as a stone 
statue who in his rictus maintains a straight face with the speaker. She uses his 
hatefulness to sentence other people who annoy her to a deathlike disappearance from her 
consciousness. Her father’s death becomes a hidden erection of the name “Sharon” as the 
two, in the dianoia of “The Ferryer,” share a joke. The proper name Charon is never 
deployed, only its mythic and structural elements serving to metonymically outline the 
father’s figure. In the blank of that outline sits the gargoyle cadaver of the speaker’s 
father. And this is the joke that the two are having: he has taken on the persona of 
Charon, as acute and expert as he is at performing the deathlike disappearance of others 
from his consciousness. The poem is classically Freudian and structurally neat in its 
occlusion of the proper name Charon as a means of penetrating the abyss of the proper 
name Sharon. And for “The Lifting” this might augur a pronunciation of Shar that would 
coincide with her father’s pronunciation of Charon—whether or not her father ever 
pronounced the word Charon. The speaker’s inner ear hearing the word in her name (or 
refusing to) imputes to it the nickname her father gives her. Refusal or negation in 
language always implies a positivation of the negated condition at some other level of 
language, especially in the case of the proper name, forming striations and smooth space 
simultaneously around the phonemes of the morcelized name. The name occupies a most 
prominent position in the subject’s particular linguistic space, including the space of her 
alterity. 
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 But which speaker has imputed this pronunciation of Sharon: the speaker of 
critical convention or the person who really heard her father’s pronunciation of her 
nickname? The graphism of “The Lifting” (Shar!) plays havoc with the masks we 
normally erect for the exercise of commentary. Or does Olds (or “Olds”) even give a 
damn how her father pronounced it, mispronounced it, un-, re-, or dispronounced it? And 
his having pronounced Shar—what would that pronunciation be now, he and the 
pronunciation having been folded back into time with his death? Is Charon pronounced 
shair'-әn or kair'-әn, (ʃɛәrәn or ˈkɛәrәn)? The OED gives ˈkɛәrәn. Share-ron or Care-
ron? Both offer moral imperatives. But some modern astronomers pronounce it shair'-
әn, as in the name Charlene. James W. Christy, who discovered Pluto’s moon, named 
it Charon, which he pronounced after his wife’s name “Charlene” (nickname “Char”). 
Ch can be pronounced sh.  
 Olds folds her father’s skin neatly, as if it were a flag, and places it on his spine 
where his internal organs are empty sacs forming the floor into the crypt of the rib cage 
and the crypt of the pelvis. In this poem about opening the crypts of the body, the speaker 
figuratively puts her body and the body of her daughter in the crypt of her father’s body, 
as if they are crypts within his crypt. As such, if this poem is not about sharing, then that 
is precisely what it is not about: nothing of the body is shared except what is taboo—an 
epistemology of taboo. After the stomach and the torso, the next thing the poem sees in 
the body of the father is its genetic code graphed into the memory of the speaker via the 
image of the hip shape shared by father, daughter, and granddaughter, as though this code 
were wound into a whelk shell. But only that synecdoche of the body, the pelvis, carries 
forward through the speaker’s daughter. The shell of the image is “hollowed out,” as if 
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for the continuance of the development of the image, for the line following returns to the 
fleshy “folds of the skin like something poured, a thick batter.”  The shell is emptied of 
its (edible?) marine snail, in order to make room for the batter of the father, displacement 
of one life by another, the batter falling into the area of the lowest chakras, the base of the 
spine, in the back of the bowl of the pelvis, as if the trait becomes the crypt for the flesh, 
as if the bodies of the female descendants become the tomb of the father, the new domain 
of the father, the origin and remains of his legacy in matter, as if his flesh will be baked 
by the sexual energy of the daughters. But the containment of the image, in a 
psychological sense, becomes confused: whose hips are contained and whose are 
container, and whose form is holding whose? As with the crisscross of gazes in this 
poem, the readability of the image involves a confusion of subject positions, a cycle of 
desire inscribed in time and in matter that folds the subjects into each other. 
 Signature effects of the poem (left column below) can be schematically arraigned 
against the sequence of images (right column) that accrete in the text, although 
technically the images and effects are immanent within each other, woven together and 
out of each other. This becomes apparent as soon as one begins to compose such lists: 
 
Shar!       nightie lifted 
to show      gaze averted 
rippled folds      father in cranked up bed 
pool of folds      lost weight 
pelvis shaped      ruddy stomach 
shell       skin fallen 
folds of skin      gaunt torso 
he shows      hips 
old body      skin like batter 
told me      rueful smile 
solid stomach      naked body 
       glans 
       penis 
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       snowflakes 
       gown 
       veils 
 
The right column suggests, in its sequence, the penetration into the taboo realm, with the 
sensational fall of the gaze down the body of the father, beginning with the “gown up, 
around the his neck,” then moving down to the stomach, down to the hips, back up to the 
face, then down again to the forbidden genitals before returning to the gown itself (a 
figure of the poem itself, a weave of text(ure)) and its attendant, apocalyptic thematic of 
veils which the poem exploits in its ending. What does the signature column suggest 
when it is juxtaposed to this penetration?  By symmetry and by the hinge of the two 
proper names in the signature, it suggests the copulation of the two names of the 
signature in the implicate order of the text. On this level, the level of the letter, what does 
language know of taboo?  The word shell suggests, in its appropriation of “ell” for its 
displacement of “-aron,” hell. Looking over Olds’ work, few readers would disagree that 
Olds’ obsession with her father willfully transgresses the boundaries of . . . decorum?  
Occasionally she explores the physical desire she feels for her father.8  But the question 
for a signature poetics concerns the joint, the hinge, the connection, the copulation 
between two names and what this dyadic relation produces. The two names veil, and 
unveil each other. 
 The end of “The Lifting” moves the dialogic of the two names, Sharon and Olds, 
into the abstract generality of the question of epistemological security, couching this 
move in a bold extension of the onto-theological intertextuality, elevating the stakes of 
the poem. What exactly does the absolute quality of the concept of omniscience have to 
                                                
8See for instance “Looking at My Father” in The Gold Cell.  
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do with the oedipal relation? The resistance of the “The Lifting” lies in its ambiguous 
slippage between the sensuous description of the abject body of the dying father and the 
bracketing biblical intertextuality, these brackets beginning the poem in the Old 
Testament mode of taboo violation, and ending it in the problem of the New Testament’s 
closure, the issue of Revelation—which amounts to the problem of the concept of 
omniscience. How can the concept (of omniscience) and the (dying) body be reconciled 
(in terms of Christian myth)?  
 The seemingly abstract philosophical structure of the poem poses the antithesis 
between the promise of omniscience and the problem of alterity which counterposes 
omniscience absolutely. Seen in this light, the poem suggests the destruction of alterity as 
a form of conceptual violence coincident with seeing through the death of the father. The 
abject alterity of the diseased body would somehow have lead to the erasure of alterity’s 
partition between the daughter and the father—if “we know everything.”  For 
omniscience to resolve the tension of the poem, it would have to resolve the issue of 
taboo violation and the question of what is finally seen in the body of the father. Consider 
the concept of omniscience as a function of the poem, or as a function applied to the 
poem. Omniscient knowledge of the father would be a mapping from omniscience-in-
general (the range of the function) back into the domain of the function, that knowledge 
coextensive with the subject matter or the gaze of the poem. This mapping reminds us 
that the concept of omniscience itself veils the potential and the possibility that it 
announces. It promises more than it delivers in any limited sense of time. 
 The end of the “The Lifting” stretches the veil of biblical intertextuality from 
Genesis, where the beginning of the poem positions itself, to Revelations, shrouding the 
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body of the father. At the end of the poem, this move to revelation diverts the gaze from 
the body of the father by shifting the range of the gaze from the material emphasis on the 
body to the conceptual problems of time, epistemology, and the ends of onto-theological 
thought. The transitional image from the taboo body of the father to the concept of the 
promise is again rooted in the gaze:  
              But now I can still 
  see the tiny snowflakes, white and   
  night-blue, on the cotton of the gown as it 
  rises the way we were promised at death it would rise, 
  the veils would fall from our eyes, we would know everything. 
 
At first glance, it appears that the play of phonemes disseminating from the signature has 
been suspended. But as the representation of the speaker’s gaze moves from the body to 
the gown and the analysis of the gown, then through memory to the association with the 
revelatory promise, succeeded by the placement of the gaze itself under erasure, if you 
will, which the concept of omniscience performs, as all this occurs in the text, the effects 
of the signature can still be surmised. With the rising and falling, the imagery has become 
cold, a strong and sensuous signature effect, first noted above in the reading of “Satan 
Says,” the first poem in the first of Olds’ books. And then the transition to the subjunctive 
mood of the last clause opens the problematic of temporality in its movements among 
tenses, as the condition of the promise is recounted: this transition traverses the old. And 
of course, the concept of omniscience raises the possibility of an absolute sharing, and in 
fact, even the end of the possibility of (not) sharing. 
 As “The Lifting” leaps from the concrete to the abstract in its close, it seems to 
invite a theoretical reading. We can pose oppositions and inversions among various 
concepts that the poem evokes: sharing vs. replacement, omniscience vs. alterity, 
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metaphor vs. irony, temporality vs. knowledge, the gaze of desire vs. desire of the gaze . . 
. . Such a list provides a hunting ground for signature effects. For instance, consider 
oldness, age and aging as a form of alterity, of becoming-alter, becoming-other. If the 
poem is ironic, then it reads as a valorization of alterity, but if its metaphoricity overrides 
its irony, then the literal revelation of the event in the hospital room, the revealing of the 
body, unfurls into the positive possibility of absolute revelation. Such a metaphorical leap 
from the body to the conceptual suggests an omniscient erasure of alterity (an Hegelian 
Aufhebung on the plane of the subject). This celebrated poststructural opposition between 
metaphor and irony, when applied to “The Lifting,” suggests an American style 
deconstructive reading, one of undecidability between mutually exclusive meanings. 
 
The Golden Rose 
 What is the hinge that joins the two names, Sharon and Olds?  Does it help to 
think of it as metaphor or as ironic?  There is a space between the names. The possibility 
of meaning, of metaphor or irony as such, requires a certain space of possibility. Any 
signature poetics must open and expand that space in terms of the signature at hand: 
spacing. The hinge must open. 
 In The Dead and the Living, at the beginning of the section labeled Private, six of 
the poems deal with three of the speaker’s grandparents, her father’s father and her two 
grandmothers, all of whom have died. These are poems addressed to dead elders. 
Through these poems the grandmothers are more or less accepted, but she writes against 
the grandfather. The fourth and fifth poems in this sequence address respectively the 
maternal grandmother and the paternal grandfather. These two poems lie on facing pages, 
heightening their thematic opposition. Like the other four poems addressing the dead 
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grandparents, these poems seem to be complex, cathartic exercises in anamnesia. 
 These two poems for the private dead single out two of her elders, and they then 
suggest a formation akin to Derrida’s anthonomasia.9 In “Birthday Poem for My 
Grandmother,” an antonomasia of Sharon, by way of “Rose of Sharon” and “Rose” taken 
as the common noun “rose,” constitutes a signature effect suggesting a form of 
identification between the speaker and the maternal grandmother. This poem orients the 
memory of the dead grandmother around the roses near the speaker’s porch and 
metaphorically describes the quality of her absence as the lack of color things have at 
night:  
           I thought of the 
  new rose,    and went out over the  
  grey lawn—    things really  
  have no color at night.  I descended  
  the stone steps,    as if to the place where one 
  speaks to the dead.  The rose stood 
  half-uncurled,    glowing white in the 
  black air.  
 
The absence of the grandmother draws out the memory of her failing body’s beauty, 
blind and in arthritic pain. This poem is about the wish to talk to and to feel the presence 
of the old who have died. Appropriately the poem associates her with roses, as it explores 
the memories that must suffice in her absence. 
 In contrast, “Of All the Dead That Have Come to Me, This Once” is a poem of 
rejection written on the occasion of the arrival of the paternal grandfather’s gold 
pocketwatch. It begins “I have never written against the dead.”  This poem explicitly 
                                                
9Anthonomasia, a neologism which Derrida suggests in Glas to describe the character of Genet’s rhetoric 
of flowers, makes a portmanteau of the words “anther” (the pollen-bearing part of the stamen of a flower) 
or “antherect” and “antonomasia,” the trope of converting a proper noun into a common noun, or vice 
versa, and suggesting the term anthology, a collection of texts. Glas itself comprises an anthology of the 
texts of both Genet and Hegel. Thus, the pun performs the flowering of a rhetorical term, a genetian effect. 
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declares that the memory of the dead grandfather is too much present and must be 
forgotten:  
  “Let the fall he made . . .  
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
    . . . be his last  
  appearance here. 
 
This explicit argument of the poem is implicitly and ironically supported by a strategy of 
color. Vivid and colorful, the poem chromatically analyzes the gold of the pocketwatch 
into the color of “the Rockies / over the dark yellow of the fields / and the black rivers,” 
then again refracts the gold into a “black room with the fire, the light of the flames / 
flashing in his glass eye,” and finally imperatively visualizes the death of grandfather in 
an image that further analyzes the text’s color value: 
  Let the fall he made through that glass roof, 
  splintering, turning, the great shanks and  
  slices of glass in the air, be his last 
  appearance here. 
 
“The great shanks and slices of glass in the air” suggests a prismatic splintering of the 
light in the grandfather’s glass eye and the dispersal of his memory as light is flashingly 
decomposed into its colors. The signature irony puts the signature effect of the 
grandfather’s name, Olds←→gold, to work writing against him. This irony contrasts 
markedly with the use of the rose in the facing poem to metaphorically figure the 
grandmother and the attraction and affection the speaker feels for her. 
 The gold pocketwatch also folds the image of the paternal grandmother into the 
paternal name: “Grandmother’s blank / face pressed against his name in the back.”  The 
“blank face” suggests a loss of affect and the “face pressed ... in the back” suggests her 
suppression and/or repression by the grandfather and his name. In addition, the 
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juxtaposition with the poem on the facing page redoubles the displacement of the paternal 
grandmother by juxtaposing the maternal grandmother (and the white rose) with the gold 
pocketwatch. The name of the grandfather is not given explicitly, but I assume it is 
Olds.10 The two poems comprise a partial diagram of the two names, Sharon and Olds. 
What the speaker of “Birthday Poem for My Grandmother” has lost in her maternal 
grandmother, is the possibility of sharing one of the possibilities of Sharon, the 
possibility of roses: “You would have been ninety and getting / roses from me.”  In 
contrast neither of the paternal grandparents receives this warm treatment. Olds writes 
against the grandfather in the facing poem, and on the following page “Farewell Poem,” 
with the dedication “(for M. M. O., 1880-1974),” is dominated by images of coldness, 
another relay of the paternal signature. “Farewell Poem” resigns the memory of the 
Grandmother Olds to an iceberg that will deliver her to a “cool white long room.”  
  
 “Fate” and Oil 
 The poem “Fate,” from “The Family” section of The Dead and the Living also 
develops a certain antagonism between effects issuing from the two names of the 
signature. From the image of the “greased, defeated face” of the speaker’s father, the “sh” 
returns repeatedly, forming a series: shining, shining, shined—“defeated face shining,” 
“whole world shining with the ecstasy of his grief,” and finally in the pronoun jumble, “I 
/ myself, he, I, shined.”  The last sentence of the poem roots this shining in the word 
“oiled,” a double epenthesis (the addition of a letter sound or syllable to the middle of a 
word) adding the letters “i” and “e” to the word “old,” planting extra vowels in it like 
                                                
10 The poem repeats imagery from “The Guild” which depicts the the “apprenticeship” of the speaker’s 
father with the grandfather, who is the “master in cruelty and oblivion.” 
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bulbs pushed down in the soil, and then the “s” of Sharon is grafted onto the word “oil” 
itself, to get “soil,” continuing the assonance of “oiled”: 
  I saw the whole world shining 
  with the ecstasy of his grief, and I  
  myself, he, I, shined, 
  my oiled porous cheeks, glaucous 
  as tulips, the rich smear of the petal, 
  the bulb hidden in the dark soil, 
  stuck, impacted, sure of its rightful place. 
 
Her identity here seems the result of new vowels, “i” and “e” pushed into the old name. 
The epenthesis from “Olds” to “oiled” takes place frequently throughout Olds’ work, 
usually in the imagery of her father’s face.11  In this particular poem, the “greased 
defeated face” [my emphasis] that opens the imagery begins the process of palimpsesting 
the father’s body and the identity of the speaker and leading to the literal effacing and 
defacing of the speaker, then to the refiguration of the speaker in the simile “glaucous as 
tulips” and her disfiguration as a “bulb hidden in the dark soil, stuck, impacted.”  The soil 
becomes a figure for the unconscious, reiterating the old, oiled, shared memory of the 
father-daughter, i.e., the “wet ground that / things you love have fallen onto / and been 
lost for good,” which “glistens” early in the poem. The dissonant oxymorons “shining 
defeat” and “ecstatic grief” gather together “greased,” “glistening,” “sour mash,” “oiled,” 
“porous,”—signature effects of the surname—and reform them into a flower, a tulip 
rather than a rose, which retains “the rich smear” of glaucous oil, unlike a rose. The tulip 
annually dies back, living on the food stored in its bulb, and renews itself from the 
ground up. This would explain the past tense construction of the poem; the winter of 
identity, the dying back into the realization that the inescapable overdetermination of 
                                                
11In The Living and the Dead see especially “Looking at My Father,” “Late Poem to My Father,” and “June 
24.”  Also cf. Anne Sexton, “A Woman Is Her Mother.” 
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oedipal identity springs from a seasonal temporality. Memories and structures of memory 
can die, resigned to an absolute past like soil which folds life forward through its 
decomposition, opening the possibilities of change through renewal. A subtext of the 
poem, in the abyss of the names, suggests, as Dylan Thomas would say, “the force that 
through the green fuse drives the flower,” the renewal of the flower, the re-composition 
out of the soil, and the blossoming of the flower of Sharon.  
 The play of light on oil, a prismatic and fluid effect, becomes the occasion of the 
memoriam to identity that accompanies the contemplation of one’s connection to others 
in the midst of alterity. The light/oil image suggests the boundary (of death) between self 
and other, if not (to diagram it) the singular vector that orients itself among the 
multiplicity of vectors comprising the Other. That relation to alterity forms the exterior 
and the abyss of the poem, the possibility of the poem, the Other toward whom she shines 
and with whom she shines. But that alterity, in its ineffable permeation of language and 
identity, cannot be clearly delimited. Yes, she becomes her father, and that is the 
becoming implicit in the title of the poem, “Fate.”  But it is not the end of that becoming. 
To begin with she becomes her father “shining toward anyone I looked at”; his gaze 
overdetermines her gaze at the beginning of the poem, and this moment has to be 
accepted, examined, subjected to a temporally retrospective gaze, and passed over for the 
poem to work itself out, to gather its strength for the flowery transformation that arises 
out of the possibility beyond the surrender and capitulation that the first line of the poem 
announces: “Finally I just gave up and became my father.”  This collapse of singularity 
and identity in oedipal confusion parallels the encryption of the names in the abyss. 
 An early poem, “The Unborn,” in Satan Says, similarly expands the surname into 
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an image that brings the boundary of alterity and death into view. Apparently addressing 
the speaker’s husband, the poem concerns “the children we could have.”  The third stanza 
characterizes these possible children in this way: “Sometimes I see them lying like love 
letters / in the Dead Letter Office.” The acronym D. L. O. reverses the spelling of Old, 
and, reading the pun on “letters,” puts the signature in the crypt of the poem at the level 
of the letter. Although most of the these imagined children never live, there is the specter 
of death that comes with the letter D, and its expansion into the word Dead, haunting 
them, including the ones that may be born. And this graft of the word “dead” onto the 
letter D reminds us of the proximity of the two words Old and Dead. For humans, old age 
inevitably leads to death. As Lucy McDiarmid says of The Wellspring, and her statement 
is generalizable across Olds’ poetry, the “bodies she writes about—her mother’s, father’s, 
lovers’, children’s, husband’s—exist with all their genetic histories and reproductive 
organs fully visible to the poet.” Including the ends of those singular genetic 
configurations, death, as well as the beginnings. The eggs that females are born with and 
which this poem contemplates, their potential children, reside in the crypt of the ovaries 
until they move out of the female body, to be released at ovulation, dispelled at menses, 
or born, or until they die with the body of the mother. Similarly, signature poetics could 
be theorized in terms of alterity. The letters of the signature could be conceived as sperm 
or eggs, folded into crypts of the proper name/body until released into texts to go their 
own way in the world.  
 Another poem that, like “Fate,” plays on both the “sh” phoneme of Sharon and the 
“old” phoneme also resides in “The Family” section of The Dead and the Living. In “The 
Takers” Olds compares her sister to Hitler as she describes an incident of sibling 
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terrorism, her sister coming into her room at night and peeing on her. After the “dark gold 
smell of the urine” permeates the room, and she has been charred with shame and her 
body “scorched” by the “boiling heat” of her sister’s urine, she feels her sister’s pleasure: 
    When the hissing stopped, when the  
hole had been scorched in my body, I lay 
crisp and charred with shame and felt her  
skin glitter in the air, her dark 
gold pleasure unfold as [Hitler] stood over 
Napoleon’s tomb and murmured This is the  
finest moment of my life. 
 
As with the oil/shining relation in “Fate,” the “old” phoneme in “gold” and “unfold” 
stands in an emotional contrast to the “sh” phoneme in “shame.”  The signature effects 
lock the two names in a death grip similar to the death or sex grip of the portmanteau 
“shoulder.”12 Note also here the crypt imagery, the hole in her body compared to 
Napoleon’s tomb, a stunning image of interiorizing violence, within which the signature 
effects refer to various affects. 
 In the same section of The Dead and the Living, the poem “The Derelict” also 
uses gold and urine in its imagery. This poem compares a derelict to the speaker’s 
brother, but in this case the causality of the familial tragedy is placed on the speaker, the 
effect on the brother. The derelict and the brother both have blond beards, and the 
“nerveless” hands of the derelict are imagined as the crushed hands of a violinist—this 
image of hands becomes a metaphor for the life of the brother: 
    I smell the waste of his 
  piss, I see the ingot of his beard, 
  and think of my younger brother, his beauty, 
  coinage and voltage of his beard, his life 
  he is not using, like a violinist whose 
                                                
12See the reading of “Love Fossil” above for a reading of the signature effect in the word “shoulder.” 
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  hands have been crushed so he cannot play— 
  I who was there at the crushing of his hands 
  and helped to crush them. 
 
The word “gold” does not appear, but the derelict’s “blond beard” evokes for the speaker 
the “ingot” of her brother’s beard, as well as its “coinage”—blond, ingot, and coinage 
together suggesting gold. In addition, the word “voltage” is also evoked by gold due to its 
excellent conductivity and the similar ways in which gold and electricity respectively 
reflect and produce light. The signature effect is further developed by the text through the 
word “beauty,” a quality that makes gold a prized possession. These golden associations 
work a stark contrast with the golden characteristics of the derelict, the “waste of piss” 
and the “skin polished [as if golden] with grime.”  The “blond beard” of the derelict is 
also “like a sign of beauty and power.”  What is the power of gold, what is its potenz?  
That would be one of the leading questions of the investigation of this signature. In this 
poem the golden properties are weighted about equally between positive and negative 
affects, with tragedy canceling potential at an originary moment of the text.  
 
Anticipation 
 Situated at the end of Part One, the poem “When” functions as a transition 
between the first two sections in Olds’ third book of poems, The Gold Cell. This is a 
slight poem, with a minimalist presentation consisting of not much more than the 
elaboration of a single image. It seems brief and undeveloped for an Olds lyric, only 15 
lines long. Most of the poems in this book run to 30 lines or more, which is typical of her 
style. In its position, strategy, and brevity the poem resides in the “margin” of the 
volume. But there is gold here, as if the book’s poetic drives insist upon the resonance of 
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the word gold.  
 Skimming down through the poem, the phoneme “old” stands out in two key 
details of the image. The image consists of a woman out in her yard, holding her daughter 
in her arms as a gold ball lifts over the horizon. Here is the poem in its entirety: 
  When 
 
 
  I wonder now only when it will happen, 
  when the young mother will hear the 
  noise like somebody’s pressure cooker 
  down the block, going off. She’ll go out in the yard 
  holding her small daughter in her arms,  
  and there, above the end of the street, in the  
  air above the line of the trees, 
  she will see it rising, lifting up 
  over our horizon, the upper rim of the  
  gold ball, large as a giant 
  planet starting to lift up over ours. 
  She will stand there in the yard holding her daughter, 
  looking at it rise and glow and blossom and rise, 
  and the child will open her arms to it, 
  it will look so beautiful. 
 
The poem’s repetitiousness prominently foregrounds the word “will.”  The holding image 
lends itself to this repetitious effect, rhythmically spacing and dividing the poem into 
three parts. The holding also sets off the most puzzling feature of the poem, the gold ball, 
which comes into view in the middle third of the poem. The question of the gold ball, its 
symbolic value, stands in relation to the mother-daughter pair, and that relation begins to 
unfold as the poem ends. The three points of this relation constitute a triangle, gold ball-
mother-daughter, connected by the holding: the mother holds the daughter, and the 
daughter opens her arms to the ball as if to hold it, and the attention of the mother is held 
by the ball. Of course, it is possible to read this triangle as an oedipal triangle with the 
corner of the father signified by the gold ball. Such a reading lends itself to the 
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interpretation of the signature as a scene of conflict. The names “Sharon” and “Olds” 
signify daughter and parents, Sharon locked in a struggle with the Olds.  
 The symbolic potential of the gold ball also suggests a struggle of mythic scope, a 
nuclear conflict erupting with a “noise like somebody’s pressure cooker / . . . going off,” 
then “rising,” “glowing,” and “blossoming” like a mushroom cloud “over our horizon.”  
The unexpected shift from third person pronouns, she and her, to first person plural 
possessive, our, also suggests some slippage on the part of the speaker, as if she has been 
speaking of herself in the third person, then lapses into first person plural as the gold ball 
ascends over “our horizon” and “our planet.”  The first person plural expands the scope 
of the poem, amplifying the prophetic tone addressed to the reader or, more generally, 
“our” culture. But this Old Testament tone comes packaged in a parabolic form, and the 
parable centers on the triangle, mother-daughter-gold ball. So, arguably, the text has to be 
examined on an Oedipal level if not on the intrasubjective level of the speaker. The poem 
starts with the pronoun “I,” which makes the presence of the speaker somehow distinct 
from the mother and daughter yet integral with the details of the image and the event that 
the poem assigns to the future. The speaker is an observer of the triangle. The later 
pronoun shift to the plural reinforces this initial integrity and brings the speaker and the 
image into immediate proximity. The question that seems implicit here concerns the 
consequences of the poem’s final movement, the child’s welcoming of the gold ball, for 
the speaker. 
 In “When” there appears only the slightest of alphabetical effects from the name 
Sharon; the “sh” of the “she” used to refer to the young mother three times. Yet this 
minimal trace of the signature suggests a link between the desire of the mother (and the 
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child’s enjoyment) and the desire of the speaker. In a psychoanalytic reading following 
Lacan, the mother-child dyad would stand as a specular counterpart to the ego of the 
speaker. For Lacan such a specular image conveys a sense of wholeness, which the 
nascent ego aims for but can never achieve. So the drives circle around this flawed sense 
of wholeness which implies a missing element, the objet a. For Lacan, in so far as the 
drives go beyond the pleasure principle their object is one of jouissance which would 
complete or finish desire, and for this reason Lacan posits that all drives are composed in 
part of the death drive. In “When” the apocalyptic tone and the final movement of the 
child coalesce around the gold ball, strangely positioning it like an objet a that has come 
into view. The gold ball looms as something monstrous, something of absolute alterity. In 
terms of psychic temporality and in the temporality of the poem, the ball signifies that 
future which affects the present. In Lacan’s reading of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit,13 this 
structure of affect is referred to as “anticipation.”  For instance, in the mirror stage the 
ego is constructed in anticipation of an imagined future wholeness as mentioned above. 
The gold ball in its roundness suggests the circular, which connotes wholeness, and in its 
gold color it suggests heaven and the attendant Judeo-Christian tenets of fulfillment and 
completion, which ameliorate the problems of death. Both the monstrous and the 
wondrous are condensed in the image. The theories of psychic temporality of Freud and 
Lacan emphasize the idea that psychic time can act in reverse, and Olds’ poem shows 
how the sense of apocalypse relates the future to the present and how, psychically, 
                                                
13 Laplanche and Pontalis define Nachträglichkeit as a “Term frequently used by Freud in connection with 
his view of psychical temporality and causality: experiences, impressions and memory-traces may be 
revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development. 
They may in that event be endowed not only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness” 
(111). They go on to point out that this contravenes the stereotypical view that Freud’s theory reduces 
psychological causation to an infantile past (112). 
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wholeness is related to annihilation. 
 As with anticipation, this poem can also be read in terms of “retroaction” (après 
coup), which more closely corresponds to Nachträglichkeit, or “deferred action,” as 
English translators have termed it. The ego of the speaker then is already doubly dyadic 
in this image. And this is in keeping with the synchronic temporality of Nachträglichkeit. 
The psyche of the mother contains only memory of her own childhood enjoyment, and 
now (in the time of the poem) that memory is remolded by the presence of her child in 
her arms. The jouissance of the child (the unbridled desire of the child) stands enfolded 
with the desire of the mother in the moment of the poem. The diachronic diagram of the 
child’s jouissance and the mother’s desire forms a circle of (non)repression around the 
mother’s jouissance, a buried memory that synchronically anchors and spaces the 
mother’s identity within the mother-child dyad. Desire is castrated jouissance, the 
condition that arises when jouissance is repressed; but the child, being held by the mother 
as if still at the breast, remains uncastrated. The love of the mother therefore implies an 
affirmation of jouissance although within herself the jouissance has been repressed and 
castrated. This repression and castration forms the mold of desire. So the scene contains a 
readable diagram of Nachträglichkeit in its retroactive aspect. The child’s mother is able 
to “see” in her daughter her own libido or jouissance as it existed before her “loss of 
innocence.”  But her understanding is not the thing itself. It is tempered by time, existing 
across the divide or gap of representation. In psychoanalytic terms, her past exists in the 
psyche only as memories, which are affected by and understood only through present 
experience. 
 “When” presents three subject positions in relation to the gold ball: the speaker’s, 
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the mother’s, and the child’s. In terms of Nachträglichkeit, the speaker’s persona 
represents  anticipation, and the mother-daughter dyad represents retroaction. The poem 
functions like a portmanteau, folding together two diagrams of Nachträglichkeit: 
anticipation and retroaction function together in text. 
 What then is the relationship between the signature, jouissance, and 
Nachträglichkeit?  This poem associates the temporality of Nachträglichkeit with the 
gold ball, and it does so as an introduction to Part Two of  the book, which consists of 
poems dealing with the mother and father. The signature in its duration takes on the 
quality of a tableau or photograph, apparently a static record or marker attached to its 
bearer. While it functions over time diachronically, it maintains the kind of synchronic 
structure that Lacan emphasizes over the linear and diachronic “stage” models of 
development of some psychoanalytic school’s theories. 
Beyond or before the veiling of identity that is inherent in the linguistic condition, 
there is (in this poem) the simple antithesis that emerges between the gold ball and what 
is “ours.”  When will our horizon and our planet be replaced or overshadowed by 
something larger or something other, something “gold”?  And in parallel on the 
intrasubjective level, when does what is introjected into the crypt of the ego (in particular, 
the signature and the proper name) give way to or lead to the Other of the unconscious, 
the alterity of interiority?  What is the poetics of invention that has to extend itself out of 
the mirror stage and the other of specular wholeness that forms the representational basis 
of the ego? That introjection of the signature might be the figure of figures for Olds’ 
poetry, the figure for that invention that both preserves and escapes the specular other. 
The most comprehensive, severe and delirious intertextuality manifests itself in the 
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sustained and insistent iterations of the word “gold” that run through The Gold Cell and 
spin conspicuously in the other books as well. It is an alchemical transformation of her 
last name that reappears insistently in poems that deal directly with oedipal issues as well 
as among the poems that do not. 
   *  *  * 
 What is it about the signature that constitutes jouissance?  At what point does the 
pleasure of the signature become painful, become suffering?  What makes a gold cell?  
What taboo can it violate?  What prison, torture, or death does it emulate?14  What life 
force, what force of language does it manifest?  Introjected into the ego, could the 
signature sponge up imagoes, contracting all the personas that constitute the complexes 
that dominate the subject?  Olds’ puts her name in language as a way of stirring the gold, 
of stirring the yolk of these complexes. In the poem “What if God” we have two such 
personas. Not the mommapoppa of the strict oedipal paradigm, but the unrestricted 
obscene superego, the superego as it traverses the id and the ideal ego (the personal 
transcendental superego of the Other). Olds’ signature reaches through gold to god. The 
poem asks, “Is there a god in the house?”  But there is a seemingly endless supply of 
imagoes that emerge in Olds’ work from the parental figures alone. And the complexes 
that are revealed (especially in the poems concerning her parents and sister, which 
endlessly unravel the imagoes woven into those familial complexes) run the emotional 
and affective gamut, as if there were a strict intertextuality between signature effects and 
the textual effects of Nachträglichkeit.  
 
                                                
14 For poems addressing these loci in The Gold Cell see “In the Cell,” “The Food Thief,” and “The Girl” –
all in Part One. 
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“35/10” 
 Consider the poem “35/10” from the last section of The Dead and the Living, at 
the end of Part Two: Poems for the Living. The section is labeled “The Children,” and 
this poem concerns her familial complexes only indirectly as it examines her relationship 
with her own daughter. Thirty-five would be the age of the poet, 10 the age of the child. 
As her daughter matures, the poet gains clarity concerning her own name and its history 
and movement across language. The “grey-gleaming,” “silver-haired servant” is 
becoming her name: Old(s). And what is the “fold in [her] neck,” but a signifier of age?  
A fold of skin like the dewlap of an elderly person?  That would be a reading in 
anticipation of the speaker’s old age rather than of her “present” age in the poem. A 
corollary retroactive reading, looking back at her own youth, would be to see the fold as 
the musculature that an adult body begins to reveal as it loses the fat that a younger body 
would maintain. This retroactive reading would double the temporality of the fold in 
accordance with the dual temporality of Nachträglichkeit; the sharpening of features 
proceeds apace for both the mother and the daughter: 
        Why is it 
  just as we begin to go 
  they begin to arrive, the fold in my neck  
  clarifying as the fine bones of her 
  hips sharpen? 
 
The anticipation of beginning and the retroaction of arrival are clarified for the speaker in 
the fold. And this clarification moves toward the name Sharon. It comes in an act of 
sharing: the poem begins, “Brushing out my daughter’s dark / silken hair before the 
mirror.”  The “sh” of sharing disseminates into ‘hips sharpening,” and they share the 
process of sexual maturation which “hips sharpening” suggests, and which the rest of the 
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poem celebrates. This is the clarification of the fold—the fold “clarifies” as the hips of 
the 10-year-old child sharpen. And the speaker’s skin “shows” its dry pitting. This 
clarification is a gift that returns to the name as well as a clarity that comes with age. It is 
a counter-signature. The “showing” and “sharpening” of the poem produces a drying 
effect in the imagery of the daughter as well: “As my skin shows its dry pitting, she opens 
like a small pale flower on the tip of a cactus.”  The pale flower might very well point 
toward some Desert Rose of the Plain of Sharon, a fertile but dry plain in today’s Israel. 
This drying effect characterizes the insight into the name, a gift that comes via the human 
condition and the feminine condition. A drying, preserving and sobering effect of the 
signature, then, which suddenly bursts and deflates itself, incurring the grandest kind of 
abstraction, a thesis or arche-narrative structure. The poem ends with this sentence: “It’s 
an old / story—the oldest we have on our planet— / the story of replacement.”  And this 
pronouncement is introduced via images of eggs, both hers, her “last chances to bear a 
child,” and her daughter’s “full purse of eggs”: 
  as my last chances to bear a child 
  are falling through my body, the duds among them, 
  her full purse of eggs, round and  
  firm as hard-boiled yolks, is about  
  to snap its clasp. 
 
The word “boiled,” like the word “oiled” in other poems, expands the word old. It does 
so within the context of the promise of a young girl’s eggs. The word yolk also reiterates 
the “ol” in Olds. It’s an Old(s) story, the most delirious of countersignatures. The irony of 
this poem may be that the signature has snapped its clasp. The poem performs the 
becoming-her-name of the speaker. Which is the acceptance of the counter-signature 
from language, a continuous acceptance over time, a sharing on.  
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“What if God” 
 An alchemical transformation then: at the level of the letter or on the level of the 
objet a, we have the addition of a letter, a way to fill the gap between the names Sharon 
and Olds. In The Gold Cell, gold is ubiquitous. This poetics turns on the addition of the 
letter g. The letter g fills the gap for Sharon Olds, especially in this book. For Lacan the 
unconscious consists of “a chain of signifiers that somewhere (on another stage, in 
another scene, [Freud] wrote) is repeated” (Ecrits 297). Whenever there is a gap or break 
in “normal,” rational, or everyday discourse, this chain of signifiers intervenes, inserting 
some part of itself, creating a link between some part of the unconscious and the 
otherwise unified discourse of meaning. This link makes sense in a different way, linking 
the circle or chain of conscious meaning to a different fantasy scene in the unconscious. 
The poem “What if God” explores the possibility of such a link. Or rather it departs from 
normal or pious discourse concerning the name-of-the-father in order to explore the 
possibilities of “another stage, another scene.”  When discourse has lost something, or the 
subject needs some “thing” that seems to be missing, the objet a appears in the place of 
the “thing.”  And in this situation meaning travels back and forth, both backwards and 
forwards. This poem presents the unconscious analog for the question implicit in the title 
of the book. The gold cell of the book’s title takes many forms as the words “gold” and 
“cell” travel through the texts and scenes presented in the course of the book. The term 
“gold cell” comes to represent not some particular cell, but rather an effect (a signature 
effect), the insistent return of the two words through and with their various manifold 
associations. In the poem “What if God,” the answer to the question “What gold cell?” 
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involves the byplay between gold and God. 
 The objet a, in this case “gold,” or more simply the letter “g” occupying the gap 
in the signature, forges a link with what would be the superego, that is, God, the ultimate 
figure for the superego. Constructing this signature relay becomes a simple matter of 
dropping the “l” and capitalizing the “g.”  The vector for this effect is already present 
when the “g” is added to “old.” The poem asks, “Is there a God in the house?” as if the 
entire question of the formation of the superego is at stake. And this is, of course, a vexed 
topic among psychoanalytic feminists. Freud’s writings are clear with regard to the 
resolution of the oedipal complex and the concomitant formation of the superego for 
boys, but for girls Freud is obscure. Thus, we have many counter-formulations and 
speculations (such as that women have no unconscious, or Woman is the unconscious for 
men), for without the superego in its role as censor and agent of repression, there can be 
no unconscious. The boy identifies with his father (and later God, the Father), repressing 
his desire for the mother. This event inaugurates the mechanism of repression, forms the 
basis of the superego, and marks the inception of the unconscious. In reaction to the 
accounts of Freud and Lacan, we also have latter-day theories of the unconscious that 
attend to it as a reserve of signifiers or metonyms rooted in the body of the mother rather 
than founded on an identification with the paternal phallus. Olds’ poem, “What if God,” 
can be read as an exploration of this theoretical issue. It seems to personalize the topic, as 
might be expected, but it also critiques broader cultural formations and practices in its 
lyric trajectory. And it does it in terms of the girl, the mother, and God: the human father 
is a missing term in this poem’s account. However, the name of the parent father is 
repressed and reserved in the signature relay: Olds (the name of the father) ←→ gold 
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←→ God. The father is the gap or break in the symbolic order of the poem, which is 
crossed by the signature relay. Once this process of substitution begins, it leads to the 
figure of the obscene superego. 
 The structure of the signature effect in “What if God” takes the form of a 
Bildungsroman, albeit a Bildungsroman distorted in an anamorphic way. The originary 
image of the Bildungsroman is centered on the word “gold”:  
  was He a squirrel, reaching down through the 
  hole she broke in my shell, squirrel with His  
  arm in the yolk of my soul up to the elbow,  
  stirring, stirring the gold?” 
 
The egg with the golden yolk metaphorically represents the speaker in these verses. This 
metaphor reaches back to the moment of conception and the sexual origin of her body, 
and the assonance of yolk/soul/elbow/gold roots her spiritual origin in the sexual as well. 
This moment of inception is then disseminated throughout the narrative of the poem by 
the word “God.” Chronologically, the issue at stake with this telos can only be resolved 
in the future beyond the speech act that the poem constitutes: 
  Is there a God in the house?  Then reach down and 
  take that woman off that child’s body, 
  take that woman by the nape of the neck like a young cat and  
  lift her up and deliver her over to me. 
 
This passage in its anticipatory temporality envisions a release from the irresolution of a 
failed oedipus. That resolution would be the end of the Bildungsroman development. The 
word “God” appears four times in the poem, once in the title, once in the first line, and 
then twice in lines fourth and fifth from the end of the poem. Between the second and 
third instances of the word “God,” capitalized masculine pronouns appear 17 times. 
Every sentence in the poem except the last is a question. The questions do not address 
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God directly, for this interrogation never assumes His existence.  
 First and foremost, the thematic of this poem centers on the speaker’s mother and 
the sadness and grief that she impressed upon her daughter. The parental father figure is 
absent in the poem, completely displaced by the theological name of the father. The poem 
begins with the image of the mother’s grief being laid on the speaker as God watches 
voyeuristically: 
  And what if God had been watching when my mother 
  came into my bed?  What would He have done when her 
  long adult body rolled on me like a  
  tongue of lava from the top of the mountain and the  
  tears jumped from her ducts like hot rocks and my 
  bed shook with the tremors of the magma and the  
  deep cracking of my nature across— 
 
As the poem continues, both the mother and God are held accountable for the violence 
that is done to the girl. This opening image of the “cracking of her nature” is reiterated 
insistently to emphasize the traumatic violence that takes place at the oedipal moment 
when the superego would “normally” be formed. This cracking moves in feminist 
counterpoint to Freud’s boy-oriented resolution. Instead of sexual prohibition that the 
father would dictate to the boy, the mother turns to the daughter bodily, coming into her 
bed. The next image offers a possible reason for the mother’s turning away: 
  what was He? Was He a bison to lower his  
  thundercloud head and suck His own sex while He 
  watched us weep and prey to him . . . 
 
The jouissance of this father figure, the association of the destructiveness and fearfulness 
of a thundercloud with the libidinal release of masturbation, is predicated upon the fear 
and grief of the mother and daughter. The following figuration of the God again has to do 
with the cracking of the girl: “was He a squirrel, reaching down through the hole she 
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broke in my shell . . .”. 
If the father figure is the cause of the cracking, the mother is the agent, and this 
relationship is repeated in the next image of cracking or, more precisely, splitting in this 
case: 
     Or was He a  
  kid in Biology, dissecting me while she  
  held my split carapace apart so He could 
  firk out my oblong eggs one by one, . . . 
 
Rather than a “healthy” repression of the oedipus complex, the oedipal matter is figured 
as if the sexuality of the girl has been “firked out.”  Instead of the healthy image of the 
sexuality that Lacan would find under the aegis of the Phallus, in this case the girl’s 
“authority figures” (whom the boy would identify with in the formation of the superego) 
are, on the maternal side, coming to her out of emotional dysfunction and sexual 
confusion, and on the paternal side deriving pleasure from violation of the incest taboo: 
“stirring the gold” of her yolk-soul, and “firking out her eggs.”  Granted, this violation of 
the incest taboo may be read as the metaphorical vehicle giving expression to the cause of 
the mother’s dysfunction. Nevertheless, the entire poem makes God the tenor, in that He 
would be a transcendental signified for all the metaphorical signifiers.  
 In this poem it is clear that both parents affect the sexual formation of the girl. 
Instead of the Law of the Name of the Father constituting the primal repression of the 
desire for the mother, the issue of sexual access and authority runs constantly to images 
of perversion: the mother in bed with the daughter, the bison’s masturbation, the squirrel 
with its arm in the yolk of the girl’s soul, and the carapace held apart for firking out her 
eggs (which is immediately refigured as the question, “was He a / man entering me up to 
the hilt while she / pried my thighs wide in the starry dark”). The argument of the poem 
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could be put this way: God is a pervert, i.e., the (cultural or religious) superego is of the 
type that Lacan outlines in “The Freudian Thing.”  This superego is both integrative and 
disintegrative. When there are gaps in the symbolic chain that constitutes the law, the 
superego arises out of the ensuing misunderstanding of the law. In Olds' poem the 
superego figure is silent, failing to utter any order word whatsoever. In such a  linguistic 
gap, according to Lacan, the superego arises from the imaginary as an illegitimate 
substitute for the law, “that obscene, ferocious figure in which we must see the true 
signification of the superego” (Ecrits 143). Olds’ speaker appeals, at the end of the poem, 
to the (absent) God to lift the mother off her body—she does not call for the proper 
speech act on His part, although she does twice call out the question “Is there  a God in 
the house?”  There is no reply in the poem. 
 
“Greed and Aggression” 
 Is there a superego for the gold cell?  Or for the woman that arises from a gold 
cell or produces a gold cell?  An excellent basis for speculation on these questions can be 
found in the poem  “Greed and Aggression.”  Although this poem appears in Part Three 
of The Gold Cell, a section of the book dealing with various experiences of sex and 
related matters rather than family memories, it makes an excellent companion piece to 
“What if God.”  “Greed and Aggression” bears several striking similarities to “What if 
God,” but the theme and scene of the poem are not oedipal in any direct way. It does have 
to do with religion, sex, Gods, cats, and jouissance; most notably for a signature reading, 
it also incorporates the same signature relay between gold and God. The first line 
announces the religious vector of the poem: 
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  Someone in Quaker meeting talks about greed and aggression 
  and I think of the way I lay the massive  
  weight of my body down on you 
  like a tiger lying down in gluttony and pleasure on the  
  elegant heavy body of the eland it eats, 
  the spiral horn pointing to the sky like heaven. 
 
The structural similarity to the opening of “What if God” is striking. A religious scene is 
linked to the image of a woman lying down on top of another person. But instead of a 
speculative and interrogative accusation of a problematical God by means of a catalogue 
of metaphorical descriptions, the poem introduces a more or less controlling metaphorical 
vehicle, that of the tiger lying down to eat, for the tenor, sexual relation. In this dramatic 
monologue, the sexuality of the speaker and her addressee stands as the tenor of this 
metaphor. And the first religious issue to hand is not the existence of God but the 
problems of greed and aggression; however, the second half of “Greed and Aggression” 
does turn to the issue of characterizing a God. This poem’s opening  plunges the reader 
into the space of religion as if it stretched from American Quaker meetings to Africa to 
Asia and then up to heaven. Elands comprise two species that live in Africa. Tigers are of 
Asia. Their convergence in this poem suggests a geologically alternative time scale 
stretching beyond the human. But in this alternative temporality (an alternative history?), 
the question of a God’s existence is still the poem’s hinge, connecting the scene of the 
lovers’ pleasure with the image of a totemic, tiger God—the God of tigers: “if they [the 
tigers] had a God it would be striped, / burnt-gold and black.”  Throughout the poem this 
human/tiger comparison is relatively stable compared to the madness of metaphor in 
“What if God.” 
 Of course “What if God” stands as an excuse for the madness of mixed metaphor: 
a list in the monumental modernist manner, one metaphorical supplement after another, 
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none of which are able singly to express the rage, confusion, and violation which the 
speaker wishes to express. This instance of Olds’ “lack of control,” for which many of 
her critics fault her, can also be read as the refusal of castration, the refusal to accept the 
dictates of an obscene father figure. This refusal manifests itself as the need to speak out 
against this superego in refusal of the terms of oedipal severance, the terms that the 
parents have dictated. In “Greed and Aggression,” a poem which again speculates on the 
nature of a personal God, the speaker outlines the form of an ideal superego figure in a 
much calmer and happier frame: 
  [If] I had a God it would renew itself the 
  way you live and live while I take you as if 
  consuming you while you take me as if  
  consuming me, it would be a God of    
  love as complete satiety, 
  greed and fullness, aggression and fullness, the 
  way we once drank at the body of an animal 
  until we were so happy we could only  
  faint, our mouths running, into sleep. 
 
The tones of the two poems are bipolar. This suggests a theoretical analysis of the “split 
subject” in terms of the superego. The superego is both integrative and disintegrative in 
its affective function. On the one hand it is obscene-perverse as Lacan argues and as 
“What if God” illustrates, exercising violence on the subject and requiring tremendous 
cathartic force for the subject merely to make it manifest and begin to imagine a healing 
process as per the end of “What if God.” On the other hand, “Greed and Aggression” 
presents the possibility of an integrative superego which structures itself according to the 
form of relation-with-an-Other, in this case a sexual partner. 
  In contrast with the scene of the lovers, we have within the vehicular space 
of the poem, the scene of the tiger, something very like the kind of violence that informs 
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“What if God”: 
  Ecstasy has been given to the tiger, 
  forced into its nature the way the 
  forcemeat is cranked down the throat of the held goose 
These lines open the question of the relationships among force, violence, and ecstasy. In 
spite of the violent use of force in the absence of any agent portrayed in this image, the 
emphasis is on ecstasy. Close readers of Olds’ books will recognize the shape of two 
childhood events condensed here that are more explicitly rendered elsewhere in her 
poems: the child being tied to a chair and the child being force-fed by her parents.15 This 
passage simply acknowledges the violence and foregoes (forecloses?) any accusation on 
the part of the speaker. As such it constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call a “line out” 
of Oedipus: not an escape from Oedipus but a reconstruction that reconfigures the 
subject. For instance, this reconfiguration might consist in the exaggeration of some 
neurotic, perverse, or obscene tendency, such as greed or aggression, in a manner that 
avoids the normally self-destructive or other-destructive outcome of the tendency. And 
here is the danger. Such a move is speculative, the outcome is unknown, and the risk is 
real. Thinking beyond teleology runs the risk of doubling the violence and destruction 
inherent in teleology. The eland in this poem undergoes something of a sparagmos, the 
tearing apart of the sacrificial victim. Across the metaphorical hinge of the poem, this 
sacrificial economy organizes itself around self-sacrifice, the mutual self-sacrifice 
between lovers.  
 Both terms of the metaphor are about ecstasy. And this ecstasy is about violence 
in both aspects of the metaphor. For the end of the poem is beautifully ambivalent in the 
                                                
15 See “That Year” in Satan Says and “The Quest” in The Gold Cell. 
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way it evokes two scenes: both the scene of the child suckling to satiety and the scene of 
the tiger drinking the blood of the eland: 
       . . . the 
  way we once drank at the body of an animal 
  until we were so happy we could only  
  faint, our mouths running, into sleep. 
 
The ending makes blood and milk metaphorically equivalent, as if to suggest a necessary 
equivalence of violence and ecstasy. But the physical force of feeding has been reversed; 
instead of forcemeat being phallically thrust into the throat, the food is drawn in. The 
body of the other is drawn in, “invaginated” as Derrida would say, deploying a strategy 
meant to re-inscribe and reshape phallocentrism. This would be the sexual ethic that 
would turn the phallic and obscene superego of “What if God” inside out. “Greed and 
Aggression,” by the shape of its argument, funnels the problems of force and violence 
into the appetite of the nursing child as if the argument were a breast to be taken in the 
mouth. But this is only the last of several images that represent phallicism and 
“invagination” in various relations.  
 The first such image is the “tiger lying down in gluttony and pleasure on . . . the 
eland it eats, / the spiral horn pointing to the sky like heaven.”  The tiger takes the flesh 
of the eland into its body, through its mouth. In this image the tiger is the feminine or 
“invaginating” body, and the eland is the masculine body, replete with phallic “spiral 
horn.”  The confused syntax of the phrase “the spiral horn pointing to the sky like 
heaven” may imply that the phallic horn merely “points” to “heaven.”  The phallus 
merely points. Or the end of the line, “like heaven,” may imply that the whole image of 
the tiger eating the elegant eland is heavenlike, and by analogy the joining of the bodies 
of the speaker and the lover is heavenlike. Compare the opening image from “What if 
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God.”  There the mother rolls her long body on top of the daughter. The phallus in “What 
if God” is fetishized as a sadistic tool of torture. The speaker of that poem, violated and 
fragmented beneath the destructive force of a Saturn-like superego that consumes its 
children, would be the eland in “Greed and Aggression.”  The eland similarly is 
morselized and consumed, but it is not the offspring of the tiger, not other but Other. In 
“Greed and Aggression” the speaker lies down heavily on her or his masculine lover—we 
can posit the gender of the speaker’s lover is masculine by analogy with the eland that 
has the phallic horn. In this poem the speaker is on top and is identified with the tiger that 
consumes, incorporating the body of the other. 
 Because she is identified with the tiger, the metaphor implies that she too has had 
ecstasy “forced into her nature.”  Although the metaphor is not explicitly extended in this 
way, the context supplied by other poems, which have to do with her father force-feeding 
her, suggests that an oedipal scene has been reinvested with an opposite affect. The scene 
has been invaginated, its affect reversed, turned inside out. The metaphorical rape that 
force-feeding symbolizes becomes transformed into the means of understanding the 
“hunger and the glory of / eating packed at the center of each tiger cell.”  Force-feeding is 
transformed into “hunger and the glory of eating” thereafter. The ineffable force implied 
in the passive construction “Ecstasy has been forced” turns out to be something like a 
fertility god instilling ecstasy “for the life of the tiger and the / making of new tigers.”     
 It would be accurate to say that the phallic and patriarchal name Olds has been 
consumed, morselized, and used to mount a critique of the god in “What if God” and to 
counter pose a God that “would renew itself.”  As the poem oscillates between forms of 
consumption, sexual and oral, the figure of invagination gives way to what Derrida calls 
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encryption, the chewing, morselizing and use of the proper name to generate new texts. 
As the tiger uses the eland, burning its energy at “the center of each / tiger cell” for the 
“making of new tigers,” the speaker burns the gold of the name Olds for the figuration of 
a new God that would imply a refiguration of the superego. Instead of the nightmare of 
“What if God” which ends in an appeal to an absent God, “Greed and Aggression” ends 
in the sleep of satiety: 
       . . . the 
  way we once drank at the body of an animal 
  until we were so happy we could only  
  faint, our mouths running, into sleep. 
 
This image satisfies the appeal of  the speaker at the end of “What if God” to “take that 
woman by the nape of the neck like a young cat and / lift her up and deliver her over to 
me.”  If the speaker’s appeal were granted, she could then inherit the structure of 
mothering based on the transference of love. That structure is precisely imaged in the 
close of “Greed and Aggression.”  If jealousy begins at the breast as Freud holds, so do 
enjoyment and love according to this poem.   
 The God that has been conjured in “Greed and Aggression” is a conditional God. 
If the last six lines of the poem which figure this God are ironic, i.e., the argument is 
essentially that God doesn’t exist, then the speaker is free to substitute the God of “Greed 
and Aggression” for the God of “What if God.”  And in the close of “Greed and 
Aggression” the memory qua retroaction is of falling asleep “our mouths running.”  This 
figure for suckling also figures speech and the morseling and speaking of the proper 
name, the encryption of the other and the encryption of the signature. 
 
Conclusion 
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 Not a particular golden egg, nor a particular prison cell: the best way to think of 
the gold cell may be to consider all the possible associations the term can muster, then to 
let that consideration unfold over time. It would be a matrix in a certain corner of 
language, an abstract structure producing meaning over time as it is contemplated by the 
reader. The same is true for a signature poetics. The poetics can avail itself of Lacan’s 
notion of logical time and its tripartite structure as a means of : 1) the instant of seeing, 2) 
the time for understanding, 3) the moment of concluding. This structure has its most 
obvious application to the dynamics of the oedipal experience, and there it functions 
synchronically in order to describe the oedipal event and not diachronically. As a 
function of memory, this temporal logic organizes the oedipal experience. Historically for 
a woman in Olds’ cultural milieu, this temporal logic could be a good way of 
understanding the possibilities of the signature.  
 The instant of seeing would correspond to the first recognition of the association 
of the proper name and the body of the subject. It settles in simple recognition of the 
name and the signature as one’s own, paradoxically as if it were inscribed on the body. 
 The time for understanding would correspond to the gradual acclimation to the 
fact of the name and signature and the turning toward understanding of one’s position in 
the family and the various other institutions that form the basis and frames of identity. 
Anticipation, the inverse of Nachträglichkeit, would be the dominant psychic temporality 
in this logical moment. Anticipation is oedipally structured on the belief, the particular 
anticipation, of the child that when she grows up she will be like her parents. She will 
continue to sign her name as her parents have signed their names. 
 The moment of concluding would correspond to the resolution of the oedipal 
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complex if the Lacanian model of logical time could be simply translated or bricoleured 
into an explanation of the signature. But like Freud’s explanation of the oedipus complex, 
there is a great difference between the way the signature has traditionally functioned for 
men and for women in the United States. Men continue to carry the parental signature if 
they get married; women generally give up the parental part of their name/signature. How 
would Nachträglichkeit delineate this logical moment in either case?  Perhaps it is 
secondarily structured according to the memory of the belief that one will grow up to be 
like one’s parents, and for the signature, the memory of the anticipation that one will sign 
as the parents sign(ed). 
 Olds’ signature poetics dwells in the moment of concluding as it constantly works 
over the two prior logical moments. The obsession with gold, the sense of entrapment 
within the cell(ular), which posits its opposite sense in another moment of the psyche or 
of the text or in another poem, exemplifies the first parameter of logical time. The oedipal 
thematic returns in each book, always being re-membered, re-constructed in memory, re-
worked from an older point of view. As such, it seems to oscillate between the second 
and third of the logical moments. Perhaps the idea of gold itself is the conclusion, gold 
connoting the alchemical transformation that metaphorically would represent the 
achievement of one’s goals through long labor and concentrated attention to the subtleties 
of the conditions of one’s existence. This kind of reconfiguration is the object of poems 
like “What if God” and “Greed and Aggression,” where the transformation of God, the 
subject, and the superego becomes the issue. Sharon Olds’ poetry illustrates the scope of 
access that the signature provides for entering, surveying, and intervening in the linguistic 
condition. 
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*    *    * 
 With Olds it appears that attention to the signature is intuitive and interior to her 
poetry and poetics. I would like to ask her if she has read Signsponge or Glas. But I do 
not doubt that her poetics were in place before ever hearing of Jacques Derrida. I have no 
doubt she understood that getting busy with her name was integral to building a home for 
herself in language. To read and hear her name fall into language and resurrect itself was 
going to be a survival from the start.  
 On the other hand, John Cage’s development as a signature thinker and poet takes 
place over the better part of a century and through his immersion in the arts.  
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Chapter 4 
The Development of John Cage’s Signature Theory 
 
“Get Out of Whatever Cage You Find Yourself In” 
The cage is an architectural readymade. Over the course of his career Cage made 
more and more use of this fact. This study examines along the way several images from 
Cage’s writings that explore studios, soundproof rooms, walls, doors, and cages: 
cagespaces, places where he constructs a signature relation between silence and spacing. 
Cage also gives us direct discussions of signature theory on several occasions; he is in 
fact a signature thinker and a thinker of the signature. In this chapter I trace the 
development of his ideas concerning the signature over roughly twenty years. There are 
three key moments in this development: Cage’s critique of Varèse, his experimental 
writing for Rauschenberg, and his homage to Duchamp. In Cage’s early experimental 
writings, which culminate in his most important book, Silence, his use of the term 
“signature” is not a component of his poetics, but rather serves as a meta-critical tool. 
Only when he comes to Duchamp does he begin to view the signature as a compositional 
tool and an element of style to be developed. Thereafter, Cage’s mature style habitually 
places the proper names of other writers and artists in the abyss of his own texts. Before 
mapping out this development, I preface it with a reading of the Lecture on Nothing, 
Cage’s seminal text on poetics.  
Christopher Shultis has argued that Cage’s text Empty Words marks the 
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achievement of Cage’s poetic vision. Cage’s poetics resembles Ponge’s in that he was 
focused on the object, the thing. But Cage roots his poetics in Thoreau, and so Shultis 
uses Emerson and Thoreau to explore Cage’s poetics. Shultis differentiates Cage’s 
thinking from Emersonian poetics via F. O. Mathiesson’s American Renaissance: “The 
Word One with the Thing,” a dualistic, organic unity, is not what Cage is about; rather, 
Cage moved “away from thought and toward the experience of the object in and of itself” 
(Shultis 116). That much could be considered Pongian. But for Cage this movement leads 
to noise. In an interview with Daniel Charles, Cage says, “I have not yet carried language 
to the point to which I have taken musical sounds. I have not yet made noise with it. I 
hope to make something other than language with it” (113). Shultis argues that Empty 
Words achieved Cage’s goal: the long poem subjects Thoreau’s Journals to, first, the 
elimination of sentences, then of phrases, leaving only letters, syllables, and very 
morcelized words (119-20). In this progression, Cage is extending a trend he noticed in 
Thoreau—an erasure of style:  
You’re going to tell me that Thoreau has a definite style. He has his very 
own way of writing. But in a rather significant way, as his Journal 
continues, his words become simplified or shorter. The longest words . . . 
contain something of Thoreau in them. But not the shortest words. They 
are words from common language, everyday words. So, as the words 
become shorter, Thoreau’s own experiences become more and more 
transparent. They are no longer his own experiences. It is experience. And 
his work improves to the extent that he disappears. . . . Subjectivity no 
longer comes into it. And there is no artifice in this effort. (Charles 234) 
 
Taking “Thoreau” a step farther, Cage produced a completely digested form of Thoreau’s 
text, which would be free of intentional meaning—that would be the fourth section of 
Empty Words. Which is of course preceded by the first three sections, so that the overall 
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text produces a progression toward non-intention rather than simple non-intention itself. 
A poetics of elimination.  
I tend to agree with Shultis’ assessment, but I’m more drawn to Cage’s series of 
texts that write through Finnegans Wake, three of which he published in his books. These 
texts appeal to me as a kind of séance or ventriloquism; like Empty Words, which is 
constructed strictly from Thoreau’s Journals, they are limit cases of intertextuality, 
constructed wholly out of their pre-text, Finnegans Wake. But because they are 
constructed by using Joyce’s name itself, key signature issues are more starkly 
foregrounded in the poems on the Wake.  
Taken together, the Wake poems recapitulate the series of textual variations in 
Empty Words in that their trajectory carries over into a legible illegibility. But the first 
two of the three Wake pieces that Cage collected in his books are constructed 
mesostically. Mesostics are Cage’s invented form, like acrostics, only spelling words 
down the middle of the poem, the spine of the poem, rather than the left edge. This gives 
the first two Wake poems a sculptural feel entirely different from Empty Words. The third 
Wake piece, Muoyce (Writing for the Fifth Time Through Finnegans Wake), forgoes the 
mesostic mode; Cage intended it to converge formally with Empty Words (X 173). In the 
early Wake poems, the fact that Joyce’s proper name is used to abstractly machine 
Joyce’s own text overdetermines signature issues so thoroughly that these texts seem to 
me to be Cage’s most valuable for exploring issues of the signature. Cage is unstinting in 
his praise of Joyce. But whereas Joyce created language and discourse worlds, Cage’s 
project was to take language across those borders of silence and aesthetic perception he 
had already explored musically. Cage wrote many mesostic series on the names of artists 
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who influenced him. Besides the series on Finnegans Wake he used Joyce’s name 
mesostically in the long lecture James Joyce, Marcel Duchamp, Erik Satie: An Alphabet 
(X 53-101) and in the long work Themes and Variations included in Composition in 
Retrospect. The biggest technical difference between these works and the mesostics on 
the Wake is syntactical: unlike the other poems using Joyce’s name, the poems on the 
Wake are meant to be freed of syntax.  
The mesostic form, when the spine spells a proper name, is definitively Cagean. 
His own name is effaced by the proper names of others. The signature of the other 
occupies the center of the poem. And yet the mesostic is the most recognizable idiom of 
the Cage’s style, in the sense of Derrida’s second modality of the signature. Maybe two 
thirds of his poetry takes this form. On the third level of the signature, the mesostic 
presents some very Derridean possibilities. By placing the proper names of others in the 
center of the mesostic, down the middle of the page, Cage erects the abyss of their 
signatures. Of the poems on the Wake, Cage says they are constructed to show the 
relation between Joyce’s name and his text (X 136). Whereas Derrida is very invested in 
exploring “Hegel,” “Genet,” “Ponge,” etc. and putting their signatures to work in the 
abyss of his own texts, Cage’s mesostic form means to allow interpenetration and non-
interference between signatures. Derrida’s calls his columnar writing (on steles, styles, 
and signatures) “Colossal” writing: 
. . . . when the denominator . . . institutes or erects himself in his own 
proper signature.  
 Colossal habitat: the masterpiece. 
 He bands erect in his seing, but also occupies it like a sarcophagus. 
The form of the name—a place of solitary confinement—eats the 
body and holds it upright. (Glas 11bi) 
 
This happens to describe the way Cage’s text erects Joyce’s name within the masterpiece 
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(see Figure 1). Clearly, the poems are memorials and decompositions of “JAMES 
JOYCE” and the Wake.   
For purposes of getting at the psychoanalytic aspects of Cage’s signature poetics, 
the Wake mesostics seem to me the royal road. Besides the Wake itself being written in 
nightlanguage, as Joyce said, Cage’s elimination of syntax raises the stakes: what kind of 
poetic economy remains from a pre-text that already plays so freely with language at the 
borders of meaning and senselessness? Another way of putting this question would be to 
ask if Cage’s text is readable, and, if so, how? What kind of discipline and devotion did 
Cage expect his text to require? What could he have intended for a text that has largely 
been freed of intention? I will take up these questions in the Chapter 5 reading of Writing 
for the Second Time Through Finnegans Wake. Cage’s aesthetic essays also give us 
plenty of grist for these questions, often in terms of his own signature theory.  
 
The Empty Cage: Space of Difference   
  John Cage’s development, in a biographical sense, can be read as a genealogy of 
his poetics. The first decision tree he finds himself in is the oedipal space: male or 
female. His father opens into the way of being we can call “inventor/invention.”  His 
mother opens into “musician/music.” But Cage’s difference is somewhere between these 
two horizons. He doesn’t really imprint to either position. He plays with paper cutout 
dolls. He performs an invention of the other, i.e., the female behavior of playing with 
dolls. His parents frowned upon his behavior. Perhaps the Lacanian No(m) of the Father 
was elicited from both the matri- and patriarchal areas of the Cage matrix.  
 As a college student and into his twenties he knows he has talent, and he 
 
 
 
 107 
considers various branch paths among the arts: painting, writing, music, and architecture. 
He moves centrifugally (“I am a duchamp unto myself”), spreading his horizons into the 
arts and into Europe, escaping from the American university, Pomona College, after one 
year of interest followed by a year of uninterest or anti-interest.  
 The next stage of development reversed the centrifugal movement: Arnold 
Schoenberg. In the mid-30s, Cage commits to music in the act of haggling with 
Schoenberg, promising that if Schoenberg will take him on as a student, then he will 
commit his life to music. For the next 15 or 20 years this commitment forms the trunk of 
his genealogy. However, all of his earlier artistic interests remain close to hand as he 
writes a great deal of music for dance. But musical composition is his first pursuit and 
focus of development. By the advent of the 60s he has begun to move centrifugally again, 
starting to de-emphasize music a little, while turning more to writing, poetry, painting, 
and social critique. 
 The 40s saw his psycho-spiritual horizons increase exponentially as he began to 
explore non-western thought. Chance, especially the I Ching’s understanding of it, acts as 
a catalyst for his centrifugal development within the framework of his commitment to 
music. The vector of chance finally carries Cage beyond the musically superegoistic 
imprint of Schoenberg. Indian, Buddhist, Taoist, and Zen thinking help steer him around 
the institution of psychoanalysis (which he couldn’t afford anyway), and out of the 
institution of heterosexual marriage.16  
 So we read a series of Cagean primal moments: oedipal, school/college, 
Schoenberg, music delimited . . . . Does this series reach its limit with writing or poetics? 
                                                
16 This mini-biography is based on information taken mostly from David Revill’s biography of Cage and 
Thomas Hines biographical essay “Then Not Yet ‘Cage’: the Los Angeles Years.”  
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Cage’s autobiographical voice is a kind of Houdini, an escape artist with respect to these 
various scenes. Likewise, his poetics is devoted to escape, and, indeed, often seems to 
escape. This is a useful perspective when we face Cage’s seemingly illegible texts. 
Cage’s poetics, with his battle cry for freedom, perhaps his most American trait, is a 
textual machine more writerly than readerly. He takes off from any cage he finds. 
 Cage’s texts are built up out of certain remains of style; this stylistic tendency 
sometimes manifests as a trajectory toward the illegible. These texts bluntly and often 
imply the question, “What does reading require here?” Cage revels in the outrageousness 
of this position. He loves to tell stories of audience rebellion against his music, and this 
reaction from readers of his poetry and experimental writing he interprets as a sign that 
his composition has achieved part of its aims.17 How could something that seemingly 
conveys no sense convey style? This is precisely the signature obstacle Cage loved to 
sign for from the 50s onward. Cage’s texts always militate against a certain concept of 
style. It is a kind of extreme signature jealousy: he does not write to evoke other readable 
signatures or to identify himself with or among writers, poets, or composers, or to 
position himself stylistically. Such associations by a reader or listener would be like 
                                                
17 Consider this anecdote from the late 80s. Chögyam Trungpa, a Buddhist lineage holder, fled Tibet in 
1959 and become one to the leading Buddhist teachers in the west. He founded Naropa University on 
Buddhist educational principles. Trungpa, artist and renowned conversationalist, was also, enigmatically 
and infamously, an alcoholic. He died at the age of 48. Cage tells this story:  
I gave a performance of my piece called Empty Words Part IV for the students of Chögyam 
Trungpa at Naropa Institute in Boulder, Colorado. The piece goes on for two and a half hours and 
contains long silences of four or five minutes duration, and then out of that silence I just say a few 
letters of the alphabet following a score which was written through chance operations from the 
journal of Henry David Thoreau. Meanwhile there are these very faint images of Thoreau’s 
drawings being projected on a screen behind me. But they are very dim and hardly change at all—
perhaps once every twenty minutes. I thought it was an ideal piece for a Buddhist audience, but 
they became absolutely furious and yelled at me and tried to get me to stop the performance. The 
next morning I had a meeting with Chögyam Trungpa, and he asked me to join the faculty at 
Naropa. (Nisker 14) 
The section of Empty Words that Cage used for this performance is not legible in any ordinary sense. No 
doubt Cage successfully conveyed that particular illegibility in his performance.   
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confusing sounds with men. For Cage the confusion of names and music in the musical 
world, as in the case of Beethoven, is a category mistake: men are men and sounds are 
sounds, as Cage often says. His signature jealousy passes over into an animosity toward 
the concept of the signature itself, an animosity readable in many of his texts on other 
artists, whether in praise of an absent signature or in repudiation of an overbearing 
signature. The idea of the signature serves as a kind of spacing between himself and the 
artists he takes off from. Paradoxically, it is hard not to read also in these texts a 
metaphorical logic drawn from his own signature. And, as we shall see, it is style in the 
sense of idiom, Derrida’s second modality of the signature that Cage opposes. His own 
signature style militates against the concept of style, and this paradox governs many of 
his texts. Texts about nothing; texts devoted to silence; texts of chance; intertexts 
designed to elude their pre-texts; texts that disintegrate: whatever the context, this is 
perhaps the only remains of style—that each text is a singular event devoted to a certain 
escape—the opening of a cage.  
 
Poetics and Silence (Lecture on Nothing) 
 
 To get right at the question of this hendyatic “and” between poetics and silence, I 
want to read Cage’s Lecture on Nothing. This text may be his most interesting single 
piece for approaching his poetics. It hinges between his music and his poetry. Part of the 
interest is temporal; the oral timing of the piece is metered. As with so many of his 
pieces, he composed it for performance; of course, it is a lecture, and he wrote it for oral 
presentation. This performative aspect is formalized by its layout on the page. Spacing 
indicates time in a graphic design emphasizing silence(s) during the space-time of 
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performance. This time of silence accrues for itself, as time, silence, and it accrues to the 
lecture a capital of silence. What comes into the piece through silence? What is gained in 
the silence over time? The piece interrogates, questions, and listens to silence. It subjects 
silence, producing subjective structural moments, forcing the listener to structure the 
silence. Cage had already been developing such techniques in his music compositions. It 
can be argued that Lecture on Nothing is the anchor piece in his most important book, 
Silence. It is the first piece discussed in his forward, and there he connects it directly with 
poetry. Its placement is roughly in the center of the 276-page book.  
 It can also be argued that the event, his actual first presentation of the lecture,  
(according to the preface in Silence, “about 1949 . . . at the Artists’ Club on Eighth Street 
in New York City” (ix)) marked the beginning of a transition in American aesthetic 
history, the turn from Abstract Expressionism, the Jackson Pollock school of painting, to 
the “cool,” anti-expressionist aesthetic of Cage, Merce Cunningham, Robert 
Rauschenberg, and Jasper Johns, which opened the way for the minimalist and 
conceptual developments of the Sixties.  
 But strictly in terms of poetics, the Lecture on Nothing presents a radical opening 
that has been for the most part ignored by the academy, although Cage does have a few 
apologists and his texts sometimes appear in places like the Norton Anthology of 
Postmodern Poetry. The difficulty of his later works, when he turned his attention more 
to poetic composition, hasn’t helped to get a better hearing for his poetic works. His 
mesostic techniques and his works of alphabetic disintegration (Empty Words for 
instance) often seem to defy conventional ideas of poetry. For instance, Ezra Pound’s 
imagist prescriptions seem irrelevant: in many cases the image, the melopoia, and/or the 
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logopoia don’t seem to be the point of the texts at all.18 Some texts even seem designed to 
get rid of such qualities. The Lecture on Nothing gives a pretty good indication of Cage’s 
starting points for this departure.  
 Cage’s lectures of the 50s mark the turning of his attention to poetics. In his late 
teens, twenty years earlier, his initial major influence seems to have been Gertrude Stein. 
In the preface to Silence he writes, “As I look back, I realize that a concern with poetry 
was early with me. At Pomona College, in response to questions about the Lake poets, I 
wrote in the manner of Gertrude Stein, irrelevantly and repetitiously. I got an A. The 
second time I did it I was failed” (x). The next sentence of the preface concerns the 
Lecture on Nothing and a question of genre implicit in this prosaic hinge. The lecture 
does not appear to be “poetry”; poetry is certainly one of its subjects, as a quick perusal 
will show, but how could a lecture be a poem? The next sentence reads, “Since the 
Lecture on Nothing there have been more than a dozen pieces that were unconventionally 
written, including some that were done by means of chance operations and one that was 
largely a series of questions left unanswered” (x).19 Still, to say that the Lecture is 
unconventionally written does not clarify its genre status. Genre may well have been a 
moot issue for Cage, implying as it does a set of expectations anchored in taste, memory, 
and values that need escaping. 
 It’s more likely that he meant to escape the genre of poetry, and that the Lecture is 
such an expansion. In the following paragraph of the preface, he differentiates poetry and 
                                                
18 Concerning the image, Pound’s imagist prescription was “direct presentation of the ‘thing,” whether 
subjective or objective, and he also defined the image as “that which presents an intellectual and emotional 
complex in an instant of time.” Logopoia has to do with the play between words, contexts, and ideas: irony 
for example. Melopoia charges words musically, amplifying meaning. Marjorie Perloff has found in Cage 
examples of poems that do satisfy these prescriptions, especially melopoia (“Music”).  
19 See the discussion of Duchamp below for more on chance operations and Cage’s relations to the 
Surrealists. 
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prose. His prose, in its direct, unadorned precision, may seem a bit unfocused at first, but 
it’s clear on second reading that the lectures are the subject of his remarks on poetry, and 
that the Lecture on Nothing is exemplary of this distinction between poetry and prose: 
“As I see it, poetry is not prose simply because poetry is in one way or another 
formalized. It is not poetry by reason of its content or ambiguity but by reason of its 
allowing musical elements (time, sound) to be introduced into the world of words” 
(Silence x). The Lecture on Nothing makes this introduction in the most literal, methodic, 
intentionally structured way. The headnote at the text of the lecture is almost 
indistinguishable from the headnotes to almost all of Cage’s musical scores from the 50s: 
There are four measures in each line and twelve lines in each unit of the 
rhythmic structure. There are forty-eight such units, each having forty-
eight measures. The whole is divided into five large parts, in the 
proportion 7, 6, 14, 14, 7. The forty-eight measures of each unit are 
likewise so divided. The text is printed in four columns to facilitate a 
rhythmic reading. Each line is to be read across the page from left to right, 
not down the columns in sequence. This should not be done in an artificial 
manner (which might result from an attempt to be too strictly faithful to 
the position of the words on the page), but with the rubato which one uses 
in everyday speech. (Silence 109) 
 
This wholesale importation of the genre discourse of musical composition (as if he were 
giving musicians instructions for performance) and Cagean rhythmical structure 
introduces exactly the musical elements, time and sound, which he claims distinguish 
prose from poetry. But this introduction is anti-melopoeiac, against the imagist 
prescription of melopoeia—Cage is not talking about musical phrasing, but discontinuity 
of sound. “Rhythmic reading” and “rubato” are matters of time. The sound introduced 
into the lecture is the sound of silence. Only a few lines of the text are without spacing to 
signify pauses in the delivery of the words, silent pauses pregnant with the ambient sound 
of the lecture space.  
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 In Cage’s early musical thinking, silence is equated with the absence of sound and 
functions to delimit duration. Cage reports that Arnold Schoenberg realized a harmonic 
cage for him:  
[W]hen Schoenberg asked me whether I would devote my life to music, I 
said, “Of course.” After I had been studying with him for two years, 
Schoenberg said, “In order to write music, you must have a feeling for 
harmony.” I explained to him that I had no feeling for harmony. He then 
said that I would always encounter an obstacle, that it would be as though 
I came to a wall through which I could not pass. I said, “In that case I will 
devote my life to beating my head against that wall.” (Silence 261) 
 
Rather than (or as a means of) beating his head against the harmonic walls of music, 
Cage chose to privilege duration over the other three fundamental elements of music: 
pitch, timbre, and loudness. Much of his early successful composition is, thus, based on 
rhythmic structures that are applied at both micro- and macro-levels of a musical piece 
rather than on harmonic necessity and exploration. By the mid-forties, he had visited an 
anechoic chamber at Harvard where the sounds of his own body made him realize that 
practically all earthly silence consists of sound, usually audible even if at very low levels. 
By the time Cage gives the Lecture on Nothing, this recognition informs his thinking on 
silence along with the Buddhist attention to interpenetration with one’s environment. 
Through silence he introduces environmental sound into the Lecture. Cage’s 
development of duration lead to temporal suspensions of the other musical elements in 
his compositions. The aesthetic object, the thing, is no longer constituted by its own 
pitch, timbre, and loudness. This allows interpenetration between the inside and outside 
of his musical compositions. Cage’s poetics translates this principle of interpenetration 
into both spoken and written forms. In the next chapter, I’ll discuss how this takes place 
on the level of the signature. The Lecture on Nothing becomes a frame for silence, 
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imminent in the figure of an empty cage. 
 In this talk on the subject of nothing (not on the concept of nothingness), Cage 
scatters many pronouncements on poetry. This poetry is not poetry in general or the 
institution of poetry. When Cage remarks to M. C. Richards that he gives his lectures 
“out of a need for poetry” (Silence x), he is not talking about the work of other poets or 
about what poetry throughout its history has supplied to people, that is, the needs that 
poetry is traditionally thought to fulfill. From the beginning of the text, there is a 
paradoxical playfulness at work between the terms “nothing” and “silence.” The first 
sentence reads, “I am here and there is nothing to say,” and it is spread out across the four 
columns something like this: 
I am here  , and there is nothing to say  . 
The “nothing” clause is bracketed between two brief silences (109). The third sentence 
announces that, “What we require is silence; but what silence requires is that I go on 
talking.” And a few lines down, following the longest linear pause thus far in the text, we 
have what may well be Cage’s most famous aphorism: “I have nothing to say and I am 
saying it and that is poetry as I need it” (109), again followed by a linear pause longer 
than the width of the page. Usually this sentence is quoted in abbreviated form, leaving 
out the final clause, “and that is poetry as I need it.”   
 This final clause is a pointer. It directs us to Cage’s poetics. Within this sentence 
it is difficult to find much more than the pointer beyond which or before which lies a 
koan, which in turn seems to be a variation of the previous paradoxical ideas that silence 
requires the speaker to continue talking and “words make [,] help make the silences” 
(109). The spacing forms a memorial; it allows each phrase to echo, to double itself in the 
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silent space that follows: time stretches forward (protention) as the duration of phrase is 
doubled. Cage is using space to figure time, a generic concern of poetry. But this could 
be the rhythm of the abyss, the step and stop of Cage, a signature cadence.  
Like all good paradoxes, there are many ways to read the aphorism “I have 
nothing to say and I am saying it.” Perhaps first and most obviously, the line carries the 
force of law, as if Cage is announcing the new law, the Cagean law of poetics. It seems a 
direct response to Abstract Expressionism specifically and the developments of American 
poetics circa 1900-50 generally. Neither the modernist nostalgia re Tradition (as 
theorized by T. S. Eliot) nor the agonism of the avant-garde (Jackson Pollock, et. al.) is 
pertinent “now,” i.e., in Cage’s moment as a function of meditative awareness of the 
present. 
 Beneath this aesthetic polemic, there are also some buried contextual relays, i.e., 
there are other cultural connections in the unconscious of this sentence and the essay. A 
psychoanalytic reading might try to isolate some latent meaning that would not 
necessarily rule out other latent readings but would nevertheless open up the text in 
powerful ways. Cage had much else at stake. 
Cage gave this talk around 1949. At that time, as Cage scholars such as Moira 
Roth and Jonathon D. Katz are beginning to point out, it was dangerous to publicly 
declare one’s homosexuality. The country was sinking into McCarthyism, the politics of 
fear, and the attendant homophobia. And yet it is out of this socio-cultural moment that 
Cage bursts to prominence, arguably as the leading thinker of the U. S. avant-garde. An 
obvious reading presents itself. “Silence,” no matter the term’s conceptual roots in 
musical thinking and in the Zen ideas which Cage was gleaning from D. T. Suzuki, also 
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conveys the political, cultural, and day-to-day reality of enforced silence on matters of 
sexual identity lived by homosexuals at that point in our history. To speak publicly of 
homosexual aspects of one’s identity at that time was an invitation to violence. 
 “I have nothing to say” submits to this reality. But “I am saying it” refuses to 
submit. Another way to write it would be “I am gay and I am (not) saying it.” By this 
time “gay” was an American slang term, so it’s possible that the assonance of Cage’s 
aphorism may have appealed to him for its semblance to that of “gay.” But this is only 
speculation, as is my entire “psychoanalytic” reading, for the possibility of a strong 
reading, that seems to reveal some unconscious aspect of a text, doesn’t bring me up to 
any truth latent in Cage’s text. The manifest subject of the Lecture is nothing. And the 
poetics that the text promotes is also based on nothing. 
 I delay my placement of “Cage” in the abyss. Nothing becomes a screen for the 
abyss. But I’ll say it anyway. The cage of homosexuality he carried with him rests in the 
abyss of his text, opening and closing according to some law of duration based on chance 
operations. Cage’s proximity to, say, Jean Genet, or William Burroughs, or Allan 
Ginsberg, is formal rather that contentual. He has nothing to say (about homosexuality), 
and yet he is saying it. His texts open and close, by chance, in lieu of placing his sexual 
signature in the idiom of the text.    
A page later in the Lecture on Nothing, we have this sentence: “Our poetry now is 
the realization that we possess nothing.” At first this may sound like a manifesto against 
materialism and bourgeois consumerism, but Cage quickly turns this claim to the 
temporal issues of retention and protention: 
Our poetry now is the realization that we possess nothing. Anything 
therefore is a delight (since we do not possess it) and thus need not fear its 
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loss. We need not destroy the past: it is gone; at any moment, it might 
reappear and seem to be and be the present. Would it be a repetition? Only 
if we thought we owned it, but since we don’t, it is free and so are we. 
Most anybody knows a-bout the future and how un-certain it is. (Silence 
110-11) 
 
What would a poetics based on this “realization” do differently? This Cagean move on 
poetry repeats his move on the history of music: Cage’s concern with attention to the 
present moment generalizes from the case of musical composition to poetic composition. 
Here, “nothing” refers most essentially to the past, even though Cage was living in the 
middle of the bloodiest century thus far in human history. Closer to hand, even though 
Cage was living through McCarthyism, it seems he was able to escape its traumatic 
effects, emerging relatively unscathed. Certainly his art flourished. Cage’s temporal 
scheme forces the consideration of McCarthyism into a (non)consideration of the 
dialectical derailment. History, both U.S. and European, does not have to be repeated. 
Instead of the negation-synthesis movement of time and history toward the absolute, 
instead of a “progress” that finds us happily floating upward toward Disneyland, Cage 
posits a near absolute past.  
This past can be forgotten absolutely: in fact, it’s a past something like Freud’s 
traumatic kernel out of which Nachträglichkeit differs and defers itself. It cannot be 
reconditioned or interpreted so that it may be accepted, dealt with, or “possessed.” The 
nature of the trauma may be such that it would destroy the continuity of the mind if it 
were properly held in consciousness. So it must be repressed, held in the unconscious for 
safekeeping. Thus it becomes improper and not the property of the conscious.  
As Derrida might say, it is the reste, or the remainder that cannot be made proper 
through negation. In this sense, it is “past,” a traumatic mental event which is temporally 
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insulated from the functioning of the conscious. From the unconscious it may continue to 
act, to return, but in ways that differ from the original traumatic effect. The step of 
change, movement away, extension, and difference is met disinterestedly by Cage, as 
would be the return. It’s a step out of the cage, for example, of McCarthyism. Even 
before it had passed, Cage could relegate McCarthyism to a past that is gone, even 
though it might reappear seemingly at random, like a telephone ringing or an “airplane 
come down in a vacant lot” that interrupts experience (111). The past need not be saved 
as if it were necessary for the future. Time need not be collapsed into an absolute present, 
some spearhead of God-consciousness; as Cage says, “We need not destroy the past.” We 
needn’t destroy it by taking it up into the present through ownership. For the present, 
such events may be passed over, perhaps only to rear their heads in the advent of 
terrorism before sheer chance again confronts the subject with catastrophe. “Most 
anybody knows a-bout the future and how un-certain it is” (111). 
 Cage’s poetics here resonates with the economy of loss that Bataille and Derrida 
oppose to Hegel’s restricted economy. Not all meanings are purposeful or necessary or 
serve the dialectic. If we possess nothing, any meaning can be a delight, since its loss 
does not alter us. “Anything therefore is a delight (since we do not possess it) and thus 
need not fear its loss” (111).  
 
Open Cage, Open Form 
Disinterest should temper desire. Cage begins to define a principle that he calls 
“poetry” in opposition to the formal characteristics of the common practice period in 
music, roughly 1600-1900. He begins with a series of substitutions: 
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What I am calling poetry is often called content. I myself have called it 
form. It is the continuity of a piece of music. Continuity today, when it is 
necessary, is a demonstration of disinterestedness. (111) 
 
Short form: poetry is (a demonstration of) disinterestedness. This aesthetic axiom goes a 
long way back toward the paradoxical aphorism, “I have nothing to say and I am saying 
it.” The speech act is disinterested. Furthermore, this moment of disinterest structures the 
entire poetic. If James Joyce’s project in Finnegans Wake is to lever reality into a new 
configuration by stepping language away from itself or creating a night language, Cage is 
no less ambitious. For poetics, the practice of disinterest prepares the way for 
interpenetration. Content, form, continuity, poetry: this chain of substitutions, like 
Nietzsche’s “army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms,” seems to imply a 
general or a commanding term (de Man 242), but “disinterest” decapitates such a 
configuration. The poet leads away from himself, and this is the paradoxical situation of 
the Cagean signature: it allows for interpenetration and freedom of the poet and reader. 
There is risk: cages can be dangerous, even open, empty cages. But the disinterested 
gesture of leaving the cage unlocked and as empty as possible suggests a line of flight 
and freedom.  
Continuity today, when it is necessary, is a demonstration of 
disinterestedness. That is, it is a proof that our delight lies in not 
possessing anything. Each moment presents what happens. How different 
this form sense is from that which is bound up with memory: themes and 
secondary themes; their struggle; their development; the climax; the 
recapitulation (which is the belief that one may own one’s own home). But 
actually, unlike the snail, we carry our homes within us, which enables us 
to fly or to stay, — to enjoy each. But beware of that which is 
breathtakingly beautiful, for at any moment the telephone may ring or the 
airplane come down in a vacant lot. (Silence 111) 
 
Sonata form, or sonnet form, will return, but its form sense limits flight. The dialectical 
struggle leaves one saddled with history. But actually, we carry our cages within us, and 
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we can move on. We don’t have to listen to the tape of the past; it’s better to be open in 
form. That way we can accept the call or the crash with awareness and acceptance.  
 
Cage and the Cage: the Rebus Signature 
In X, and in other texts such as For the Birds, Cage relates this series of answers 
to interviewers: 
Received letter from journalist: put your philosophy in a nutshell. 
Replied: get out of whatever cage you find yourself in. Asked to supply 
catchy title for conversation with Daniel Charles, suggested For the Birds. 
TV interview: if you were asked to describe yourself in three words, wha’d 
you say?  An open cage. Satie was right: experience is a form of paralysis. 
(X 159-60) 
 
The passage gives us the rebus signature wrapped up neatly in an antonomasia, the proper 
name falling into the abyss of Cage’s style as a common noun. The cluster of images 
makes a wonderful rebus for Cage’s abyss: an open cage with birds flying up out of it. As 
we shall see, these birds will sign like the spirit of JC arising from a sarcophagus. How 
does this signature troping actually model the poetics of Cage’s texts? During the ‘50s 
Cage began to broaden his focus from musical composition to the production of written 
texts to be read and, often, gathered into book form. Before this transition, during this 
transition, and for the rest of his life, Cage maintained a constant strategy of applying 
chance operations to any compositional process he was engaged in. As the last sentence 
in the quotation above implies, this enables the composer to escape the past, experience, 
and memory, although it is not without some irony that Cage refers to Satie, who might 
be considered part of the tradition of music. Intention can be limited in ways that enable a 
writer or composer to escape the history of genre and genres. In the Foreword to X  (and 
in many other places), Cage gives his logic for this practice: 
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 The title of this book, like that of M, was found by subjecting the 
alphabet to chance operations. It signifies the unknown place where poetry 
lives, tomorrow, I hope, as it does today, where what you see, framed or 
unframed, is art (cf. photography), where what you hear on or off the 
record is music.  
 Years ago in a review of Silence Alfred Frankenstein wrote that 
my writings were the story of how a change of mind came about. . . . so I 
have more and more written my texts in the same way I write my music, 
and make my prints, through the use of chance operations and by taking 
the asking of questions rather than the making of choices as my personal 
responsibility. Or you might say that I am devoted to freeing my writing 
from my intentions. (ix) 
 
In other words, intentions tend to form a cage, and this cage needs escaping. This anti-
intentional desire sets Cage in resistance to the intentional structure of the signature in 
general and especially of course his own. Throughout Cage’s work this signature 
resistance is everywhere in evidence. It is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a line-
out. One is never off the line, the escape is never final, there are always cages in various 
stages of becoming, and the metaphoric totalization of this process is the subject 
circumscribed by cages.  
So Cage has a penchant for suturing over the artist, himself, and letting the 
viewer, listener, or reader move about altogether freely in the field of the artwork. When 
he signs with the rebus signature, as “an open cage,” Cage announces his directions for 
reading or hearing his texts: interpenetration (you are free to enter) and non-interference 
(you are free to leave). This signature troping appeared late in Cage’s career. But Cage’s 
attitude toward the second modality of the signature, the recognizable idiom of the 
composer, is in place from early in his critical writing.  
 
Cagean Signature Theory, Stage I: Resistance to Idiom 
Early on in his published texts Cage uses the concept of the signature as a critical 
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device. For instance, in Varèse’s music Cage hears the recognizable signature style as a 
fault. In Cage’s view, Varèse’s signature style is overbearing in his compositions, 
lessening the distance between the composition, its performance, and its audition, 
rendering all three moments too close to the personality of Varèse. In this instance, the 
signature, because of its proximity to the ego of the artist, reduces Varèse’s style to a 
musical trap, that is, it reduces Varèse’s work in scope at the moment when it should, 
through a kind of absence, open up the range of the music’s affect. This has to do with 
noise, letting sounds be sounds. For Cage, Varèse uses noise to exercise his imagination, 
so that instead of opening up to noise as noise, Varèse manages to make his compositions 
all sound trademarked, a return of the same rather than an exploration of difference. 
Varèse’s use of noise isn’t about noise; it’s about Varèse (Silence 69, 83-4). In Derridean-
Pongian terms, the second modality of the signature conveys nothing but the fact of its 
idiomaticity.  
 Strangely enough, Cage’s contentiousness with Varèse plays out the cage 
metaphor that his texts often circle about and to which he is always returning. It is an 
enactment of Cage’s own signature style, not within a musical composition but rather as 
theory of composition. We are on the way to this extreme: composition = no 
composition. While encaging Varèse implies a great deal about Cage’s own 
compositional goals, it locks Varèse up in a cage of Varèse’s own making, which Cage 
reads or hears in Varèse’s compositions. In this special case, Cage would open Varèse’s 
cage. In the general theoretical case, Cage’s goal would be to open the cage of music, 
letting in the remaining range of sound, letting sound reterritorialize music. Hence the 
aphorism, MUSIC = NO MUSIC (Composition 62). Cage’s own compositional cages 
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should leave their doors open to the remainder of sound where Varèse’s do not, a kind of 
musical (ar)rest or release. An empty cage may be the best metaphorical vehicle for 
Cage’s tenor/signature. And Cage specifies that this is a problem of the signature: 
What is unnecessary in Varèse . . . are all his mannerisms, of which two 
stand out as signatures (the repeated note resembling a telegraphic 
transmission and the cadence of a tone held through a crescendo to 
maximum amplitude). These mannerisms do not establish sounds in their 
own right. They make it quite difficult to hear the sounds just as they are, 
for they draw attention to Varèse and his imagination. (Silence 69) 
 
Instead of an empty, open cage, Varèse’s listener is forced to deal with the musical image 
of Varèse. The problem with Varèse lies in the proximity between his mannerisms and 
his signature, a proximity that frames Varèse, rather than sound or music. The signature 
can be territorialized by the imagination, or mannerisms, which seem productive of the 
artist/composer, and for Cage this is a dead end. Yet Varèse is extremely important for 
Cage in terms of musical roots. Cage considers Varèse to have fathered noise into the 
history of music: consider this patriarchal genealogy: 
“Sound come into its own.” What does that mean? For one thing: it means 
that noises are as useful to new music as so-called musical tones, for the 
simple reason that they are sounds. This decision alters the view of 
history, so that one is no longer concerned with tonality or atonality, 
Schoenberg or Stravinsky (the twelve tones or the twelve expressed as 
seven plus five), nor with consonance and dissonance, but rather with 
Edgard Varèse who fathered forth noise into 20th century music. But it is 
clear that ways must be discovered that allow noises and tones to be just 
noises and tones, not exponents subservient to Varèse’s imagination.”  
(68-9) 
 
For Cage, signature and imagination need to be disassociated. One reading of Cage’s 
gesture might be Eliotic, having to do with impersonality (or the appearance of such) 
while maintaining artistic control, somewhat like the ironic Joycean artist paring his 
fingernails invisibly beyond the villanelle. But it is as if “noises and tones,” indeed, 
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sound itself, as it is, without mannerism, should countersign for the signature once the 
history of music has been gotten past—or at least that would be the proper Cagean 
signature. This would take the signature of alterity, of all things exterior, and substitute it 
for Cage’s signature, that is, open the cage. The difference between exteriority and 
interiority presents the opportunity for a substitution: the presence of silence (ambient 
noise) stands in the absence of the artist/composer and in the absence of the signature. 
We could theorize this absence as a traumatic kernel within the signature. The listener is 
in a crisis: she has to decide whether to sign for something the artist/composer has given 
her but has not signed for himself.  
 A signature event creates a link between some subjective interiority and objective 
exteriority: the signature of an artist or a writer puts the viewer’s or reader’s link at stake. 
If the reader doesn’t sign for the writer, the writer’s worth goes down.  
And this would be a way of transcending signature jealousy, the attraction and 
repulsion that Cage feels toward Varèse for his move on the history of experimental 
music. Calculating the exponential potential of “noises and tones” without the coefficient 
of personality takes Varèse into account and sediments or stratifies his position within 
that history of music. And yet this gesture is a kind of chance procedure, a calculation of 
the odds that alterity will sign for Cage. The spirit of affirmation, of the Joycean “yes, 
yes,” can be read here in Cage’s yes to alterity, to the other of music, whether it be 
silence or noise or “no music.” By operating on Varèse’s signature, Cage is taking his 
chances with his own signature.  
 Cage performs a variation on this signature theme in the short piece, “Edgard 
Varèse” (Silence 83-4). Varèse leaves no musical space for countersignature: “for in 
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Deserts he attempts to make tape sound like the orchestra and vice versa, showing again a 
lack of interest in the natural differences of sounds, preferring to give them all his 
unifying signature” (83). A unified signature: what would that be? Or more apropos of 
the Cagean signature, what is absent or what has escaped from the signature? Cage has 
split, as it were. He has left the cage in lieu of his signature. And he has split the signature 
using the issue of the presence/absence of the composer in the composition, performance, 
and audition of the musical text, i.e., in the musical event. Readers of Glas will recognize 
a similar use of presence and absence in the case of Genet, the thief. One of his habits 
was to mark the event of his presence (or his passing) by the theft or absenting of some 
object.20 Rather than leave behind the mark of his imagination, Cage would leave an 
empty (musical) cage. At least in the case of the silent pieces like 4’ 33”.  
 Cage’s intertextuality, his predominate mode of poetic composition, enacts a 
similar kind of theft and, I will argue, counterfeiting. Writing for the Second Time 
through Finnegans Wake clearly illustrates this.  
Elsewhere Cage critiques the notion that art originates in the interiority of the 
Artist or genius:  
‘Art should come from within; then it is profound.’ But it seems to me Art 
goes within, and I don’t see the need for ‘should’ or ‘then’ or ‘it’ or ‘pro-
found.’ When Art comes from within, which is what it was for so long 
doing, it became a thing which seemed to elevate the man who made it 
above those who observed it or heard it and the artist was considered a 
genius or given a rating . . . so proudly he signs his work like a 
manufacturer. (Silence 129) 
 
This denigration of signature interiority leaves the implication that the only good 
signature is countersignature originating outside the artist.  
                                                
20 Derrida plays on this gesture as part of Genet’s signature style by means of the word vol, which means 
both theft and flight in French, suggesting a deconstruction of the eagle/Hegel. 
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Revill notes that Cage, coming to printmaking, “was anxious to avoid ‘gesture,’ 
by which he meant personal, habitual reactions (this had formed the basis of his 
criticisms of improvisation, of jazz and of surrealism)” (Revill 262). And Revill supports 
this assertion by quoting Cage from an interview by Robin White: “something connected 
with the knowing aspect of the person, as in a signature—when you sign your name, you 
just do it by habit (qtd. in Revill 262). In this instance Cage is identifying the signature 
not with interiority generally but with habit—a kind of unconscious interiority? or the 
most superficial level of conscious agency? In this paradigm, conscious interiority 
becomes stuffed with discursive trash. On this same question of interiority, 
poststructuralist psychoanalytic thought tends to posit a traumatic kernel of 
unconsciousness that must be repressed and sutured over with neurotic structure. In this 
view the production of interiority, or interiorization, is a scene of violence.21 In either 
case, if the signature is habitual, then it is reduced to a function of the discursive 
interiority, the “knowledge” as Cage would say, of the ego. 
Grouped with the texts that mention Varèse in Silence, are texts on Satie and 
Robert Rauschenberg, two artists in whose works Cage finds the openness that Varèse 
lacks. 
 The text entitled “Erik Satie” comes between the two texts that mention Varèse, 
“History of Experimental Music in the United States” and “Edgard Varèse.” Positioning 
an imagined conversation with Satie between articles on Varèse suggests their similar 
importance for Cage. Cage signals his preference for Satie’s approach to sound-as-sound 
and personal sentiment: 
                                                
21 For an exemplary reading of this type, see Avital Ronell’s interpretation of Madame Bovary in Crack 
Wars. There she notes that the reading of romance novels, a kind of textual discursive trash, constitutes the 
primal violent interiorization of Emma for the purpose of suturing over the loss of her (absent) mother. 
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To be interested in Satie one must be disinterested to begin with, accept 
that a sound is a sound and a man is a man, give up illusions about ideas of 
order, expressions of sentiment, and all the rest of our inherited aesthetic 
claptrap. (82) 
 
“Claptrap” suggests an unpacking of the cage metaphor. A trap: “claptrap,” or noise, or 
bombast, in this case is not to be given our attention, in spite of the theorization of silence 
and attention to noise. The aesthetics of the past is bad noise. What we are given by 
tradition is a useful cage, but it limits us in our ability to think and sense beyond the 
ordering words and concepts of music. For Cage this quality of tradition automatically 
times it out. We need new music for a new world. Actually it is even more extreme than 
that. We need to let the world’s noise, rather than the noise of our egos, become music. 
Cage quotes Satie: “Show me something new; I’ll begin all over again” (Cage’s italics) 
(80). Cage refers to this as “moving out from zero” (80). Also with Satie, Cage moves 
into temporal formations designed to allow unstructured sound to open within music, 
where previously sounds had not been let to be just sounds.  
To repeat: a sound has four characteristics: frequency, amplitude, timbre 
and duration. Silence (ambient noise) has only duration. A zero musical 
structure must be just an empty time. (80) 
 
Silence has only duration—from a musical point of view. If the window is open or if time 
structure is suspended, the ambient noise comes to us replete with frequencies, 
amplitudes, and timbres, as well as duration. Empty time structures are like empty cages 
that are ready to capture silence, ready for the claptrap that will belong strictly to the 
moment of performance and audition. The past does not overdetermine performance and 
the space of musical possibility is open to the present. 
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Robert Rauschenberg: A Silent Signature? 
In the essay “On Robert Rauschenberg, Artist, and His Work” Cage loosens 
several formal constraints in an attempt to convey the sense of freedom and openness he 
feels in relation to Rauschenberg’s work. In the editorial note introducing the essay, Cage 
makes reference to his own signature piece and addends his own siglum to the statement. 
This gesture is set off typographically to emphasize its importance. The note appears 
roughly like this: 
This article, completed in February of 1961, was published in Metro (Milan) in 
May. It may be read in whole or in part; any sections of it may be skipped, what 
remains may be read in any order. The style of printing here employed is not 
essential. Any of the sections may be printed directly over any of the others, and 
the spaces between paragraphs may be varied in any manner. The words in italics 
are either quotations from Rauschenberg or titles of his works.  
To Whom It May Concern: 
The white paintings came 
first; my silent piece 
came later. 
               —J. C. 
 
Cage places his signature piece, “the silent piece,” in immediate proximity to 
Rauschenberg’s white paintings.22 He is signing for his artistic debt to Rauschenberg. The 
                                                
22 The Guggenheim Museum gives this background on the White Paintings, including a narration of Cage’s 
response:  
In the summer of 1951 Robert Rauschenberg created his revolutionary White Paintings at 
Black Mountain College, near Asheville, North Carolina. At a time when Abstract 
Expressionism was ascendant in New York, Rauschenberg's uninflected all-white surfaces 
eliminated gesture and denied all possibility of narrative or external reference. In his 
radical reduction of content as well as in his conception of the works as a series of 
modular shaped geometric canvases, Rauschenberg can be seen as presaging Minimalism 
by a decade.  
The White Paintings shocked the artistic community at Black Mountain, and word of the 
"scandal" spread to the New York art world long before they were first exhibited at the 
Stable Gallery in October 1953. While generally misunderstood at the time, the works 
were highly influential for Rauschenberg's frequent collaborator, the composer John Cage. 
Under the sway of the Buddhist aesthetics of Zen, Cage interpreted the blank surfaces as 
"landing strips" or receptors for light and shadow, and was inspired to pursue the 
corresponding notion of silence and ambient sound in music. His response, 4'33" (1952), 
consisted of the pianist sitting quietly at the piano without touching the keys for four 
minutes and thirty-three seconds so that incidental sounds in the surrounding 
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circumstances of this gesture are worth noting. After using the siglum and his full name 
to sign respectively the foreword and the manifesto which together comprise the front 
matter, nowhere else in the editorial matter of the book does Cage use his siglum or 
proper name. Cage’s handwritten, full signature is reproduced on the spine, and his last 
name, enlarged and as it appears on the spine, is impressed into the front cover of the 
hardback edition. That is a lot of emphasis on the physical signature as a covering 
gesture. So the use of his siglum to introduce the Rauschenberg piece puts pretty strong 
emphasis on it as it relates to Cage’s own theorization of the signature.  
  In the second section of the Rauschenberg piece, Cage writes, “And the signature 
is nowhere to be seen” (Silence 98). This particular small section of Cage’s essay reads 
elliptically, giving the term “signature” broad scope: 
 The Goat. No weeds. Virtuosity with ease. Does his head have a 
bed in it? Beauty. His hands and his feet, fingers and toes long-jointed, are 
astonishing. They certify his work. And the signature is nowhere to be 
seen. The paintings were thrown in the river after the exhibition. What is 
the nature of Art when it reaches the Sea?  (98) 
 
Some of Rauschenberg’s works are indeed unsigned. The White Paintings are apparently 
unsigned as is the Erased de Kooning Drawing. However, it’s doubtful that Cage is 
referring to the literal signature. More likely this sentence continues his earlier thinking 
on style. Cage would have artists and composers suppress all sign of signature style, in 
the sense of personal style. What’s more important is the counter-signature of the 
materials themselves—a goat for instance. Is Rauschenberg making his materials sign? In 
Cage’s estimation, it is not Rauschenberg’s personality that certifies his work, but the 
beauty of his digits. And then the materials themselves are thrown away. Literally, the 
                                                                                                                                            
environment—such as the wind in the trees outside or the whispering of audience 
members—determined the content of the piece. (Singular) 
Cage took off from Rauschenberg.  
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works do not return to Rauschenberg himself.  
 Rauschenberg manages to evade certain strictures of a signature style. 
Rauschenberg’s work and his method find their ways into the perceptual apparatus of his 
friends as Cage notes: “Rauschenberg is continually being offered scraps of this and that, 
odds and ends his friends run across, since it strikes them: This is something he could use 
in a painting” (Silence 100). There is a remainder of idiom in play in Rauschenberg’s 
style, and he orients it at times by using his friend’s feedback as a field for 
discrimination: “Nine times out of ten he has no use for” the “odds and ends” (100). But 
early on, the question of personal expressivity was practically and ethically complex for 
Cage. The aesthetic that he reads in the work of Rauschenberg seems to match that of the 
direction that his work took as he was getting started as a composer. 
 Explaining how he was led to the exploration of structural rhythm, Cage remarks 
the dual nature of artistic expression: “I recognized that expression of two kinds, that 
arising from the personality of the composer and that arising from the nature and content 
of the materials, was inevitable, but I felt its emanation was stronger and more sensible 
when not consciously striven for, but simply allowed to arise naturally” (John Cage: 
Writer23 34). This sentence concedes that there will be personal expression in a 
composition. What is personal expression that does not involve conscious striving? What 
role does that personal expression play in the signature style, and what role does the 
expression of materials play in the style? It seems that ethics and necessity played a role 
in Cage’s development at the point of this issue of expressivity. “I felt that an artist had 
an ethical responsibility to society to keep alive to the contemporary spiritual needs: I felt 
                                                
23Hereafter referred to as JC: W. 
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that if he did this, admittedly vague as it is a thing to do, his work would automatically 
carry with it a usefulness to others” (34). In typical Cagean fashion, societal ethics, 
indeed some form of spiritual ethics, must underwrite composition. And it is interesting 
that this statement takes on the air of confession: “I felt . . .. I felt.”  Indeed, the statement 
enacts personal expression. Nevertheless, the moment informs his negative attitude 
toward signature visibility in questions of style. On the level of necessity and chance, 
Cage adds, “Any latent longing that I might naturally have had to master expressivity in 
music was dissolved for me by my connection with the modern dance. For them I had 
continually to make suitable and expressive accompaniments” (34). There are two 
important moments to note here: Cage’s “vision” is rhythmically focused by the needs of 
the dance, “writing within the lengths of time prescribed for [him] by modern dancers” 
(34), and the ethical path before him was rhythmical, for there are other artists, the 
dancers, within this scene whose work requires it. This scene might be called a cage 
named “rhythmical structure.” Later in his career Cage will work with Cunningham to 
move out of this structural connection between the dance and the music for the dance. 
Describing the Cunningham style Cage says:  
the continuity . . . no longer relies on linear elements, be they narrative or 
psychological, nor does it rely on a movement towards and away from 
climax. As in abstract painting, it is assumed that an element (a 
movement, a sound, a change of light) is in and of itself expressive: what 
it communicates is in large part determined by the observer himself. It is 
assumed that the dance supports itself and does not need support from the 
music. The two arts take place in a common place and time, but each art 
expresses this Space-time in its own way. The result is an activity of 
interpenetrations in time and space, not counterpoints, nor controlled 
relationships, but flexibilities as are known from the mobiles of Alexander 
Calder. (JC: W 91) 
 
Over expressivity Cage valorizes a certain repressivity. But the limits of this repression 
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are situated along a border between the personal and the material (“the sounds and 
silences of a composition” (Silence 18)), and this material includes the space of societal 
ethics, as distinct from ego, memory, taste, and an aesthetic ideology valorizing the 
master composer. What kind of rhythmic structure allows Cage to work along this 
border? The short answer: chance-determined counting. The more interesting issue is 
what remains of signature style when “what it communicates is in large part determined 
by the observer himself.” 
 
Cagean Reception Theory 
 Cage’s appreciation of Rauschenberg includes a moment of reception theory. This 
element of style becomes something like a carrot held out in front of the 
viewer/reader/auditor that moves away upon the approach—of either viewer or artist. Of 
the items brought to Rauschenberg, then rejected, Cage says, “Say it’s something close to 
something he once found useful, and so could be recognized as his. Well, then, as a 
matter of course, his poetry has moved without one’s knowing where it’s gone to” 
(Silence 100). The objects of attention that are dispersed throughout the field of the 
painting, combine, or assemblage do not become fetishized for qualities identifiable with 
the artist. Rauschenberg withdraws his stylistic sensibility. However, the “poetry” of 
Rauschenberg’s painting does retain continuity with the history of painting: “He changes 
what goes on, on a canvas, but he does not change how canvas is used for paintings—that 
is, stretched flat to make rectangular surfaces which may be hung on a wall” (100). The 
style, the signature style, is a process of change: “He changes what goes on.” Does this 
continuous variation take place inside or outside a stylistic cage? Or perhaps to reframe 
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this question, are we on a line out of the cage? If Rauschenberg’s work remains 
“painting” by virtue of canvas and walls, there is flight or change within this process of 
presentation. Any vocabulary of symbols or allegorical structure is constantly relieved. 
This process of change or relief becomes an element of style. The mode of art remains 
recognizably the same; a matter of canvases, walls, and seeing, and, thus, structurally it 
remains painting. Cage’s characterization of the Rauschenberg aesthetic hinges on the 
attention of the viewer, and this is where he places the trajectory of the term “freedom.” 
From one cage to another, from one subject to another, from artist to viewer, from one 
center to another center (to use the Buddhist terminology that informs Cage’s and 
Cunningham’s thinking24) we are perhaps on the line out of the cage, if not all the way 
out at least on the way out. The rebus reads, “get out of whatever cage you are in.” Cage 
attempts to place the artist and the viewer on the same plane. The way Rauschenberg 
positions canvases on a wall leads Cage to this aesthetic leveling: 
These [canvases] he uses singly, joined together, or placed in a symmetry 
so obvious as not to attract interest (nothing special). We know two ways 
to unfocus attention: symmetry is one of them; the other is the over-all 
where each small part is a sample of what you find elsewhere. In either 
case, there is at least the possibility of looking anywhere, not just where 
someone arranged you should. You are then free to deal with your 
freedom just as the artist dealt with his, not in the same way but, 
nevertheless, originally.  (100) 
 
As subjects, the artist and the viewer should be on the same plane of freedom, asking 
themselves where attention is to be focused. What is given for reception is freedom, or 
rather the return to freedom, as if it had been lost or surrendered to the artist in the 
                                                
24 Cunningham discusses this in the film Cage and Cunningham. Here are examples from Cage in JCW: 
“This desire [to explore the unknown] has found expression in our culture in new materials, because our 
culture has its faith not in the peaceful center of the spirit but in an ever-hopeful projection on to things of 
our own desire for completion” (43). And “Nothing in life or art needs accompaniment, because each has 
its own center (which is no center)” (63).  
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moment the viewer brings his attention to the canvas or the scene of painting. Where was 
attention prior to that moment? Cage says, “All it means is that, looking closely, we see 
as it was everything is in chaos still” (100). The chaotic syntax of this sentence points the 
way back and out of the cage one enters upon arriving at the field of the painting. The 
question of how the subject should order his attention should be returned to the subject. 
The (absent) presence of the artist should not totalize or reterritorialize the plane of 
perception or the space of the other. 
 In an interview with William Duckworth, Cage explains how he cultivates this 
mode of attention in his musical compositions: 
D: How do you weaken taste and memory? 
C: The Zen method is by sitting cross-legged. 
D: But the majority of Western civilization doesn’t feel it can do that. 
C: No. The way I have chosen to do that is to compose by means of asking 
questions rather than making choices, and to use chance operations to 
determine the answers. 
D: And how should the listeners do that? 
C: The listeners and the critics have a problem. And I would like to find 
out how to solve that or how to indicate where that is. I know that I may 
be able to answer it, because instead of hearing music in my head before I 
write, I write in such a way as to hear something that I have not yet heard. 
Therefore, I’m in the position that the listener is in, and the critic is in with 
respect to my music. How do I approach it? How do I hear it, is the 
answer. Not because I know anything that they don’t know, but because I 
haven’t heard it anymore than they’ve heard it. (Duckworth 31-2) 
 
Cage composes in order to put himself in the same position, the same place (“where that 
is”), the listener is in. He composes in order to receive. It is not intention but protention 
he wishes to convey, not the directing of attention, but the freeing of attention. There is a 
sense of place here that has to do with reception, with making oneself a receptacle. This 
is not a way of knowing, but of placing oneself in a position of reception. It is a place 
where taste and memory weaken. Taste and memory tend to reduce experience to what 
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our ears, and our bodies by extension, have been organized to desire. Beyond that 
organization lies alterity. Of course, we cannot completely escape into alterity. We can 
get on the way to it though, on the way to an escape from taste and memory. Cage would 
put listener, critic, and composer in an empty cage and let them leave. Cage himself is not 
the solution to the problem facing his listeners and critics, the problem of finding this 
place. But he can put himself in that place. Cage figures himself as a general addressee, 
an ideal, capable of understanding everything crucial at stake in the experience of 
listening and therefore of receiving everything, and yet, at the same time, Cage disfigures 
this general addressee. The empty cage left behind should be forgotten, put away, 
distanced, along with taste and memory. Perhaps Cage does not assert both these opposite 
figurations, especially not the former, the musical sujet supposé savoir, yet his signature 
might signify in this manner. “John Cage” as the history of music: he traps the listener, 
caging him or releasing her by writing music unidentifiable with the prior history of 
music. He attempts to exit the history of music and leave the door open. What that 
history, or what the music of the past, is not, depends on what it is. Hearing it depends on 
freedom from expectations from past experiences of music.    
To come back to the Rauschenberg text and the two points that bear on this sense 
of place: “You are then free to deal with your freedom just as the artist dealt with his, not 
in the same way but, nevertheless, originally,” and “we see as it was everything is in 
chaos still” (Silence 100). The problem of space and place is partially taken up in the 
figures of the door and the room in the rest of Cage’s paragraphs on Rauschenberg.  
“The door is never locked. Rauschenberg walks in. No one home. He paints a new 
painting over the old one” (101). This image that Cage gives us to contemplate presents 
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Rauschenberg as a graffito wandering into an abstract cage. Cages have doors, and artists 
may enter them. Another level of signature resistance manifests itself here. Cages are 
meant to be locked, but in this scene the door is never locked. Rauschenberg’s studio has 
been recast as an empty cage: “No one home.” There is no one to direct his attention. 
Subject positions cannot be locked in or locked out. The artist is in and out. As readers, 
listeners, or viewers we should be in the same place. Where are we? It would seem to be 
the artist’s studio, but how then is “no one home”? The syntax confuses or leaves open 
the relative subject positions of the speaker, Rauschenberg, and the reader of this passage. 
And this accords with the aim of placing the other in the same position with the same 
freedom (to exercise) as the artist. To end the paragraph, Cage writes, “It’s a joy in fact to 
begin over again. In preparation he erases the De Kooning” (101). “No one home”—it’s 
an empty cage, or an empty canvas, or an empty field. Erasure of De Kooning: 
preservation is not an issue. The naming of things can be resisted. But renaming goes on.  
“Were he [Rauschenberg] saying something in particular, he would have to focus 
the painting, as it is he simply focuses himself, and everything, a pair of socks, is 
appropriate, appropriate to poetry, a poetry of infinite possibilities” (103). “Focusing 
himself” means enacting the decisions to see and observe in particular ways. It’s a kind of 
appropriation. Rauschenberg takes his chances with his materials just as the other must 
take her/his chances in focusing on the painting. Where and how will the gaze fall? Could 
Cage’s text, or even his signature, serve as well as a pair of socks? To focus on the socks 
is to pass through an abstract cage. How can socks take us beyond? Well, there can’t be a 
beyond without a before or below, the mud out of which we stand and look up.  
“Is the door locked? No, it’s open as usual” (101). For the viewer, perception is 
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not through the other, the artist. Perception is to be let through the door, both in and out. 
Perhaps a better formulation is that the exterior, with the artist lost in the alterity of 
exteriority, is to be allowed to flow into the interior, that is, the outside of the studio or 
the outside of the home allowed to come in. “No one home”: what is the economy of this 
“usually” open door? The space of interiority is not closed. The scene of painting is not a 
trap, and the other of the artist is not trapped. I am free to go in again and begin again. 
Cage writes, “It’s a joy in fact to begin over again. In preparation [Rauschenberg] erases 
the De Kooning” (101). Cage is always ready to start out again from zero, as he says of 
Satie (80), to find and orient oneself on the lineout. What is interior must be let out, a 
venture outward into alterity, in balance with the inward flow. Speaking of plan-as-
technique, Cage writes, “More important is to know exactly the size of the door and 
techniques for getting a canvas out of the studio. (Combines don’t roll up)” (104). In 
other words, the transpositional space of the painting is limited by the size of the door. 
This crossing over of the object, from interior to exterior, is the initial event of a visual 
model for the transposition of the subject. The subject would enter the space of the artist, 
just as the canvas or objects in a painting enter the space, by the chance proximity of 
artist and object, with the one room of the scene suggesting interiority. The artist expects 
that the subject, the “divine stranger,” will also leave as the painting will leave, through 
the open door. 
“There is in Rauschenberg, between him and what he picks up to use, the 
quality of encounter. For the first time. If, as happens, there is a series of 
paintings containing such and such a material, it is as though the encounter 
was extended into a visit on the part of the stranger (who is divine). . . . 
Shortly the stranger leaves, leaving the door open.” (103)  
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The alterity of the stranger is marked by the strangeness of the other, and the artist is also 
symmetrically granted the divine element of the strange. In this scene the artist’s 
strangeness dwells in the interiority of the studio, and the strangeness of the stranger is 
allowed to enter and then leave by the open door connecting interiority and exteriority. 
The painting is ejected from the interiority of the artist where it originated. The process of 
(ex)change with the other can remain open: Cage writes, “If you do not change your mind 
about something when you confront a picture you have not seen before, you are either a 
stubborn fool or the painting is not very good” (106). The painting should bring alterity, 
and the other should be open to alterity. He’s against caging out the other. 
Of the white paintings, Cage remarks: 
Into this, structure and all, anything goes. The structure was not the point. 
But it was practical: you could actually see that everything was happening 
without anything’s being done. Before such emptiness, you just wait to see 
what you will see. Is Rauschenberg’s mind then empty, the way the white 
canvases are? Does that mean whatever enters it has room? (In, of course, 
the gap between art and life.) And since his eyes are connected to his 
mind, he can see what he looks at because his head is clear, uncluttered? 
That must be the case, for only in a mind (twentieth) that had room for it 
could Dante (thirteenth-fourteenth) have come in and gone out” (107). 
 
What comes in, should go out. Rather than possessing Dante, being stuck with him, or 
stuck on him, or stuck to him, it is a matter of  “FLUENCY IN AND OUT,” as Cage puts 
it in one of his aphorisms (Composition 60). The temporal and cultural alterity of Dante 
flows easily in and out of the mind/room/cage of Rauschenberg. In the white paintings, 
“anything goes.” Signature resistance and signature reception come together to form a 
kind of becoming-cage-free which would cancel out the metaphorics of imprisonment, 
traps, punishment, cells, walled-in-ness, etc., but instead goes by way of indeterminacy 
and undecidability toward other undetermined and chance meanings. Negation of the first 
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metaphorics happens. But it doesn’t stop there. As with Varèse, the metaphorics of 
becoming-caged seems to elicit at the same time the metaphorics of becoming-free: 
“fluency in and out” applies as much to Varèse/Cage as it does to Dante/Rauschenberg. 
In the oedipal register, the Cage signature allows the patriarchal to have its place, but 
then moves on to the next event without overdetermination. Cage says of his father, “he 
was very—I guess the word might be cagey. I was going to say ‘canny,’ but . . . (JCCA 
72). 
Signature, Order Words, Superego: From Rauschenberg to Duchamp 
“And the signature is nowhere to be found.” 
 Throughout Cage’s meditation on Rauschenberg the architecture of space remains 
thematic. It is the means by which Cage presents Rauschenberg. The imagery of galleries, 
studios, walls, doors, etc., persists. Within Rauschenberg’s paintings and within these 
spaces that Cage draws, the reader may wander; we cannot hear Rauschenberg, who, 
Cage argues, has withdrawn from the spaces. The artist-as-superego, as moral father-
figure, has been, at least, put under examination if not under erasure. The reader/viewer is 
given empty spaces on the pages, among Cage’s paragraphs. This time there are no 
instructions to the reader for interpreting the spaces, as there were in the Lecture on 
Nothing. The form of the text helps the reader enact or enter the decision space Cage is 
describing. Cage evokes a mood of quietness and contemplation, as if Rauschenberg is no 
longer present.  
 Yes, Cage is structuring an aesthetic intervention that is an ordering in itself, but 
the order or assemblage is designed to allow variation as are Rauschenberg’s paintings. 
Cage directs that his paragraphs be read or printed in any order. Responsibility for the 
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order of reading passes over to the printer-publisher and then to the reader as the order of 
viewing passes over to Rauschenberg’s viewer. Within the assemblage writer-text-reader 
(or painter-canvas-viewer) the onus of production (of meaning, affect, experience) can be 
redistributed. In effect, the reader is being asked to sign stylistically. Cage’s remark that 
“the signature is nowhere to be found” marks the withdrawal of the artist’s persona and 
its baggage. That withdrawal permits an economy of countersignature.  
 When Cage comes to Duchamp in the 60s, it is as if he is repeating the discovery 
of noise beyond silence. Everything has changed. Suddenly the aesthetics become an all 
out celebration of the signature. Duchamp’s signature is everywhere to be found. Cage 
adopts Duchamp as his aesthetic superego, even naming himself “a duchamp.” The 
aesthetic of withdrawal has been turned inside out, and Cage calls it centrifugal. This is 
because no one funnels more of the aesthetic process through the signature than 
Duchamp. But what differentiates this centrifugal movement from simple 
reterritorialization? One way to answer this question is to examine the relative 
approaches to the signature in terms of order words. Deleuze’s & Guattari’s theorization 
of the order word in A Thousand Plateaus can be read as an argument that the superego is 
a function of language rather than of the individual psyche.25 It is as if the order word has 
cycled over into its would-be antithesis, the password. The signature itself has become a 
tunnel through the order word structure of language. The signature pre-immanently 
exemplifies the order word, and can therefore deconstruct the order word. The password, 
Deleuze’s reversal of the order word, is an order word, albeit a reflexive and ironic 
intervention. What can be more reflexive, more self-reflexive than the signature? The 
                                                
25 See Chapter 4, “November 20, 1923—Postulates of Linguistics.” 
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order of identity encodes itself in the signature, which itself structures the symbolic order. 
To leave one’s mark is the original symbolic gesture.  
 Rauschenberg’s silent signature style is a way of silencing the superego. In fact, it 
challenges the entire symbolic order by foregrounding the image of silence. Duchamp’s 
registration of the symbolic order through the signature takes an entirely different 
approach, a more active than silent strategy. The signature, empty in itself, is trumpeted, 
but as a framing device.  
Duchamp’s signature style makes a password out of his own signature. Duchamp 
presents a monstrous, alteristic, deployment of the signature. How does Cage begin to 
understand Duchamp? Duchamp is perhaps the greatest artist of the signature, the 
champion of the field, the winner. In French his name means the field, the place, the area. 
His name resonates with opening, clearing, the field of view. The crypt in the signature is 
empty, or perhaps the crypt is full in some absolute sense, fully open to everything. 
Duchamp says “yes” to his signature by leaving it places. He throws his signature away. 
He signs cigars, then smokes them. He disseminates his signature in order to purvey the 
found object. He sees his signature inscribed on the thing then he shows this inscription 
to us by signing the object. His signature event immediately challenges his appreciator. 
Will the viewer concede that the object countersigns for Duchamp?  
Taking off again from the mark in Marcel, we see that his first name opens right 
on the structure of the signature also. Marcel makes his mark. Indeed, his signature is on 
the march, like a soldier in Nietzsche’s army of tropes: metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms, . . . , duchamps. It frames and renames everything. As a machinic 
assemblage it seems capable of consuming and aesthetically repackaging any thing. 
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Implicit in this event is a release of the name to get rid of it, to throw it away, in order to 
have it come back countersigned. The name comes back countersigned by the object. 
Cage is hypersensitive to this play of the signature: 
The works signed by Duchamp are centrifugal. The world around becomes 
indistinguishable. (X 53) 
 
The check. The string he dropped. The Mona Lisa. The musical notes 
taken out of a hat. The glass. The toy shot-gun painting. The things he 
found. Therefore, everything seen—every object, that is, plus the process 
of looking at it—is a Duchamp. (AYFM 70) 
 
It’s too much. As Cage says, “What's more boring than Marcel Duchamp? I ask you” 
(71). Perhaps a good joke shouldn’t be repeated. And Cage is aware of this also:  
He [Duchamp] requires that we know that being an artist isn't child's 
play: equivalent in difficulty—surely—to playing chess. Furthermore a 
work of our art is not ours alone but belongs also to the opponent who’s 
there to the end. 
Anarchy?  (71) 
 
Yes, it is a joke, but it is more than that also. Neither Duchamp nor Cage is simply 
joking. Property, propriety, the proper name, ownership, order: all these are at stake. Who 
owns a way of looking? How could anyone sign for it, or take ownership of a process? 
Could the joke become a self-fulfilling prophecy? a true joke? What would its relation be 
to the unconscious? In his biography of Cage, David Revill suggests that Duchamp’s 
understanding of the unconscious and Cage’s understanding were different, particularly 
in relation to chance: “Their apparent shared interest in chance masked very different 
perspectives; “your chance is not the same as my chance” Duchamp warned (without 
addressing Cage specifically), for he saw chance as an expression of the subconscious 
personality” (214-15). Cage saw chance as an expression of nature and a way to escape 
“the subconscious personality.” Because their signatures are different, their chances are 
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different. If Duchamp’s signature chance is a form of automatic writing that 
reterritorializes everything, Cage sees beyond Duchamp’s chance by looking at it through 
his own signature. Or I might say Cage positions himself within Duchamp’s signature. 
This event begins as a slur on Jackson Pollock:  
Seems Pollock tried to do it—paint on glass. It was in a movie. There was 
an admission of failure. That wasn't the way to proceed. It's not a question 
of doing again what Duchamp already did. We must nowadays 
nevertheless at least be able to look through to what's beyond—as though 
we were in it looking out. (AYFM 71) 
 
As though one were inside a cage looking out: Cage is inside what “Duchamp already 
did.”  
Oddly, Cage repeats the gesture of painting on glass himself, in the act of 
mourning for Duchamp. Following Duchamp’s death, Cage created with Calvin Sumison 
a plexiglass piece with random inscriptions randomly positioned on it and entitled it Not 
Wanting to Say Anything About Marcel. Looking at the piece, one gazes through several 
pieces of plexiglass. How does one read random inscriptions? But beyond the 
inscriptions, this memorial is a wall, a see-through wall—a glass wall, a glas wall, and a 
mourning wall. And now the wall separates Cage and Duchamp. Cage is writing for 
Duchamp, as if he understands Derrida’s calcul of the mother. In the Hegelian scheme of 
marriage, the wife or mother is the survivor who writes the name of the father/husband. 
No doubt there is a lot of Duchamp in the piece, even if it wants to say nothing about 
him. Duchamp’s last piece, the elaborate installation Étant Donnés, includes a landscape 
painting on glass.  Competing signatures overdetermine the process of looking at it. The 
piece has “Marcel” in the title, so it has got half of Duchamp’s proper name 
accompanying it. It is done on plexiglass very like “what Duchamp already did.” But one 
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is also looking out to “what’s beyond” as though one were negotiating an inside/outside 
distinction. It says nothing in its broken, random language, which amounts to a kind of 
Cagean silence. Unlike Pollock, Cage is perfectly happy to meld his signature with 
Duchamp’s. The only anxiety of influence that Cage feels toward Duchamp arises only in 
the second modality of the signature event. Not wanting to repeat Duchamp’s gestures, 
the mourning of traumatic loss reverses the fluency: fluency in and out of the tomb. 
Perhaps Cage’s tears, broken language, falls on the plexiglass the way Pollock let the 
paint fall on the glass: after Duchamp in its deconstruction of vision by means of a glass 
cage, in spite of the chance operations Cage used to construct the piece. 
“I became in my way a duchamp unto myself. I could find as he did for himself 
the space and time of my own experience” (X 53). Cage dramatically names himself “a 
duchamp.” This common noun is a function of Duchamp’s own singular signature 
aesthetic. Whether or not Cage coined the term, “a duchamp,” he gave it a prominent 
place in his texts. In 1962 or ’63, before his close association with Marcel and Teeny 
Duchamp of the mid-60s, he wrote the piece “26 Statements Re Duchamp,” and one of 
the statements is simply, “A duchamp”, unpunctuated. In this antonomasia, the proper 
noun “Duchamp” has become a common noun, a trope worthy of Duchamp himself. As 
Derrida would say, Duchamp loses his name in order to have it monumentalized, 
enshrined in language as its own term, applied not to Duchamp but to anything that 
countersigns for Duchamp. This event can be seen two ways. Has Duchamp 
reterritorialized “nature” or “reality” for himself or in his name, or has he somehow 
gotten “things” to deterritorialize his signature? If the case is both, then there’s a 
teleological trajectory here: Duchamp is the origin and the goal of this interaction 
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between things and language. 
Cage takes a deferential attitude toward Duchamp. To name himself a duchamp 
implies that he has seen himself according to the perspective of Duchamp. But what is 
that perspective? “I could find as he did for himself the space and time of my own 
experience” (X 53). As we have seen in the Pollock quote, “It's not a question of doing 
again what Duchamp already did.” The movement is oedipal on a psychoanalytic plane. 
When he calls himself a duchamp, the patriarchal structure of the language of naming 
positions Cage as Duchamp’s son. The placement of Pollock in the margin repeats the 
stance Cage took toward Varèse. Both Pollock and Varèse function as failed aesthetic 
fathers, Duchamp’s evil doubles: Varèse, who fathered noise into 20th century music, and 
Pollock, head of the Abstract Expressionist school of painting. In the end Cage rejects 
both as phallic superegos, hyperhetero aesthetic fathers. But they function in the double 
structure of the superego. Duchamp is the good cop, Pollack and Varèse as bad cops. 
Both Pollock and Varèse are frozen in the second modality of the signature. There is no 
countersignature. Varèse’s “mannerisms” are second mode signature, not counter-
signature, because those sounds, as Cage says, are not “established in their own right” 
(Silence 69). Pollack’s mature style is also pure idiom. There is no outside in his work. 
The closure of idiom restricts the economy of the signature.  
Duchamp’s signature economy is hyper-Pongian: any thing can come back 
signed, especially things that in their thingness exceed the signature. That is one of 
Ponge’s conditions for counter-signature: “the only texts that I can with dignity accept to 
sign (or counter-sign) are those that could be unsigned altogether” (Signsponge 130). 
These “texts,” (the subjects of his poems) are often objects from nature but not always: 
 
 
 
 146 
Derrida writes, “He often describes the thing, which may be an animal, a human scene, 
an anthropomorphic form when he describes them as themselves scenes of writing or 
signature (Points 367). Duchamp’s signature technique elides the description of the thing 
as a scene of writing. As with Rauschenberg, there remains something of the second 
modality, the treatment of the thing having become an idiomatic mark, but the 
countersignature itself, especially Duchamp’s, has been subjected to “sacred parody,” 
(Geoffrey Hartman’s term for Derrida’s Glas-style).  
Nevertheless, Cage takes off from Duchamp the way Derrida takes off from 
Ponge. Derrida’s focus on Ponge’s “The Swallows” bears an uncanny resemblance to 
Cage’s signature rebus, where he repeats the antonomasia of “duchamp”: I (Cage) am an 
open cage, “For the Birds.” Cage trumps “duchamp” with “cage,” then takes off. “Each 
swallow tirelessly hurls itself—infallibly exercises itself—in the signature, according to 
its species, of the skies” writes Ponge (qtd in Points 376).  
Yet, like Derrida, Cage is careful to separate his enterprise from Duchamp’s, and 
the trace of his signature provides the line out for this departure, what Derrida calls “the 
take off”: Cage could find his own cage, “the space and time of his own experience” (X 
53). Likewise, Derrida is careful to allow the artist, Ponge, his freedom:  
I would say that I take off from Ponge’s proper name: that is why not 
everything comes back to it, that is why I would not want to lead one to 
believe that, by concerning myself with his legal proper name, I tried to 
deduce everything from it. Moreover, in this text I take precautions in this 
regard: it is not at all a matter of deducing everything from the patronymic 
proper name, or even of deducing everything from the signature of the 
proper name. Everything takes off from his proper name, that is, proceeds 
from it, and at the same time takes its distance from it, detaches itself from 
it. And it is this detachment that makes the work in some sense. (Points 
368) 
 
This is very close to Cage’s practice of interpenetration with noninterference. As with 
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Rauschenberg’s paintings, the issue is freedom, that is, confronting the other with the 
same freedom that the artist faced in the process of his work. The decision space must be 
left empty. For Cage this means freedom from the personality of the artist. The artist 
cannot absolutely divorce his personality from his work, but he can leave his work open 
so that it is up to anOther to decide when to come and go, or take off. Cage countersigns 
for Duchamp and Rauschenberg by taking off from their works.  
*                                  *                                  * 
 Cage wrote repeatedly, subtly, and enthusiastically about the signature. He also 
constructed a poetics of signatures. This poetics doesn’t owe much to tradition. Whereas 
Sharon Olds draws heavily on 20th Century poetics, especially the confessional poetics, 
and makes no formal departures from short lyric, Cage diametrically opposes the 
confessional impulse. Not even impersonality, but the erasure of personality as an aspect 
of the text was his stated goal. And to do this, he made formal departures that require 
enormous leaps from readers of poetry. Cage and Olds inhabit opposite ends of the 
poetics universe, working over their own signatures. 
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Chapter 5 
Cage Joins the Wake 
 
It is the control of intention, and its denial of non-intention’s 
existence, that Cage wished to expel from the process of making. 
Control assumes a hierarchical relationship between nature and 
humanity that disallows the presence of what we do not intend. 
(Shultis 33)  
 
Cage’s long poem Writing for the Second Time through Finnegans Wake 
(hereafter W2FW) seems like a trojan horse meant to penetrate the walls of poetics. It 
looks like a poem on the page. But reading it is immediately more difficult than reading 
Finnegans Wake. At one time it might have been called a post-poem. By design, Cage 
wishes to alter the desire of reading and readers, i.e., Cage wanted to free the text from 
Joyce’s intentions, as well as his own (X x). His aim is not to become a reader of Joyce’s 
intentions or of Joyce’s intended meaning, but to make something else again out of 
Finnegans Wake. Reading through the first page of Cage’s poem, the poetic economy 
seems crippled by the lack of grammar (see Figure 1). The protocol seems to have been 
lost. 
 
Protocol: Funeral Arrangements 
 
First time readers will no doubt take quick recourse to Cage’s introduction to the 
poem in Empty Words, which is interesting but provides little help in reading the poem. 
Cage does clarify the poem’s construction—that it consists of a cutting or subset from 
Finnegans Wake, achieved by both a mechanical operation and operations based on taste. 
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For the mechanical operation, Cage follows the letters of Joyce’s name through the text. 
He takes those words which contain the letters: the first word with a “j,” the next word 
with an “a,” the next word with an “m,” and so on, each word anchoring a new verse. To 
complement this operation, by exercising taste, he usually picks some of the intermittent 
words from the Wake to be used as “wing words” of the mesostics: how much play can 
there be in this procedure? Finding the random distribution of the letters in the proper 
name “James Joyce” is a perfectly mechanical operation, so there is no play or looseness, 
other than that of error, in the procedure itself. The play of “chance” has occurred in the 
prior construction of the Wake, and the decision to apply the algorithm opposes the 
“intentions” of Joyce and Cage to the random distribution of the letters of Joyce’s name 
in the Wake. Through the operations based on taste, there is opportunity for subjective 
play in the procedure—this, of course, mixes Cage’s intentions in the process. Although 
limited, this opportunity allows Cage to exercise some traditional “poetics,” by which I 
mean considerations of sound, sense or image. Nevertheless, the overall procedure 
functions to greatly reduce intentional control of the text, both Joyce’s and Cage’s, 
creating a text that questions relations between intention and design throughout the 
intertextual space. 
 
Glasification of Mourners 
 
For readers of the Wake, this interrogation conditions the reading of W2FW. 
Undoubtedly a large percentage of Cage’s audience consists of serious Wake readers. For 
these readers, Cage’s poem can work like a table or an abyss on the text of the Wake, a 
miniature version of the Wake, skeletal perhaps but not key-like or explanatory. It is an 
abyss (in the heraldic sense of the term) in that it looks like a miniature version of the 
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novel that stands on or in front of the Wake but is not the Wake itself. W2FW also works 
 
Figure 1: The first page of Cage's poem as it appears in Empty Words 
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like a signature in that it refers to the Wake but has a much more accelerated, scribbled, 
seemingly illegible quality. Cage has signed the Wake in a peculiar way. While Cage’s 
poem may provide provocative readings and useful insights into the Wake, those readings 
are always accompanied by questions of proximity, raising the issues of mis-reading, 
parasitism, allegory, etc. Any desire to return to the pre-text for certainty or to measure 
the proximity of Cage’s poem to the Wake will ring through these questions. Cage’s 
stated aim is to move beyond the Wake, to move beyond Joyce’s intentions. However, 
readers armed with some understanding of the Wake will be hard pressed not to bring 
their understanding, and its assumptions concerning intentions, to bear on Cage’s poem. 
The text becomes un-locatable, and the scene of reading constantly shifts between the 
poem and the novel, as if one were looking for noon at two o’clock. On its face W2FW is 
a counterfeit and not a very good one. Maybe alarm bells should be pealing. 
This coefficient of uncertainty is even greater for readers who know of the Wake, 
but don’t read it. Without some background, some grasp of the pre-text, the relation 
between the text and the pre-text remains unimproved by reading W2FW. Cage’s text is 
probably freest in this situation: the reader lacks the baggage of intentions that attaches to 
Joyce’s signature and the Wake. And yet Cage’s text is perhaps most haunted by the 
Wake under these conditions since the mystery of its intertextual relations is maximized. 
Cage’s poem is a form of the Wake that lacks the presence of the Wake. The “writing 
through” of Cage’s poem cannot be explored because the Wake itself, the immediate 
textual context of the poem, is, for nonreaders of the Wake, a lacuna. What’s left is a 
tracery of Joyce’s name: it’s like waiting for a funeral to pass at a stoplight, a funeral that 
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includes a train of banners repeating the name of the dead.  
Scoring the Signature 
Furthermore, Cage’s text is not faithfully reproducing the unintentional 
productions of the Wake: the violence of his procedures insures that unintentional as well 
as intentional effects and structures of the Wake are cut away. In part, reading becomes a 
question of the survival of any intended play of meaning, and the effects of this question 
also exist in complimentarity with whatever new effects and meanings accrue from 
Cage’s poem. This cutting and grafting of formal and contentual structures works to 
confuse the signature poetics at stake here, the poetics of the two signatures, Joyce’s and 
Cage’s.  
How can any desired play of meaning survive this mapping from one text to 
another seemingly lesser, secondary, parasitical, even counterfeit text? Cage’s attempt to 
“save” the unintentional Wake amounts to a sacrificial economy. Three parts of the 
sacrifice stand out: 1) some large part of Joyce’s intentions, 2) the material integrity of 
the pre-text, 3) Joyce’s signature itself, the literal signature subscribing the text in 
Derrida’s first modality, now replaced by Cage’s. In return there is a monumentalization 
of Joyce’s name, its erection in the spines of the mesostics. After the sacrificial process, 
what’s left? Are we getting the right words, the good, or the goods, out of the Wake? 
What kind of meaning emerges on attempting to make sense of Cage’s poem? What is 
produced in this sacrificial economy? 
For each of these sacrificial elements there are certain remains. Where Joyce’s 
syntax and the intention therein are lost, we have Cage’s anti-intention. This substitution 
is intentional on Cage’s part. It takes as its object the remains of Joyce’s intention: the 
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hand that grasps that object is Cage’s intentional anti-intention. Next, replacing the 
material integrity of the pre-text, we have the integrity of Cage’s text, again constructed 
or strung together out of remains of Joyce’s text. Third, replacing Joyce’s signature, there 
are its monumental remains mesostically organizing the poem with Cage’s own signature 
authorizing the monument. Cage uses Joyce’s letters to remove Joyce’s intention: it’s a 
double signature; as if Cage is holding Joyce’s hand and guiding another “James Joyce” 
over Joyce’s original signature and all the way through the pre-text, leaving a deep cut 
with the letters JAMES JOYCE furrowed into the text. Any strong reading of the poem 
would have to keep all these productions in mind.  
How does a gift read? How does a monument to a writer offer itself to be read? 
Readers face a sacrificial economy; to whom are the sacrificial gifts, the sacrifices 
themselves, offered? But let me ignore these questions for a moment, and forge ahead as 
if I know how to read this poem on its own terms. 
 
Reading Joyce Cagefree 
Looking at the opening stanza, the first word is “wroth,” wrathful or angry. A 
reader’s frustrations with Cage over this text may verge on wrath. Is something of the 
grotesque at work here? The resistance to syntax which Cage has programmed into his 
methodology makes the opening verse seem freely dissociative in relation to the rest of 
the text—even on repeated rereading: “wroth with twone nathandJoe.” The rest of the 
stanza reads “A / Malt / jhEm / Shen.” “A malt” suggests alcohol. “[J]hEm” suggests 
Joyce’s nickname, Jim, and, thus, himself. “Shen” presents the same kind of difficulties 
“twone” presents. It looks like a portmanteau word combining “she” and “hen” just as 
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“twone” appears to combine “two” and “one.”  “Shen” also happens to begin with a 
capital letter, as if it were a proper name or the beginning of a sentence. But this could be 
chance because a quick scan of the poem (or having read Cage’s remarks on mesostic 
rules) shows that only the letters in the mesostic strings get capitalized; therefore, the 
capitalization of Shen could be mere chance. (As it happens, it is capitalized in the Wake, 
as is Jhem.) 
Setting aside “twone” and “Shen” with their lexical difficulties for the moment, 
the rest of the stanza seems to have to do with anger and drunkenness. Resupplying some 
syntax and tugging on the words a bit gives something like this: 
Angry with Nathan and Joe, a drunken Jim . . . (Shen?). 
 How does the sense of it proceed? Is it merely noise, senselessness manifesting itself as 
such? Cage did say roughly ten years earlier that he had not yet produced noise out of 
language (as if there weren’t plenty there already), as a means of making something 
different out of language (Cage & Charles, 113). Yet, even if it can be thought of as 
noise, we seem to have the beginning of a sentence, which suggests that some sort of 
closure at the level of the sentence may lie ahead.  
Proceeding on the assumption that the second stanza conceals or contains a 
continuation of this sentence, we have these words to work with: “pftJschute / sOlid man 
/ that the humptYhillhead of humself / is at the knoCk out / in thE park.” The wonderful 
word “pftJschute” immediately supplies us with a predicate for the noun “Jim” of the 
previous stanza: Jim shoots. “[S]Olid man” looks like a squinting modifier, apposing 
either Jim or, ironically, the humpty dumpty knocked out in the park. A sentence seems 
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to be latent in the lines: Angry with Nathan and Joe, a drunken Jim shoots Humpty 
Dumpty, the solid man, in the park.  
What has happened? If a reader wants sentence closure out of Cage’s poem, she 
doesn’t have to work too hard to get it. Cage took out Joyce’s syntax, but Cage’s readers 
can put syntax back into the poem. But who authorizes this reading? Only the reader? 
After all the cutting and pruning Cage’s poem carries out on the pre-text, the reader is left 
out on a limb. Returning sentence syntax to the text does not get back to the original 
meaning of the text. If the reader, for whatever reason, wishes to get back to Joyce’s 
intention, then Cage’s poem seems more like marketing: the full version is readily 
available in the handiest copy of the Wake. Staying with Cage’s poem, however, means 
separating oneself textually from Joyce but not completely. There is still plenty of 
Joyce’s signature to be had and plenty of Joyce’s intention with respect to the Wake. 
Plenty, but is it enough? Would intention form a limit of the signature? The boundary 
between Joyce’s signature and Cage’s becomes the hinge of reading.  
 
Joyce-Cage: the JC-effect 
In the introduction to his book X, Cage makes this remark concerning his poems 
constructed out of the Wake:  
Years ago in a review of Silence Alfred Frankenstein wrote that my 
writings were the story of how a change of mind came about. From the 
beginning in the late ‘30s I have been more interested in exemplification 
than in explanation, and so I have more and more written my texts in the 
same way I write my music, and make my prints, through the use of 
chance operations and by taking the asking of questions rather than the 
making of choices as my personal responsibility. Or you might say that I 
am devoted to freeing my writing from my intentions, and so, in those 
cases like the writings through Joyce’s Finnegans Wake and The Cantos 
of Ezra Pound included in this book in which chance plays no part, I 
 
 
 
 156 
merely follow the rolling of a metal ball (the name of the author through 
his work) which serves to free me and the reader not only of my intentions 
but also of those of Joyce and Pound. I am confident, however, and some 
friends support this view, that Joyce would have been delighted by what 
happens when intention is removed from the Wake . . . . (x) 
 
Cage’s last sentence here is unfortunate because it needs to be qualified. He hasn’t 
removed intention from the Wake; he has (intentionally) allowed nonintention to alter the 
text. This operation or economy does not necessarily do away with intention in the text 
even when it removes syntax entirely. It does allow intention and nonintention to 
interpenetrate. Furthermore, it is not quite true that “chance plays no part” in the 
composition of the poem. As I have implied above, the placement of the letters of Joyce’s 
name in the Wake was unintentional, and, hence, by chance. Actually Cage addresses 
this, speaking of a different poem of mesostics on Joyce’s name which he wrote, also cut 
from Finnegans Wake, entitled 7 out of 23: 
In such a case my work was merely to show, by giving it a five-line 
structure, the relation of Joyce’s text to his name, a relationship that was 
surely in these instances not in his mind, though at many points, as 
Adaline Glasheen cheerfully lists, his name was in his mind, alone or in 
combination with another name, for example, “poorjoist” (page 113), and 
“joysis crisis” (page 395). (Empty Words 136) 
 
“Surely” in some sense Joyce wasn’t watching the letters of his name bubble up to the 
surface of his book. Perhaps his perception during the writing process did not form itself 
around the letters as they arrived at the letter of the text. Perhaps he did not identify 
himself with them nor seek refuge in them. But Cage’s qualification, “surely,” points to 
the problem of where to draw the line in this speculation on Joyce’s investment in his 
own name and his signature. The problem of limning this investment is Cage’s also. He’s 
putting his own name “in combination with” Joyce’s. The joist’s in Cage’s poem form a 
cage out of the james and the joyces; on every page the reader is peeping through the bars 
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of james and joyces. How well built is this cage? “Joysis crisis” dovetails neatly with 
John Cage’s initials. And the artist-to-artist relation that Cage’s poem constructs clearly 
plays on the theme of resurrection and crucifixion. The Wake is an allegory of 
resurrection. Cage’s poem would sacrifice Joyce’s intentions and erect a monument out 
of the remains of the Wake. It’s an investment in a sacrificial economy.  
That line of speculation is precisely the moment where Cage goes to work. 
Interpenetration is the key trait or seed that lies immanent in the image of the cage. An 
empty cage with an open door: the cage is there, the new text is there, but it doesn’t 
interfere with the access and egress of Joycean memory. Cage would escape his own 
signature, that is, the strictures inherent in a “personal style.” This image models for his 
intertextual signing practice, i.e., his signature intertextuality, especially the works that 
use earlier texts as compositional matter. In this case, his project releases Joyce’s 
signature from its text-cage—it frees Joyce’s text from his signature. This violent 
monumentality recombines Joyce’s text and aspects of his signature in an arbitrary way. 
While Joyce’s signature goes free, the text-cage that remains is constructed as if Joyce’s 
name were its joists. The text is returned to Joyce’s name, and excessively so, and yet this 
is an unauthorized return. How does this escape the implications of Cage’s Zen 
hendiadys, Interpenetration and Noninterference? 
The return on this speculation could subsidize an analysis of the relative positions 
of the superegos of the two artists. What is the psychological structure of the intertexts in 
their relation to the superegos of the artists and the artist’s superego in general?  
Monumentalization is both celebration and mourning, like a wake. The 
resurrection of the superego in the superegos of those who follow becomes an iteration of 
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the text in Cage’s poem. If we use the idea of the order word as a kind of metric for the 
superego, Cage’s text can produce interesting results for the superego. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s fondness for Cage’s work could probably be indexed by the lack of order 
words in many of Cage’s later works. Of course, that lack of syntactical order tends to 
redistribute the functions of the order word to every word in the text if there are words 
left in the text. This effect combines with Joyce’s own combinatorics to give us a kind of 
molecular reading of Joyce’s text. The word structures are relieved of their syntactical or 
molecular bonds. On the other hand the atomic forces within Joyce’s words, the molar 
forces if you will, the sameness of Joyce’s pun-etics, the adhesion within many of the 
words, becomes stronger.  
The superego can be read, according to Lacan, distributed throughout the 
symbolic order. The Other is distributed throughout the order, in the sense that the 
unconscious is structured not only like a language, but by language wherever it 
congregates topologically. Joyce’s words tend to reseed the symbolic order with new 
order words and anti-order words, and Cage’s poem celebrates that moment making the 
protocols of reading more difficult to unconsciously exercise. This makes the superego of 
reading apparent in the difficulty of reading.  
This interpenetration turns on the relation between syntax and intention. Syntax, 
in its interplay with grammar, may be the strongest way to exert authorial control over the 
meaning of a text—is it the primary vehicle of intention? Syntax certainly regulates the 
acceptable valences of a word. Syntax, as context of a word, privileges certain meanings 
over others. But with a text like the Wake, it would seem that reducing syntax would 
hardly eliminate intention, since the Wake invests so heavily at the level of the word, by 
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virtue of Joyce’s tactical punning. It might be more useful to think of the Wake as a scene 
of resistance between the word and the sentence rather than as a simple opening of the 
word while sentence closure is maintained: or narrative vs. the puncept. Cage’s poem 
redacts the whole scene by getting rid of the syntax. Finnegans Wake is the exemplary 
modernist writerly text, in Barthes’ sense of the term. Cage’s poem amplifies that 
writerliness of the Wake. 
Yet, several key aspects of the Wake remain more or less intact in Cage’s 
redaction. Four signature elements of the Wake appear in the first two stanzas of Cage’s 
poem: detonation of the word, the bawdy, the Fall, and the riddle/mystery. The word 
“pftschute” pretty much entails these four themes: the six consecutive consonants in their 
sibilance sound out the death rattle, whether oral or anal, making a bawdy play on the 
death by falling (Humpty Dumpty) of “humself.” Who is humself? Joyce’s riddling 
remains present. The lack of syntax, although easily remedied, expands the scope of the 
riddle/Wish structure built into the dream style of the Wake, suturing over the syntax of 
the pre-text, producing an even more cryptic condensation of the Wake’s dreamwork. 
Cage’s introduction to his poem also remarks a thematic complex: “The play of 
sex and church and food and drink in an all time all space world turned family was not 
only regaling: it Joyced me” (Empty 136). It was Joyce’s intention to Joyce his readers, 
and Cage’s poem doesn’t relieve the remains of Joyce’s text of this intention. As a reader 
of his own poem, Cage comes to it already Joyced, the process of composition having 
been another joycing. Likewise, readers of the Wake will recognize in W2FW Joyce’s 
wordwork, characterization and characters, plot structures, encyclopedic elements, etc. In 
short, they will recognize the Wake. On the other hand, those who don’t read the Wake 
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will understand that the Wake is the pre-text; they will find plenty of meaning effects to 
attribute to Joyce if they wish.  
At the same time both subsets of readers will be adding a new element to that 
reading: Joyce’s proper name appears vertically roughly 300 times in Cage’s poem. This 
repetition works like a concrete poem. The visual repetition forces a double reading. 
While trying to read what’s left of the Wake, the reader also sees in the text the words 
“James Joyce” being repeated constantly. This visual effect is ‘heard’ in the background 
of the ‘standard’ reading. The effect is something like that of a mantra. It is the sound of 
Joyce’s signature. It is no longer Joyce’s signature, but rather Cage sounding the letters.  
 
Colossal Writing 
What role does this mantra-like concrete structure play in the poem’s economy of 
reading? Visually the presentation is not simply a mantra, but a mantra wrapped in 
cuttings from the pre-text. The name itself gets vertical billing while the terms it “selects” 
from the pre-text, along with the terms Cage elects, get horizontal presentation. This 
fetishization results from a substitution. Syntactical structures are largely removed, and 
instead we are given the “mesostic spine,” “J-A-M-E-S J-O-Y-C-E,” as if the burden of 
meaning, and the work of reading have begun to shift from the horizontal to the vertical 
structure of the text. Working in the absence of syntax, whether that leads to resupplying 
syntax or simply letting other structures of the text center the interpretation, the reader 
must decide how far to go with Cage’s movement from horizontal, sentence-structured 
text to the vertical, repetitive mantra structure. Without syntax and its attendant 
distractions, the reading of the Wake becomes much quieter. It takes a strong 
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determination to stay with Cage’s text, to stay focused on the sounding of the name and 
the adumbration of the Wake.  
Of course, this is a fetishization of the proper name, “James Joyce.” Sacrifice, 
economy of loss, mourning for Joyce/father/superego. Cage has taken on the role of 
Joyce’s mother as per Derrida’s calcul. He is writing the name “James Joyce” on a stele 
erected by gluing up stones of language cut out of the Wake.  
 
Protocol: Forget It 
Thinking musically and according to the puncept of the signature, the letters of 
Joyce’s name have become a key signature, rendering the Wake along the scale j-a-m-e-s-
j-o-y-c-e. The mantra is performed in this key. Every reader will be “Joyced,” if not in 
Cage’s sense of the term, at least graphically by Cage’s visual presentation of the term.  
The economy of this concrete scale will involve readers both more and less 
familiar with the Wake. Cage has programmed the letters “James Joyce” to produce 
nonintentional effects from the Wake. This act is a kind of will-to-power, specifically a 
will-to-forget the original intentions of the Wake. 
One of Derrida’s most interesting themes in Given Time is the problematic 
concept of forgetting. What is it that Heidegger is forgetting when he writes on the es 
geben? Indeed, it goes without saying in Derrida’s text that the antecedent of “es,” “it,” is 
forgotten. The problem of giving, the forgotten origin of “it” and of giving itself, lies at 
the core of the concept of the gift. Derrida anchors his deconstruction of the gift in the 
paradox of the commonsense understanding of it: a gift is free, with no expectation of 
return; otherwise it is not really a gift. But economy, financial, psychological, cultural or 
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otherwise, is always about return law. There is always an expectation of return attached 
to a gift. The other becomes the gifted. Gifts are exchanged. Even friendship or good 
feelings are a form of return. A gift is never completely free.  
When Cage follows a monumental rolling ball through the Wake, there is a lot of 
machinic forgetting going on as if to emphasize the chiasmus of gift and sacrifice. First 
and foremost, much of the pretext is “forgotten,” lost as if part of the theater or eidos of 
the ur-text has vanished. JC’s text is only miming, by silencing the syntax, JJ’s text. This 
problem is already thematic in the Wake, built into the dream movement of the narrative, 
which forgets itself constantly as elements (words, names, events) are constantly 
displaced and condensed. For Derrida, the forgetting involved in the gift is both absolute 
and radical. Carrying out a structural analysis of the concept gift, he sifts through several 
models of both (un)consciousness and of the gift: the perception-consciousness of 
Phenomenology; Freud’s models of the Unconscious, particularly the economy of 
repression; Heidegger’s given as an essential knot in the problem of the gift; and 
anthropology’s theories of gift economies. What gives time and space? Derrida’s analysis 
of the gift takes on a decidedly temporal emphasis throughout, and especially when he 
comes to Heidegger. Derrida comes out of this curve or swerve in his narrative/analysis 
firmly grasping the opening he has found in the forgetting required by the concept of the 
gift (23). For the gift to exist it must be absolutely forgotten, flushed out of the symbolic 
aspects of the psyche, in order that no economy can attach to it. In this respect the 
concept of the gift functions like a wormhole with respect to the time-space of economy: 
for a gift to exist, it must escape any economy. The gift is quite impossible as Derrida 
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shows, and yet this relieves none of its necessity in our thinking. Who could give up the 
idea of the gift? 
Where does the forgetting that is going on in Cage’s poem lie in relation to the 
forgetting Derrida is theorizing? Cage’s poetics is crafted in order to forget Joyce’s 
intention in the Wake. What would this sacrificial event gain us? This forgetting is quite 
impossible anyway, since so much of Joyce’s intention is programmed into the New 
(Joycean) Word. What issues of control are at stake in the antinomy between roots of 
meaning in the (New) Word and roots of meaning in the Sentence? It seems Cage wants 
to add a forgetting to the text of Finnegans Wake, in spite of the preservative or saving 
aspect of his project. Forget syntax: save the text. Or are we looking at a counterfeit? A 
countertext, which preserves much of the textuality of the pretext, especially that 
textuality that survives in the words themselves of FW. On one level the whole thing is 
simply a countersign or password by which Cage addresses other readers of the Wake.  
In Given Time Derrida’s main strategy is to remember the forgetting inherent in 
the gift. But the impossible condition of the gift figures a symmetry with the counterfeit. 
This relationship governs the economy of intertextuality. It might look free, but there are 
always strings attached.  
 
Starting Out From Zero, Again 
The third and fourth stanzas and first verse of the fifth stanza of W2FW drive the 
reader back into the Old Testament as this crude gloss of six of the twelve words shows: 
  Jiccup    Jacob 
  the fAther  Patriarchs, the fathers of Israel 
  hEaven  heaven  
  Judges   Judges, one of the books of the Prophets 
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  deuteronomy  Deuteronomy 
  pentschanJeuchy Pentateuch, the Law or Torah 
 
If the first two stanzas thematize the fall, the next two condense, in the sense of 
dreamwork, the Pentateuch, or “five scrolls,” that comprise the beginning of the Old 
Testament. Stanzas three, four, and five also look forward from the Pentateuch, to Judges, 
a little further into the Old Testament, to heaven, a New Testament idea, and to the 
concept of the future itself, in “watsCh / futurE” of the fourth stanza. This metonymic 
breadth reinforces the alltime-allspace characteristic of the Wake that joyces Cage. 
Readers of the Wake will also recognize in “Jiccup” one of the twins, HCE’s sons, who 
play their role in the “world turned family,” as Cage describes the Wake (136). The 
names “Jacob” and “Esau” occasionally recur in the Wake, stand-ins for Shem and 
Shaun. Cage’s first stanza already evokes this pair in “jhEm” and “Shen.” Thus, in the 
first four stanzas of Cage’s poem, Joycean structure and intention exerts itself in ways 
clearly recognizable to those familiar with the Wake. Readers unfamiliar with the Wake 
will remain free of that Wakean intertextual ballast. They are less likely to escape the Old 
Testament ballast.  
Abrogation of syntax, Cage’s method, foregrounds issues of narrative. Who 
controls the narrative? Plenty remains of the narrating voice(s) from Finnegans Wake. 
Cage’s “voice” is heard in the absent syntax or the music of the Wake that remains after 
the scoring carried out in the poem. Nevertheless, the poem puts narrative under erasure, 
producing a barred form of the text. The narrative has spread out into three scenes: the 
original scene of the ur-text (characterized by Joyce’s syntax), the scene of the poem 
(which lacks syntax), and the scene of reading, wherein the reader may resupply syntax 
and narrative structure in order to read through the bars of Cage’s text. The structure of 
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desire inherent in reading is deconstructed. What is reading in the possible absence of 
narrative? 
Space of the monstrous: Cage’s operation excises ease of narration. Syntax, 
“sintalks,” as Cage quotes Joyce, is the structural glue of narration. In order to say, “this 
happened, then this happened, then this happened,” syntax is required. To suppress 
syntax is monstrous. The monstrous absence of the storyline solicits the reader who must 
trust his own narrating identity alone to (re-)produce narrative. The distance in the gap 
between Joyce/Cage and the reader stretches to an infinity across this loss of connection. 
The story must be retold in the dissonant narrative space of signature jealousy: whose 
signature does the reader most naturally guard? This intertextual scene places three 
signatures most prominently at stake: Joyce’s, Cage’s, and the reader’s. The relative 
trajectories are all clinamens. They will swerve on their own. Joyce’s name comes erect 
in Cage’s poem. But it’s not the only such erection of that name. The monstrous nature of 
the signature also opens the possibility of the gift. That possibility opens like a cage. 
Cage has let Joyce’s text out of the cage of syntax.  
Cage’s gift is the cage: it opens the aporetic space between the idea of gift and 
exchange-economy-return-term-time-metric-capital-etc. This abyss of speculation, into 
which we must plunge, engage, fall, struggle, acts as a cloud chamber of the superego. 
The trails of clouds, traits, traces, and marks record the chaos of movement. The shadow 
of the superego, its evil twin, its obscene discourse of power, is mapped in the Wake and 
in Cage’s poem. The Wake is of course very much an abyss and intertext on the Father 
figure, mapping its relation to and intersection with the artist, using popular culture and 
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history as pre-texts to be exceeded. Its excesses parody itself as a text first—as an attempt 
at history. 
 
The DoubleJoynted JJ 
Trying to read and reread the poem is reduced to searching for the abyss, the 
protocol for reading. For instance one begins to notice that the J words often resonate or 
play on “James Joyce.” One could read through the poem to list the J words with the idea 
of looking for words that Joyce would clearly have associated with or derived from his 
signature. Although Clive Hart’s concordance for the Wake would give us all the words 
beginning with J while the poem does not, the poem does single out some J words which 
have J for a noninitial letter. For examples, there “iJypt” (154) and “interJoked” (163). 
The poem also gives us “J. J.” from page 83 of the Wake (145), as does the concordance, 
but the poem goes a step farther than the concordance in this case, supplying the nearby 
signature pun, “gaY gay” (145). Scanning the J words, it quickly becomes apparent that 
there are more words with J as the initial letter than there are words with j as a noninitial 
letter. The ratio is something like two or three to one. Is that as true of (the) language as it 
is of the poem and, presumably, the novel? The poem also locates some words containing 
two J’s: Japijap (141), Jouejous (143), reJaneyjailey (144), ziJnzijn zijnzijn (145), 
Juicejelly (152), Jigjagged (153), jimjams26 (154), Jogjoy (158), Jumbjubes (160). 
Because these words carry the double J, they would be important for a signature reading 
of JJ.  
                                                
26 Not a spine word, but hard to miss when scanning for JJ words: “black mass of Jigs and jimjams haunted 
by.” 
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But Cage has also joined his signature with Joyce’s. Or at least he found this joynt 
in the Wake, doubling and dublin’ down in the abyss. 
 
Syntax Return 
Rereading the long poem, it also becomes apparent that some of the mesostics 
seem to work better than others. While stanzas (mesostics) three, four, five and six (the 
remainder of poem’s opening page) all sound biblically rooted, and thus unified, all the 
preceding mesostics pale when compared with the first mesostic taken from page 27 of 
the Wake: 
 you were the doubleJoynted  
          jAnitor 
     the Morning 
         thEy were delivered and you’ll be a grandfer 
    when the ritehand Seizes what the lovearm knows 
 
This is a syntactically well-made sentence. Is it a Joycean sentence that has survived the 
Cagean method? Cage chose eighteen of the twenty-three words, the ones not chosen by 
the letters in “James.” Hence, in this mesostic Cage chooses either to maintain or 
construct the syntax. (Read this endnote if you would like this ambiguity resolved now.i 
For the sake of speculation, I withhold the resolution a short time.) Unlike most of the 
mesostics in Cage’s poem, the cadence of this stanza clearly implies sentence structure. 
Order words flow trippingly over the rhythm of the syntax. A narrator speaks directly to 
an addressee. But by the end of the stanza this border of identity is wrestling with itself, 
as the co-figuration of narrator/addressee morphs into the image of copulative or 
masturbatory arm wrestling amid the usual Wakean welter of denotative references. The 
rhythm of Matthew 6: 3 stands out: when giving alms, “let not thy left hand know what 
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thy right hand doeth.” Cage’s/(Joyce’s?) parody loses the personal reference of the 
biblical phrase: “thy” hands have become “the” hands. In this movement from the 
personal to the general the subject of enunciation can be read into the subject of the 
statement: the narrator has become the “ritehand,” and the silent lovearm of the 
“doubleJoynted janitor” may actually belong to the narrator as well. The propriety of 
“rite”-ness (rites, rights, writes) stands in ironic yet complementary contradistinction to 
the bawdy impropriety of the “lovearm’s” private “knowledge.”  
All of which precisely figures the duplicitous structure of the superego. In Freud’s 
late topology (id, ego, superego), the superego comes to be defined as a moral agency 
which judges and censures the ego, as if it were the conscience of the psyche. Ordinarily 
its inception occurs with the interiorization of parental authority. Lacan’s work on this 
heading exposes the darker aspects of this agency. His first major move is to identify the 
superego with the symbolic order as opposed to the imaginary order; it has to do with 
language and speech. In that it has to do with the Law, the superego should be identified 
with the symbolic order itself, since this is for Lacan (following Lévi-Strauss) the 
linguistic order wherein kinship rules and regulations are encoded. As such, the 
superego’s essential structure takes the form of an imperative: the Oedipal prohibition. 
Lacan emphasizes the tyrannical and senseless character of this force, which integrates 
and regulates subjectivity. Senseless: in the gaps of the subject’s knowledge it proceeds 
to command anyway, destructively misinterpreting the Law. The prohibition not to enjoy 
(the pleasure principle) gets inverted. The command of the obscene superego becomes 
“Enjoy!” –as Zizek is constantly pointing out. This command comes from the Other in 
that it comes from the symbolic order. 
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Cage’s doubleJoynted mesostic opens on these aspects of the symbolic order. 
Roland McHugh’s Annotations to Finnegans Wake gives the pun “progenitor” for 
“janitor.”  
Back on the signature edge of this issue is the question of the origin of this syntax; 
is it JJ or JC? And is it JC or JC? Obviously Cage approved it. And obviously it echoes 
the Sermon on the Mount. For the reader the question swerves through the issue to the 
pragmatics of reading. Should she read or at least desire to read Joyce? Or can she read 
without the knowledge of what the lovearm knows. Who is the janitor in this economy of 
delivery and temporal dislocation, moving from past tense to future tense? The censor 
function of the superego of the reader is very much in play and not indistinct from the 
free indirect discourse modeled by the poem as it skips and moves discontinuously along 
the already continuously variable restructuration of discourse within the Wake.  
Surely Cage did not censor Joyce’s syntax in the final verse of the stanza. What a 
coincidence if the abstract machine of Cage’s rolling ball, in all its diagrammatic 
functionality, plops itself right back onto the tracks of Joyce’s syntax for the length of an 
entire mesostic. If this is the case, the name “JAMES” has spelled out the letter of Joyce’s 
syntax. The abstract machine has double bound Joyce’s intentions at both the level of 
syntax and at the level of the word. Both are saved, given back to the reader—with 
Cage’s approval, if not his own act of counterfeiting, in the performance space of the 
wing words.  
The reproductive imagery of the stanza remains silent in the epistemological 
shroud of “what the lovearm knows” which is a password, an unexpected inversion of an 
orderword, to a bi-gendered reading for both hand and lovearm. “Grandfer” puns to grand 
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fur from grandfather—at least. Grandfer could also pass to grandmother by way of the 
genitalic imagery, the fetish fur that might double for the mother’s missing phallus. At 
the same time, staying within Cage’s text means not knowing whether the syntax of the 
stanza originates with Joyce. Let’s leave the cage; it is Joyce’s syntax. This mesostic is 
Joyce’s sentence, missing just two words. By chance.  
 
Conclusion: Rolling Doubles 
 This doubleJoynted mesostic could be the abyss of Cage’s poem. He intentionally 
put it there. It combines the JJ and the JC-effects. Because it is concerned with progeny, 
cleaning (the toilet for the dead? funeral rites?), and grandfathering, it seems to proffer 
some kind of paternal calcul or clacking. Cage’s poem is JJ’s grandson. The ritehand and 
the lovearm could figure for Cage’s seizure of Joyce’s name to write the poem through 
Finnegans Wake. Because Jesus’ text is also in play, we could also read the open crypt, 
stone rolled away. All three signatures will have taken off, through a process of doubling 
after Cage has cleaned up the Joycean crypt. 
                                                
i As it happens Cage is maintaining Joyce’s syntax almost perfectly. Here is Joyce’s 
sentence: “You were the doublejoynted janitor the morning they were delivered and 
you’ll be the grandfer yet entirely when the ritehand seizes what the lovearm knows” 
(Finnegans 27). Cage left out the words “yet entirely.”  
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Appendix: Review of Criticism on Sharon Olds 
 The first general task that seems to have emerged for reviewers in response to 
Olds’ work was to position her vis-à-vis Sylvia Plath. Richard Tillinghast characterizes 
Olds’ style as “powerful documentary” in order to differentiate it from Plath’s genius-
madness: “The father in Plath is essentially a fantasy, the creation of a mind hovering on 
the edge of madness. Olds is, one feels certain, recording an actual story” (362). G. E. 
Murray, reviewing Satan Says, categorizes Olds with Plath and Ai, for the intensity of her 
voice. William Logan places Olds in a category with Anne Sexton, arguing that her 
images are not reconcilable, especially the public-private comparisons, which he judges 
to be asymmetrical. In general, the violence and pain of Olds’ images produce too much 
dramatic extremity. This lack of image modulation keeps Sexton and Olds from 
achieving Plath’s level of artistry.  
Carolyne Wright avoids the Plath comparison in her review of The Dead and the 
Living. She laud’s Olds’ directness, seeing other aspects of what Tillinghast calls the 
“documentary” quality of Olds’ style: “Olds’ confidence in the power of detail, and her 
concomitant refusal to show off verbally, to interpose a display of verbal or prosodic 
pyrotechnics between subject and reader, make for clarity, a style very much at the 
service of the subject” (160). Wright thinks Olds’ style succeeds when it becomes 
“invisible,” and weakens when the descriptive elements become wordy and excessive. 
Unlike Logan, Wright praises Olds’ public-private connection as an essential aim for 
American poetics.  
Diane Wakoski gives a playful analysis of Olds' “documentary” style in her 
review of The Gold Cell, by likening it to National Geographic with it lush photography 
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and subject matter stretching from the esoteric to the quotidian. She adds, “Olds language 
of physical image and metaphor is never illusory (seldom allusive); it is the perfect self-
contained language that the New Critics talked about” (6). However, beneath the 
National Geographic surface, she reads an obsession with destruction and creation, and 
especially the bestial aspects of sexuality. Wakoski assigns guilt as the force of this 
obsession: “In the most traditional sense, this is the poetry of guilt. Guilt for being white, 
for being alive in America, for being well-off, for being a parent, for being happily 
married, for being a successful poet” (6). This guilt includes the guilt for “animal 
hungers,” which manifests itself in the bestiality that runs through Olds’ imagery. “Watch 
out, readers, you may think you’re just opening the pages of a nice middle-class National 
Geographic in . . . the pediatrician’s  . . . office when you crack this book, but unless you 
are a stupid or insensitive reader, you are going to come away with infanticide, incest, 
matricide, rapacious desires for power” (7). For Wakoski, this bestiality “covered over 
with a thick veneer of densely packed language and imagery” characterizes ‘the 
civilization we are, which has come so far and yet will probably will obliterate itself” (7). 
Wakoski’s reading seems fairly accurate to me. I would take it a step farther. There is an 
undefined proximity between the thematic of healing and adjustment and the “Greek 
tragedy of passions” beneath it. In my thesis on Olds, this proximity is governed by the 
fetish logic and its suspension in a Nachträglichkeit effect. Olds documents the primal 
scene: but its description and resolution are not the result. Action in the present is not 
governed by past event, but by a re-imagination of the past. The last line of the signature 
poem “Satan Says” injects the element of love, which was missing or weakened 
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beyond recognition in the primal location of the poem and the dialogue with Satan that 
takes place there. Linda Lancione Moyer says something similar: “Her refusal to bargain 
with the devil, to take the easy way out, her willingness to see clearly yet stay with her 
ambivalence makes her work healing, though often painful to read” (453). 
Terri Brown-Davidson pans Olds for being overwrought and tasteless in The Gold 
Cell. She sees Olds form as having settled into tired formula: Describing “I Go Back to 
May 1937” she writes, “This passage is pure Olds formula: the skinny but irregular 
column, the typical enjambment between article and noun, the overwrought similes 
which never quite work . . . , the relentless parallelism” (6). Olds has confused beautiful 
language (“she can wield a phrase with the best of them”(6); “insisting, at any cost, on . . 
. painterly language” (5)) and formulaic form with real awareness of craft. In addition, 
Olds’ subject matter is questionable, and she “presses far too hard on the image” (5). 
Olds often comes up for this kind of criticism, but it generally isn’t the main argument of 
the criticism. Carolyne Wright notes “a tendency in places to overwrite, to overdescribe 
or explain what would suffice,” and suggests “careful cutting.” William Logan argues 
that Olds’ violent imagery slips over into absurdity, and overdone sexual imagery 
becomes silly.  
Echoing Brown-Davidson on Olds’ lack of taste, Logan also suggests Olds’ intent is 
undercut by “the accretion of aggressive metaphors” which just becomes embarrassing 
(212). Suzanne Matson sees Olds’ “prolific and unapologetic metaphors” as a means of 
story-telling that enables her “to leap across the distance of repressed memory and pain” 
(40). My reading of “What if God” tries to account for the excessive mixed metaphor of 
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that poem. I can understand the desire for more craft, but I think there is room for some 
of the excess, which begins to approach the apocalyptic tone of Schreber. Calvin Bedient 
is less tolerant calling Olds’ fourth book, The Father, “85% rant and 15% wisdom” (170). 
He gives a bit of a Calvinist reading of Olds’ ragged style. He reads “The Lifting” as 
better left unlifted, “the religious sentiment of revelation absurdly out of proportion to the 
sight of a man’s penis—even a father’s” (174). But weak similes, sloppy syntax, and 
comma splices can be somewhat justified: “Olds hooks the reader by seeming to be a 
prose writer who has found herself on a verse treadmill that is racing out of control, one 
who finally pulls fearsome resources out of herself and ends with a bang” (173-4).  
Margaret Diehl and Louise Glück both view Olds as repeating herself; Diehl seems to 
appreciate this, Glück does not. Diehl: “She picks up where Plath left off in “Daddy” and 
goes her one further: where Plath could manage only a few agonized, passionate poems, 
and then killed herself, Olds keeps saying the same thing over and over, seemingly 
without shame. Reading her work over the years has helped me to see my own traumas 
less heatedly, to see them as writable or readable, and so perhaps bearable” (8). Glück: 
“Olds uses her genius for observation to make, repeatedly, the same points, to reach the 
same epiphanies; the energy and diversity of detail play out as stasis” (54). On this 
heading Alicia Ostriker reads the excess of Olds’ style as “mimetic of the procreativity 
Olds identifies with eroticism” (246). Is it the same conception, the same epiphany each 
time? Glück notes the repeated image of the speaker with father in her womb, as if he is 
her child. Perhaps there is something of a calcul of the mother here. It would coincide 
with the actual revelation, this repeated showing of the epiphany. In my introduction 
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and the chapters on Olds, I discuss this Sh-effect at length. Bedient, Logan, and Ostriker 
all seem to be noticing the rushed and accelerated quality of this showing.   
Laura Tanner’s excellent article on The Father isolates this signature effect, the 
slide from Sharon to showing. Tanner’s study recenters the concept of the gaze, which 
has evolved from Laura Mulvey’s seminal article, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema.” Mulvey’s work theorizes the isolation of the viewing subject from the object of 
desire on the screen, pleasure deriving from voyeuristic objectification, usually of a 
woman. Tanner retheorizes the gaze, by placing emphasis more on the confrontation with 
terminal illness and less on the fetishistic structuration of sexual difference. In this 
context the possibilities of the gaze are shown to include very different distributions of 
power. Olds’ poetry of the death-watch models a gaze that actually brings viewing 
subject and object together in authentic connection (via the visceral realization of 
mortality) rather than separating them. Tanner uses Michel Foucault and Anatole Broyard 
to define the medical gaze that ignores the embodied subject in order to make disease 
plainly visible. She theorizes that the medical gaze tends to exaggerate the normal gaze 
when faced with terminal illness: a person with cancer for instance might begin to see 
himself or herself only as an “impending absence.” To describe the gaze of a healthy 
subject on engagement with a dying body, Tanner turns to Julia Kristeva’s concept of the 
abject, with its threat of “death infecting the body.” Kristeva says eroticization of the 
abject is the attempt to stop death. But Tanner’s reading shows Olds doing something 
else: she allows the abject to emerge in the text, refusing Kristeva’s “empowerment of 
extrication.”  She points out that Calvin Bedient misses this entirely in his reading of  
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Olds’ erotics: the constant irruption of the father’s dying body, “swelling, oozing, 
sweating, and bleeding” in Olds’ poems. After documenting Olds’ seeing through to her 
father’s subjectivity, conditioned by his wasting body, Tanner can say, “The body Olds 
rearranges as text is one that she owns exactly because she has owned up to it, one in 
which she can locate her father because she has located herself in it.” 
I’ve given more attention to Tanner’s reading because it seems to me the first 
piece on Olds that depends on and advances psychoanalytically-oriented theory. A critic 
who turns to Olds even more directly from psychoanalytic research, Kay Torney Souter 
presents a reading of “Waste Sonata,” the next to last poem in The Father. Her reading 
comes at the end of an article arguing for consideration of relational psychoanalytic 
models of selfhood because they are more in line with the epistemological assumptions of 
postmodern literary criticism: “The relational psychoanalytic theories operate in the same 
epistemological universe as postmodern literary criticism, congruent with the postmodern 
idea of truth as constructed and relational, and selfhood as shifting, contingent, and 
always-in-process” (347). Souter offers “countertransference” as the demarcation point 
between modern and postmodern psychoanalysis. In the old model analyst and analysand 
remained psychically separate, whereas the theory of countertransference “destabilized 
the idea of the bounded subjectivity for psychoanalysis” (347). 
Rather than “intraself,”  “interself” is the new password for Souter. Lacanian 
theory in particular has become a cul-de-sac: “It has been argued that Lacanian theory 
does not have a meaningful grasp of post-Chomsky linguistics; it tends to come by way 
of second-hand and often tendentious interpretations, and ([she] would argue) it does not  
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have a workable theory of early infancy or of the maternal, except as absence” (350). 
Wilfred Bion, among relational psychoanalysts, offers the workable theory needed, 
according to Souter. Formation of mind is modeled on the idea of links. A child’s 
“normal projective identification” (which Klein mentioned that she found but did not 
theorize (Souter 352)) needs to result in creative exchange with the parent. Otherwise the 
child succumbs to dread of its own rages and terrors. Creative links would return these 
projections in modified “less toxic form” (351). In the absence of such creative links, 
stunted links of cruelty result in “perverse, cruel, and sterile” mental processes (352). 
This inter-relational theory sounds made to order for reading Olds. 
Reading “Waste Sonata,” Souter begins by noting the movement between 
“civilized comment and the voice of pop culture” that “enacts the boundarylessness of the 
postmodern” (354). I would have remarked this quality as modernist “stream of 
consciousness”: but Souter has allowed herself this flexibility by arguing that postmodern 
psychoanalysis remains in dialogue with modernist versions of itself (348). Playing on 
the “voice of pop culture,” she compares Olds’ father to Homer Simpson, and, accurately 
I think, holds that the poem is usefully compared to The Simpsons for “the depthlessness 
of suburban life, the clichés and resentments which order relationships, and so on” (354). 
The rest of her reading does an admirable job of applying the interpersonal psychology to 
the poem, showing the speaker suspended between the cruel mother and the father, 
absent-by-alcohol. Souter matches up the projective links with the voices of the “warring 
parts of the self”: the opening sentence of the poem projects both careful adult (“I think at 
some point”) and “the witheringly mimetic vindictiveness of the adolescent (‘He’s full of  
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shit’)” (355). Souter’s next move is remarkable to me for the way it illustrates the 
countertransference that she earlier argued differentiates postmodern from modern 
psychoanalysis. Souter, like many other critics begins to channel Oldsian signature 
effects: “The poem returns to a muted sense of sanity when the protagonist miraculously 
moves to consider her own cruelty and shittiness, her own involvement in the family 
interactions” (my emphasis) (355). Olds uses some form of the word “shit” seven times 
in the poem, and the effect spreads via “waste,” “coprofy,” and “white stink.” All the 
relational links Souter reads are traced by the word. And the passage where she reads 
sanity arising in the voice of the speaker is doubly remarkable:  
Well it’s fun talking about this, 
I love the terms of foulness. I have learned 
to get pleasure from speaking of pain. 
But to die like this. To grow old and die 
a child, lying to herself. 
 
Olds writes reflexively here about the term of foulness that runs throughout this poem. It 
is an Sh-effect. In this passage it combines with an antonomasia—Olds/old. Souter ties 
the passage to Shakespeare: “When the poem drops into “But to die,” with its echoes of 
Measure for Measure (Claudio, III i, “Aye, but to die, and go we know not where . . .”), 
she has rescued an identity which is made of more than projected parental parts” (356). 
Olds also does this on the level of the Sh-effect. The last sh-word in the poem is 
“shapely”—the poem ends this way:  
I almost love those shits that move through him,  
shapely, those waste foetuses,  
my mother, my sister, my brother, and me 
in that purgatory.  (The Father 77) 
 
Souter quotes the last two lines to buttress her argument that the speaker has moved  
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“from mindless reactive splitting to something like a Kleinian depressive position” (356). 
Olds has her signature working overtime in this poem; it seems apparent that it is the glue 
that holds her poetics together against the “mindless reactive splitting.”  
 To finish her article, Souter quotes Peter Fonagy to bring the aims of 
psychoanalysis and literary studies into line: “An analysis of ‘Waste Sonata’ shows the 
protagonist (and maybe the reader too) that ‘gradual transformation of a non-reflective 
mode of experiencing the internal world’ and the text” (357). I think something similar 
can be said in terms of the signature and the relations it draws between the text and the 
proper name. Olds is a writer who has become very reflective in the way she connects her 
poetics to her name. In The New York Times Book Review she gives this quote to justify 
her choice of Stanly Kunitz’s book Next-To-Last-Things as the most important book of 
poetry to her personally over the last 25 years: 
. . . The way I look 
at it, I’m passing through a phase: 
gradually I’m changing to a word. 
Whatever you choose to claim  
of me is always yours: 
nothing is truly mine 
except my name. I only 
borrowed this dust.  (“Poetry” 15) 
 
 To close this review of Olds’ criticism, I want to very quickly mark a few more 
instances of Olds’ signature effects coming through in the works of her readers. William 
Logan, as I’ve discussed above, argues that Olds’ imagery is too violent. About Satan 
Says he remarks its bloodiness:  
Like any pure fiancée, Olds has passed the blood test (“mask of 
blood,” “streaked with blood,” “blood bond,” “blood-spattered,” “blood-
red,” blood bomb,” “language of blood,” “blood culture,” “raised on  
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blood,” “glaze of blood,” “hard blood”) . . . .  (213). 
 
Olds’ later volumes continue this frequent deployment of “blood” with its hypogram of 
“old.” Brian Dillon traces the image of her father coming home wearing a mask of blood 
through her first 3 books. Although never explained, it recurs as an image that haunts 
Olds’ speakers. He also notes that “The Departure” (in The Dead and the Living) 
compares the father to the Shah of Iran. The quote Dillon uses is very telling of the 
signature: “Did you forget / the way you had had me tied to a chair, as / he forgot the 
ones strapped to the grille / in his name? (my emphasis) (Dillon 112). Olds reinforces this 
Sh-effect, the Shah, in another poem from The Dead and the Living, “Aesthetics of the 
Shah.” The poem is about a showing as the title note indicates: “(The poster, up all over 
town, shows / dissidents about to be executed in Iran)” (12). Carolyne Wright’s reading 
of this poem turns on the photographic quality of Olds’ showing, justifying her use of the 
political—“her attitude emerges from and is justified by the patent horror or pathos of 
what she shows us” (159).   
 Calvin Bedient, perhaps unknowingly, remarks a play on the Oldsmobile. 
Beginning his reading of The Father he describes Olds as “a cannibal who will eat [her 
father’s] ashes (‘There are people who will swallow whole / cars, piece by piece’—‘The 
Urn’)” (169). Carolyne Wright likens the first half of The Dead and the Living to “a 
gallery of Old Master family portraits darkening with age” (152). I suspect this is tongue-
in-cheek. Effects similar to these seem to pop up quite often in the criticism. Whether this 
is a result of Olds having programmed them into her writing or whether a given critic is 
intentionally playing with her name is often hard to tell. Maybe this indicates something   
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about the power of the name and the degree to which Olds has managed to harness that 
power. 
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